Below is a new blog post by Dr Manu Lekunze first published on LSE blogs.
What African history can tell us about US objectives in its war with Iran
Since the US and Israel began military strikes against Iran at the end of February, the campaign’s objectives have been unclear. Manu Lekunze writes that looking to the history of Western powers’ attempts to control West and Central African governments, such as the Congo during the Cold War, can give some clues as to US objectives in Iran. Ultimately the US aims to force Iran to “make a deal” so that it can dictate the country’s foreign policy to the US’ advantage.
What is the main US foreign policy goal in the war with Iran? On 28 February, many woke up to news of the United States and Israel’s aerial bombardment of Iran. Since then, the United States and Israel, on one side, and Iran on the other, have been engaged in a fierce conflict. However, several commentators have struggled to identify the main US foreign policy objective in the war. For example, Sir Lawrence Freedman, a prominent British strategist, described it as a war seeking a strategic end or a political goal.
Drawing on the history of external great power behaviour in Africa, I argue that the main US foreign policy goal in the war is strategic government capture. This means that the US and Israel have designed the campaign to weaken the Iranian government’s capacity to pursue an independent adversarial foreign policy. They aim to install a governing system in Iran that defers to the United States on important geopolitical issues.
Far from being a war seeking a strategic objective, US behaviour in Iran, as in Venezuela, is consistent with how great powers act in the Global South (known in the past as the “Third” or “Fourth” world) during periods of great power competition.
As seen in previous periods of great power competition, the United States is unlikely to achieve strategic government capture in one swift campaign. Attacks on Iran are likely to continue until the United States achieves its objective or accepts defeat. Strategic government capture campaigns and counter-capture movements would become a more enduring feature of international politics.
Strategic government capture as an instrument of foreign policy
Strategic realism, a theory that I have adapted in previous work, views strategic government capture in international politics as a foreign policy in which a great power, rather than pursuing its interests through normal diplomacy, seeks to exert significant control over a country’s government, often through coercive means. It is a more comprehensive form of influence in which the entire governance system is realigned to serve the external great power’s long-term strategic needs.
The great power exerts significant influence over the government of the captured state to the point where, on important issues, the latter defers to the former. Neocolonialism is an extreme form of strategic government capture. Although a neocolonial state retains the appearance of separate statehood, it lacks foreign policy independence.
Great powers often achieve and maintain a strategic government capture policy through a variety of approaches, including war. However, most strategic government capture methods target a government’s capacity to grow or translate its latent power into real military power that can support an independent foreign policy.
Strategic government capture differs from traditional colonialism in that it allows the local elite significant freedom in domestic politics. The captured elite can also enjoy a degree of agency in foreign policy. However, they must defer to or align with the great power on more serious geopolitical issues.
Lessons from African history
The case of the United States and its Western allies in the Congo during the Cold War’s bipolar great power competition is a good example of strategic government capture. Through a military coup in 1960, the United States installed a native regime led by a CIA asset, Joseph-Désiré Mobutu, in Kinshasa to carry out its will. The imposition of the Mobutu regime resulted in the death of Patrice Lumumba, the more independent-minded Congolese nationalist.
The Mobutu regime enjoyed great freedom in domestic politics and even a degree of agency in foreign policy. However, when it came to issues that could affect the delicate balance of power between the United States and the Soviet Union, Mobutu aligned with the former. For example, at a time when uranium was not known to be widely available and the nuclear taboo was not yet so strong, the Congo deferred to the United States on issues such as who could access its uranium deposits.
Looking further back, during the multipolar great power competition in Europe, beginning in the second half of the 19th century, the behaviour of France and the United Kingdom in West Africa evidences the use of strategic government capture by great powers. Although generally described as traditional colonialism, in the interior of West Africa, Britain and France primarily employed strategic government capture.
Through wars in the late 19th and early 20th centuries, the great powers compelled weakened West African elites to sign “treaties of protection”. The conquest wars were followed by several “imperial policing wars” to establish and maintain strategic government capture.
However, at the time, the great powers lacked the physical infrastructure, knowledge, and technology to effectively control countries in West Africa’s interior. To govern the captured territories, they collaborated with the local elite through forms of “indirect rule”, which allowed the African elite some freedom in domestic politics. Over time, using “colonial programming” (sophisticated psychological manipulation and physical violence), the great powers degraded the captured elite’s capacity to resist the will of the metropole, especially on international political issues, thereby creating strategic government capture relationships.
The US’ objective of strategic government capture in Iran
Applying this understanding of strategic government capture, it is clear that the ultimate foreign policy goal of the United States in the war in Iran is strategic government capture. Strategic realism predicts that, as a latent great power with strong prospects for regional hegemony, Iran suffers the tragedy of latent great powers. This means This means that because all states dislike there being a regional hegemon, and regional hegemons do not tolerate the emergence of another regional hegemon, the United States, the only regional hegemon in the world, is bound to seek to degrade Iran’s ability to convert its latent power. This ensures that Iran lacks the ability to develop real great military power that can support regional hegemony in the Middle East.
Iran is a latent regional hegemon because it has the largest population in the Middle East. With its abundant hydrocarbon wealth and a large, vibrant population, Iran could grow to become the wealthiest nation in the region. Although composed of several ethnic groups, it has a core nation large enough to sustain a formidable sense of Iranian nationalism. Moreover, its physical geography provides excellent natural defence against external invaders. These are all crucial ingredients of military power, the primary variable in determining national power.
As such, unlike the Obama administration, which opted for normal diplomacy through the negotiation of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), the Trump administration is pursuing strategic government capture as its main instrument of foreign policy in US-Iran relations.
Degrading the Iranian government until it makes a deal with Trump
Donald Trump has stated he wanted to pick the supreme leader of Iran. This is similar to what the United States achieved in Venezuela. As it replaced Lumumba with Mobutu in Congo, the United States has replaced Nicholas Maduro, a more independent-minded Venezuelan nationalist, with Delcy Rodríguez, who is more subservient to US interests. In Iran, the United States can kill independent-minded Iranian nationalist leaders until it can install a leader who is more amenable to US interests.
Inferring from military activities in Iran and open statements from both governments, the United States and Israel are degrading the Iranian government’s ability to govern independently to compel the elite to “make a deal” – sign a treaty of protection similar to 19th century West African elite.
If the Iranians do “make a deal” then over time, they would be socialised into a situation where the United States dictates important Iranian foreign policy positions, especially regarding oil, relations with Israel, nuclear weapons, future rearmament approach and the balance of power in the Middle East. The United States would also reshape Iran’s orientation in the three-way great power competition involving China and Russia.
Looking forward
Considering how strategic state capture evolved in West African history, it seems likely that normal diplomacy in US-Iranian relations will take a back seat for many years. Efforts to establish and maintain a strategic government capture relationship would define the US approach to Iran in the long term.
It would involve more kinetic US strategic government capture campaigns and Iranian resistance campaigns. As already seen in this war and the 12-day War in June 2025, as in the recurring wars of conquest and imperial policing in West Africa, attacks on Iran are likely to recur several times before the United States achieves its strategic objectives or accepts defeat.
It is important to note that nationalism is the strongest ideology on earth. As seen in the briefness of strategic government capture in West Africa, obvious external interference stirs nationalism, and nationalism often prevails.
Moreover, in multipolar great-power competition, other great powers, such as China and Russia, can provide Iran with counter-capture resources to thwart US ambitions. There are already reports of Russian and, possibly, Chinese intelligence sharing with Iran as a counter-capture resource.
Strategic government capture interests are here to stay
US rhetoric and military activities in Iran are consistent with a great power pursuing strategic government capture to further its foreign policy. The war in Iran already shows that the strategic government capture interests of great powers and the resistance strategies of small and minor powers will be a durable feature of international politics in the foreseeable future. States must prepare, depending on their interests and share of global power, to execute, resist, or confront others’ strategic government capture campaigns.