Bidding behaviour in asymmetric first-price auctions
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This is a past event
Bidding behaviour in asymmetric first-price auctions
Abstract:
We report on a laboratory experiment on first-price private-values auctions with two bidders, where the values of the bidders are independent but come from different value distributions.
Our design takes advantage of a recent theoretical result by Kaplan and Zamir which identifies such environments which retain some of the ``nice'' properties of the symmetric case. We systematically manipulate the degree of asymmetry between the bidders.
We find that when asymmetry is large, bidders in the strong role become much less responsive to their realized private value than any expected-earnings maximising model can (reasonably) predict.
- Speaker
- Dr Theodore L Turocy, Director, Centre forBehavioural and Experimental Social Science School of Economics UoEast Anglia
- Hosted by
- Prof. Miguel Costa-Gomes
- Venue
- Room S86, Edward Wright Building