![Mr Joshua Thorpe Mr Joshua Thorpe](/img/200x200/staffpages/assets/images/default-profile-picture.jpg)
Research Fellow
- About
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- School/Department
- School of Divinity, History, Philosophy & Art History
- Research
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Research Overview
I am Joshua Rowan Thorpe, a philosopher, and a Postdoctoral Research Fellow on the Digital Knowledge project hosted by the University of Glasgow and the University of Aberdeen.
My main research area is epistemology, but I also work on philosophy of mind, philosophy of language, and ethics.
More information on my webpage: https://www.joshuarowanthorpe.com/
Research Areas
Philosophy
Research Specialisms
- Epistemology
Our research specialisms are based on the Higher Education Classification of Subjects (HECoS) which is HESA open data, published under the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International licence.
Current Research
Digital knowledge. In 2023 I became a postdoc on the AHRC funded Digital Knowledge research project, which applies the tools of epistemology to solve the practical and theoretical challenges of knowledge in the digital age. My work for this project has focused on threats to knowledge that arise in the online environment. In particular, I am interested in the phenomenon of online knowledge defeat, and in online conspiracy theories.
- Publications
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Page 1 of 1 Results 1 to 7 of 7
Putnam's Proof Revisited
Engaging Putnam. Conant, J., Chakraborty, S. (eds.). de Gruyter, pp. 63-88, 25 pagesChapters in Books, Reports and Conference Proceedings: Chapters- [ONLINE] DOI: https://doi.org/10.1515/9783110769210
Merely superficially contingent a priori knowledge and the McKinsey paradox
Synthese, vol. 200, no. 1, 38Contributions to Journals: ArticlesExternal World Scepticism and Self Scepticism
Philosophical StudiesContributions to Journals: Articles- [ONLINE] DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-022-01910-6
Radical interpretation, scepticism, and the possibility of shared error
Synthese, vol. 196, pp. 3355-3368Contributions to Journals: ArticlesSemantic self-knowledge and the vat argument
Philosophical Studies, vol. 176, pp. 2289-2306Contributions to Journals: ArticlesButton, T., The Limits of Realism, Oxford, Oxford University Press 2013
Argumenta, vol. 3, no. 2, pp. 381-393Contributions to Journals: Review articlesClosure Scepticism and The Vat Argument
Mind, vol. 127, no. 507, pp. 667-690Contributions to Journals: Articles- [ONLINE] DOI: https://doi.org/10.1093/mind/fzw035
- [ONLINE] http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/mind/fzw035