Interplay of European, National and Regional Identities:
Nations between States along the New Eastern Borders of the European Union

Series of project research reports

Contextual and empirical reports on ethnic minorities in Central and Eastern Europe

Belarus
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Research Report #16

Immigrants from East Central Europe and post-Soviet countries in Germany

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enri-east.net

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About the ENRI-East research project (www.enri-east.net)

The Interplay of European, National and Regional Identities:
Nations between states along the new eastern borders of the European Union (ENRI-East)

ENRI-East is a research project implemented in 2008-2011 and primarily funded by the European Commission under the Seventh Framework Program. This international and inter-disciplinary study is aimed at a deeper understanding of the ways in which the modern European identities and regional cultures are formed and inter-communicated in the Eastern part of the European continent.

ENRI-East is a response to the shortcomings of previous research: it is the first large-scale comparative project which uses a sophisticated toolkit of various empirical methods and is based on a process-oriented theoretical approach which places empirical research into a broader historical framework.

The distinct ethno-national diversity in this region, along with the problems resulting from it was generated by dramatic shifts of borders, populations and political affiliation which have continued until today. The prevailing pattern of political geography of this part of Europe was the emergence and the dismemberment of empires, a process which created ethno-national enclaves within the boundaries of new nation states. These minorities were frequently drawn into interstate conflicts and subjected to repression, ethnic cleansing and expulsion. The subjects of interests were ethnic minorities in the supra-region “Wider Eastern Europe”, i.e. the region between the Baltic Sea and the Black Sea, along the current geo-political “East-West” division line. Estimated 8 to 10 millions of people are affected by “ethnic splits” or minority groups, whose ethnic compatriots would constitute a titular majority in another country, some of them even on each side of this contemporary geopolitical east-west diving border line.

The complex ENRI-East study was designed as a comprehensive set of theoretical, methodological, empirical and comparative work streams exploring the interplay of identities among the twelve ethnic minorities in the supra-region of Central and Easter Europe. These ethnic groups are: Russians in Latvia and Lithuania, Belarusians and Ukrainians in Poland, Slovaks in Hungary, Hungarians in Slovakia and in Ukraine, Poles in Ukraine, in Belarus and in Lithuania, Belarusians in Lithuania as well as Lithuanians in Russia (Kaliningrad oblast). The project includes also a case study of Germany, where our target groups were the ethnic Germans returning to their historical homeland after the centuries of living in other European countries as well as Jewish immigrants (so called “quota refugees” who had moved to the country since 1989).

ENRI-East addresses four general research themes. The first one deals with the interplay of identities and cultures by comparing ‘mother nations’ and their ‘residual groups abroad’. The second theme is a cross-cutting approach which addresses the nations and the states: more exactly, the attitudes and policies of ‘mother nations’ and ‘host nations’ toward the ‘residual groups’ and vice versa. The third research theme comprise the reality of self organization and representation of “residual groups abroad” (ethnic minorities) along the East European borderland. Finally, the last research theme of the project deals with path dependencies, historical memories, present status and expected dynamics of divided nations in Eastern Europe.

The empirical data base for ENRI-East was generated through 5 sub-studies implemented in all or several project countries:

- ENRI-VIS (Values and Identities Survey): face-to-face formalized interviews with members of 12 ethnic minority groups in eight countries, 6,800 respondents;
- ENRI-BIO: qualitative, biographical in-depth interviews with members of 12 ethnic minority groups in eight countries (144 interviews);
- ENRI-EXI: semi-structured expert interviews with governmental and non-governmental representatives of ethnic minority groups in eight countries (48 interviews);
- ENRI-BLOG: online content analysis of weblogs and Internet periodicals run or maintained by ethnic minority group members;
- ENRI-MUSIC: special study on cultural identities and music; an innovative, multi-disciplinary pilot effort in Hungary and Lithuania.
Main outcomes of the ENRI-East research program are summarized in the series of research papers and project reports as outlined below. The whole collection of papers will be publicly available on the project web-site by December 2011, while some papers can be accessed since September 2011.

Individual papers are written by ENRI-East experts from all project teams and the whole series is edited by the Coordinating Team at the CEASS-Center at the Institute for Advanced Studies under the guidance of the Principal Investigator Prof. Hans-Georg Heinrich and Project Coordinator Dr. Alexander Chvorostov.

Summarizing and generalizing reports

1. Theoretical and methodological backgrounds for the studies of European, national and regional identities of ethnic minorities in European borderlands (Edited by Prof. Claire Wallace and Dr. Natalia Patsiurko)
2. Interplay of European, National and Regional Identities among the ethnic minorities in Central and Eastern Europe (main results of ENRI-East empirical program) (Edited by Prof. Hans-Georg Heinrich and Dr. Alexander Chvorostov)
3. ENRI-East Thematic Comparative papers and synopsizes of authored articles of ENRI-East experts (9 tender papers and further bibliography of project-related publications)

Contextual and empirical reports on ethnic minorities in Central and Eastern Europe:
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4. The Polish Minority in Belarus
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12. The Lithuanian Minority in Russia (Kaliningrad oblast)
13. The Hungarian Minority in Slovakia
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Series of empirical survey reports:

17. ENRI-VIS: Values and Identities Survey
   o Methodology and implementation of ENRI-VIS (Technical report)
   o ENRI-VIS Reference book (major cross-tabulations and coding details)
18. Qualitative sub-studies of ENRI-East project (methodological and technical reports)
   o Methodological report on Biographical Interviews (ENRI-BIO)
   o Methodological report on Expert Interviews and data base description (ENRI-EXI)
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   o Methodological report and main findings of the Pilot study of web-spaces (ENRI-BLOG)

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# TABLE OF CONTENTS

## EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

1.1 Abstract .............................................................................................................. 7
1.2 Summary of the study ......................................................................................... 7
1.3 Summary of practical implications .................................................................... 10

## 1 INTRODUCTION

## 2 ETHNIC GERMAN IMMIGRANTS IN GERMANY

2.1 Historical overview ........................................................................................... 13
2.2 Admission regulations ....................................................................................... 18
2.3 Demographic and social characteristics ............................................................ 19
2.4 Economic integration ......................................................................................... 22
2.5 Social integration ............................................................................................... 23
2.6 Ethnic German networks .................................................................................... 25

## 3 JEWISH QUOTA REFUGEES

3.1 Historical overview ........................................................................................... 27
3.2 Admission regulations ....................................................................................... 29
3.3 Demographic and social characteristics ............................................................ 29
3.4 Economic Integration ......................................................................................... 31
3.5 Social Integration ............................................................................................... 31
3.6 Jewish Quota Refugee Networks ........................................................................ 32
# NEW IMMIGRANT POPULATIONS FROM EAST CENTRAL EUROPE AND POST-SOVIET COUNTRIES IN GERMANY

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>4.1 Asylum movements</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.2 Labor, student and family related migration</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.3 Foreign citizens and persons with migration background from East Central Europe and post-Soviet states in Germany</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

# IDENTITY FORMATION AND INTEGRATION PROSPECTS OF ETHNIC GERMAN AND JEWISH IMMIGRANTS FROM POST-SOVIET COUNTRIES IN GERMANY: FINDINGS FROM EXPERT INTERVIEWS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>5.1 Description of expert interviews</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.2 The purpose of experts' organizations</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.3 Identity formation</td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.4 Integration prospects: The role of language competence</td>
<td>52</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

# SUMMARY AND PRACTICAL IMPLICATIONS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>56</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

# REFERENCES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>59</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

# ABOUT THE AUTHOR

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>64</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

1.1 Abstract

This report analyzes the migration experience and integration prospects of immigrant populations from East Central Europe and post-Soviet countries in Germany. According to their background and admission status these immigrant groups are highly diverse. They include ethnic Germans, Jewish quota refugees, asylum seekers, students, labor and family related migrants. While ethnic Germans and Jewish quota refugees were accepted on the base of ethnic, political and humanitarian criteria, other immigrants from East Central Europe and post-Soviet countries passed through the general immigration procedure. Meanwhile, immigrants from East Central Europe and post-Soviet countries are an important group in Germany. In 2010, every fourth person with migration background was rooted in East Central Europe and the former Soviet Union. Besides many differences with respect to their status, economic, social and home country background, immigrants from these regions share a number of integration problems. The report showed that the unemployment rate of immigrants from East Central Europe and post-Soviet countries was higher and the earnings positions were lower than that of comparative natives. Often immigrants from these regions worked below their skill level. In the context of social integration the occasional development of migrant enclaves was observed, particularly among ethnic Germans from post-Soviet countries. These integration frictions in the economic and social field were primarily related to German language deficits and problems of human capital transferability. Furthermore, on the side of the native population elements of social closure towards immigrants from East Central Europe and the former Soviet Union were noticed. This calls for advanced and concerted integration efforts by governmental institutions, private initiatives and representatives of various immigrants’ organizations.

1.2 Summary of the study

In the European Union, Germany hosts the greatest number of people with migration background, coming from East Central Europe and post-Soviet countries. This was the result of various immigration waves since the early 1950s, including the return of ethnic Germans, the admission of Jewish quota refugees and the immigration of asylum seekers, students, labor and family related migrants. While ethnic Germans and Jewish quota refugees were accepted on the base of ethnic, political and humanitarian criteria, other immigrants from East Central Europe and post-Soviet countries passed through the general immigration procedure. The inflow of ethnic Germans began in the 1950s and accelerated as a result of the political transformation in East Central Europe and the break-up of the Soviet Union. Between 1991 and 2010 approximately 2.2 million ethnic Germans moved to Germany, more than 90 percent came from post-Soviet Union countries. Due to various legal restrictions the immigration of ethnic Germans from the successor states of the Soviet Union declined since 2005. This was also observed in the case of Jewish quota refugees whose immigration to Germany included approximately 231,000 persons between 1991 and 2010. Since the end of the 1980s a growing inflow of immigrants from East Central Europe and post-Soviet countries to Germany has taken place that was not directly related to the admission of ethnic Germans and Jewish quota refugees. Initially asylum seekers formed the majority of these immigrants. But with the enlargement of the European Union asylum migration from the new East European members to Germany ceased to exist, while asylum migration from post-Soviet states continued on a lower level. Instead, labor, family related and student migration gained in importance.
As a result of the overall immigration from East Central Europe and the former Soviet Union 813,000 citizens from East Central European countries and 497,000 citizens from post-Soviet states lived in Germany in the year 2010. They accounted for nearly one fifth (19 percent) of all foreign citizens. As a matter of fact, citizens from East Central Europe and the former Soviet Union are the fastest growing foreign population group in Germany in the recent two decades. Among persons with migration background, who include ethnic German immigrants and naturalized foreigners, every fourth immigrant comes from East Central Europe and the former Soviet Union. While the most prominent home country for persons with a migration background is Turkey, Poland is second and Russia third.

Until the end of the 1980s the integration of ethnic Germans in Germany was considered a success story. In later years, ethnic Germans experienced substantial integration problems that were typical for immigrants from transition societies. Although ethnic Germans were in general better educated than labor migrants and their descendants who came in the 1960s and 1970s to Germany, they had difficulties in transferring their human capital to the German labor market. As for other immigrant groups, the labor market integration of ethnic Germans depended on German language proficiency, qualifications and professional experience. Professions with different profiles in market and transition economies, for example jobs in administration, trade, banking, technology or education, denoted a special employment risk. Because the German language competence of ethnic Germans was low and their qualifications did not fit the German labor market, their unemployment risk is higher and their earnings positions are lower than that of comparative native Germans. With respect to social integration, a lack of socio-structural adaptation was observed for ethnic German immigrants since the beginning of the 1990s. A growing spatial segregation was accompanied by the tendency to withdraw from German institutions and neighborhoods, particularly in the younger generation. Although the inflow of ethnic Germans from the former Soviet Union decreased since 2005, Russian speaking Aussiedler communities developed. In these communities major elements of social and cultural activities practiced in former home countries were retained.

Although Jewish quota refugees differed significantly from ethnic Germans with respect to their social background and education, they show some similarities regarding their economic and social integration in Germany. Their educational attainment and their professional experience are often incompatible with the German labor market and their German language competence is low. This lead to an unemployment rate above the national average and forced many Jewish quota refugees to work in lower-skilled professions than they had been trained for. The integration of Jewish immigrants into German neighborhoods or institutions is rather limited. Most Jewish immigrants base their social relations on family and friendship networks which rely on connections built up in their former home countries. Jewish communities in Germany played a key role in supporting the integration of Jewish newcomers. But the more secular practices and the post-Soviet cultural background and education of Jewish immigrants contributed to a diversification of Jewish Communities in Germany. Nevertheless, the immigration of Jews from the former Soviet Union turned Germany into the only country in Europe with an expanding Jewish population.

Besides ethnic Germans and Jewish quota refugees a new immigration population from East Central Europe and post-Soviet countries established in Germany since the end of the 1980s, initially on the part of asylum seekers and subsequently in relation to labor, family related and student migration. Because of the enlargements of the European Union, labor immigration from EU-8 countries became easier and is no longer restricted since May 2011. Against this backdrop,
Polish citizens outnumbered traditional immigration groups in Germany. In 2010, they ranked third among the foreign population, after the Turkish and Italian communities. Immigrant populations from Romania and Bulgaria also experienced a remarkable growth. Nevertheless, this has not manifested in the formation of minority enclaves or in the organization of East Central European citizens in cultural or political terms. The analysis of the economic integration of this group reveals a number of deficits. Although the labor force participation of immigrants from EU-8 countries is higher than that of immigrants from non-EU states, it is significantly lower than that of native Germans. Moreover, unemployment rates among migrants from EU-8 states in Germany are substantially higher than among Germans. This reflects their sectoral employment structure, i.e. their above-average occupation in agriculture, construction and services and their higher occupation in low skilled jobs.

In the framework of the ENRI-East project, identity formation of ethnic German and Jewish immigrants from post-Soviet states was studied by means of expert interviews. Group identity is typically constituted as a sense of belonging to a distinct group based on shared characteristics such as language, history, culture and values. This translates into cultural differentiation in comparison to other social groups. Besides the social formation of group identity, the state is an important actor in defining group affiliation. Governmental institutions and policies contribute to the formation of immigrants’ group identity in defining the characteristics of belonging by an institutional setting of boundaries. More concretely, this involves the formulation of admission laws and integration provisions that relate to various immigrant groups. Hence the expert survey investigated the role of cultural differentiation and policy measures (institutional setting of boundaries) in defining the group identity of ethnic German and Jewish immigrants. Furthermore the experts were asked to assess integration prospects in analyzing the role of language competence and use.

In the light of these objectives, eight interviews were conducted with highly educated specialists who represented governmental and non-governmental institutions and organizations representing ethnic Germans and Jewish quota refugees. The interviews found that the social experience, education and cultural practices of ethnic Germans were defined by the institutions of their former home countries, although elements of German minority culture and religious practices were preserved and revived after the emigration to Germany. In the view of the experts it is important to understand that ethnic German immigrants promote their cultural heritage and social traditions to a large part in a network of family and friends. The tendency to organize is very low in this group, most likely related to experiences in their former home countries. As in the case of ethnic Germans, Jewish immigrants from post-Soviet states share a common ancestry and the history of belonging to an often discriminated minority. Although many Jewish immigrants were not religious in the narrow sense of the word before immigration, they identified as Jews and were identified as Jewish in (post-)Soviet societies. Jewish communities in Germany relate to this background and promote a deepening of religious practices.

A further element that contributes to the formation of group identity in the case of ethnic German and Jewish immigrants alike is the migration experience. Against this background relation to the former home countries are of particular relevance. While the relationship of ethnic Germans to their former home countries was very limited in the period of the cold war, this situation changed since the political transformation and the dissolution of the Soviet Union. In recent years not only governmental representatives increasingly look for cooperation with the former home countries of ethnic Germans this is also the case for associations representing this group. The main intention is to support ethnic Germans who still live in post-Soviet states and to cooperate with them
in economic, social and cultural projects. This is similar for Jewish immigrants who relate to their former home countries essentially on the base of family and cultural bonds. Travels are often connected to a visit of family members left behind. Recently, the Central Council of Jews in Germany has initiated cooperation with Jewish communities in regions where Jewish people had left for Germany.

All experts who participated in the survey agreed that the most important integration requirement is the German language competence. In the absence of language proficiency, the perception of many ethnic Germans who expected their German ancestry to facilitate their integration turned out to be wrong. As an obstacle to the German language acquisition, experts pointed to the development of Russian speaking immigrant communities in Germany which tend to prevent the advancement of German language competence, particularly in the older generation of immigrants from post-Soviet countries. But experts observed that it is not only the older generation that tends to keep the Russian language but there is also a tendency to promote Russian among children and youth. It was further discovered, that families from post-Soviet countries are often bilingual (Russian/German) and that a bilingual education is supported by a number of them. Although experts agreed that the German language is of vital importance for the labor market and social integration, there is also a consensus that a bilingual background might benefit social relations and occupational advancement.

1.3 Summary of practical implications

Based on evidence obtained by this report, some practical implications for integration policy measures can be derived. In the context of economic and social integration, everything points to the fact that integration policy measures have to be broadly defined, including not only specific programs for immigrants, such as language or integration courses, but general policies as well, for example labor market and education policies. The precondition for an equal labor market participation of immigrants is the unrestricted access to the labor market and the equal participation in the educational and vocational training system. As has been shown in this report, the unemployment of immigrants from East Central Europe and post-Soviet countries is higher than of natives and many qualified immigrants can not find a job according to their qualification. Besides language problems, these frictions can be explained by a number of labor market rigidities that concern many new immigrants. It is harder to move up the social ladder in Germany than in any other country in Europe and formal qualifications play a key role in labor market access. Although it is discussed in Germany to simplify the procedure for recognizing the educational credentials for all immigrants and thus to ease the chance of newcomers to find a job according to their skills, the introduction of this measure has to speed up. If differences between the education and qualification system in the home country and Germany are very high it is reasonable to offer training and further qualification courses. In any case, a cutback of labor market rigidities would facilitate the labor market access of immigrants and provide a chance of job advancement.

This report illustrated that German language competence plays a key role for the economic and social integration of immigrants from East Central Europe and post-Soviet states. The German language is not only a determinant for the labor market access and wage level, it is also the basic requirement for social interaction. Accordingly, the advancement of the German language is of high priority for new as well as for second generation immigrants. However this does not mean to neglect the mother tongue or the language of the former home country. Among all immigrant groups from post-Soviet states there is a strong affiliation to the Russian language and a number of immigrants from these countries argue in favor for keeping the Russian language competence
and of a bi-lingual education. Besides the cultural relevance of maintaining the former home country’s language there is also evidence that a bi-lingual background advances the professional career of immigrants.

In the context of social integration the occasional development of migrant enclaves was observed among East Central European and post-Soviet immigrants, particularly among ethnic Germans. This was related to frictions in social adaptation processes on the side of the immigrants and to elements of social closure on the side of the native population. Meanwhile it is standard in European Union societies to understand social integration as a two-sided process and to promote the acceptance of cultural and ethnic plurality within societies. Accordingly, the social integration of East Central European and post-Soviet immigrants in Germany can only be advanced if their unique migration background is taken into account, if they are supported to cope with the social norms and the value system of the receiving society, and if indifferent and hostile attitudes of natives are overcome. This requires the joint effort of legal and educational institutions, of the media and representatives of various immigrants’ organizations in raising the awareness for cultural diversity but at the same time supporting equal treatment.
1 INTRODUCTION

Since the early 1950s Germany is a host country for various immigration groups originating from East Central Europe, the Soviet Union and its successor states. The most important immigrant community from this region consists of ethnic Germans (Aussiedler) who were admitted by special legal provisions, relating to ethnic and political reasons. These movements became particularly relevant after the political transformation in East Central Europe and the dissolution of the Soviet Union which allowed an increasing part of the ethnic German minority to leave for Germany. In a similar way the immigration of Jewish citizens from (post-)Soviet states to Germany occurred against the background of politically motivated admission regulations. They had been introduced in 1990 to provide an immigration option for Jewish people from post-Soviet states who felt threatened by anti-Semitism. Additionally, family related, student, asylum and labor migrations from East Central Europe and the successor states of the Soviet Union started in the end of the 1980s, leading to a growing number of citizens from these countries, living in Germany. Although these immigrants can hardly be defined in terms of ethnic minorities they constitute an important group of former residents and citizens from East Central Europe and post-Soviet countries.

To understand the migration history and the integration prospects of immigrant populations from East Central Europe and post-Soviet countries in Germany, their home country origin, their demographic and social background as well as immigration regulations in Germany are of vital importance. Immigrants from the regions under consideration are very diverse with respect to their migration motivation, their ethnic, cultural, social and economic characteristics. Furthermore they differ in terms of legal status. While ethnic Germans are entitled to the right of return, other immigrant groups have come in the framework of refugee, asylum or labor migration laws.

This report analyses the historical background, the admission regulations, the demographic and social characteristics and the integration patterns of immigrants from East Central Europe and post-Soviet countries in Germany. The second section examines the case of ethnic Germans, the third section that of Jewish immigrants from post-Soviet countries, while section four studies new immigrant populations from this region. In section five results of expert interviews are presented which have been conducted in the framework of the ENRI-East project. The expert survey investigated the identity formation and integration prospects of the two most important immigrant groups from post-Soviet countries that have come to Germany since the beginning of the 1990s: ethnic Germans and Jewish immigrants. Section six summarizes and derives practical implications following from the evidence presented in the report.

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1 In the framework of this report ‘East Central Europe’ includes all states that joined the European Union in 2004 and 2007.
2 ETHNIC GERMAN IMMIGRANTS IN GERMANY

The immigration of ethnic Germans from East Central Europe, the Soviet Union and later its successor states played a significant role in the post World War II immigration and integration experience of Germany. But in contrast to labor migrants, the inflow of ethnic Germans was not related to economic factors like recruitment programs or the business cycle. Because ethnic Germans in East Central Europe and the Soviet Union had experienced forced resettlement and ethnic discrimination during and after World War II, they were allowed to immigrate to Germany and were granted the German citizenship after arrival. Since the political transformation in East Central Europe and the break-up of the Soviet Union ethnic Germans are the biggest immigrant group from this region in Germany.

2.1 Historical overview

The history of German speaking minorities in Central and Eastern Europe is closely related to the history of early European migration movements. From the 15th to the 19th century German speaking persons came to East Central Europe as well as to the Russian Empire, to work and settle there (Press 1992; Sundhausen 1992; Schödl 1992; Brandes 1992). A considerable part of these migrants had been explicitly invited by the governments of the receiving states which wanted them to cultivate land, work in (agricultural) engineering or secure border lands. As a consequence of this West-East migration, German minority settlements developed in regions which nowadays belong to Poland, Romania, Hungary, the Czech Republic, Slovakia and the successor states of the Soviet Union. Furthermore changing borderlines contributed to the formation of German minorities in East Central Europe. The territory of Upper Silesia (contemporary Poland) is a case in point. It belonged to the Holy Roman Empire of the German Nation between 1335 and 1742 and later on to Prussia. Thus a remarkable part of Upper Silesia’s population considered itself German (Cordell 2000). When Upper Silesia was divided between Poland and Germany in 1921 both parts included national minorities of the respective other nation.

Until the end of the 19th century most ethnic Germans lived in peaceful coexistence with their neighbors in East Central Europe and the Russian empire. However, with the development of nation states and national ideologies in the end of the 19th century this situation changed. The political goal to even out national and territorial borders provoked the expulsion of national minorities or their (forced) assimilation. National governments and authorities in East Central European states and Russia reacted more and more suspicious towards its ethnic minorities, also ethnic Germans, withdrawing privileges formerly granted. In addition ethnic tensions and conflicts increasingly characterized the relations between Germans and their East European neighbors. In the 20th century political transformations, revolutions and two World Wars destroyed the livelihood of German minorities in East Central Europe and the Soviet Union.

2.1.1 The post World War II period

Following the convulsive history of the first half of the twentieth century and Germany’s involvement in two world wars, especially the destructive policy of Nazi Germany, the response of authorities of Soviet bloc countries was to step up the oppression of ethnic German minorities in their countries. This saw the expulsion of ethnic Germans from North-west Poland and Czechoslovakia (Sudetenland) immediately after World War II. In the USSR many Germans had been deported to the Eastern parts of the country in 1941, where they lived in labor camps or under police control until 1955. They were not allowed to speak their mother tongue in public until the
end of the 1960s or to return to their former settlements before 1972 and suffered discrimination in daily life (Stricker 2000).

After the initial wave of expulsions of ethnic Germans from Eastern Europe immediately following World War II approximately 4 million Germans were still living in this region, predominantly in Poland, Romania, the Czech Republic, Hungary and in the USSR, holding the citizenship of the respective states. In that period, many ethnic Germans in East Central Europe and the Soviet Union considered emigration to Western Germany an option to escape the repressive situation in their home countries. However, although the (re)migration of ethnic Germans to Germany started in the beginning of the 1950s, the Cold War severely restricted the further emigration of ethnic German citizens from East Central Europe and the Soviet Union to Germany (Bade 2000). Only in exceptional cases were people allowed to leave these countries, for example in the context of family reunion.

2.1.2 The immigration of ethnic Germans to Germany

On the basis of the 1949 German constitution and the 1953 expellee law, the German government allowed ethnic Germans from East Central Europe and the Soviet Union to move to Germany. After arrival these immigrants were granted the German citizenship (Halfmann 1997). Due to political and ethno-national considerations the German government actively supported the inflow of ethnic Germans and urged socialist bloc leaders to remove emigration barriers. On the one hand this movement had been supported to compensate ethnic Germans for hardships resulting from ethno-national discriminations in their former home countries. On the other ideological arguments played a fundamental role: In the period of the Cold War the emigration of ethnic Germans from socialist countries had been used as an evidence for the superiority of the West German system (Ronge 1997, 125).

Between 1950 and 1987, approximately 1.42 million ethnic Germans moved to Germany. In that period 59.7 percent of all persons came from Poland, 14.6 percent from Romania, 7.7 percent from the Soviet Union and 18 percent from other countries (mainly from Hungary and Yugoslavia). On average 37,000 persons of ethnic German descent immigrated per year. However, the open door policy of the German government towards ethnic Germans was not designed to cater for the sudden increase in migration flows that followed 1988. As Brubaker (1998, 1050) pointed out: “what began as a transitional legal provision intended to grant a secure legal status to millions of ethnic Germans who were quite literally driven out of their homes and homelands, ended up as something quite different: an open door to immigration and automatic citizenship for ethnic German immigrants from Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union”. This became evident with the political transformation of East Central Europe and the collapse of the Soviet Union. As emigration restrictions were released in this region, the flow of ethnic Germans to Germany increased sharply. In the year 1988 nearly 79,000 ethnic Germans arrived in Germany; in the year 1989 377,000 Aussiedler came (see figure 1).
Because of the high inflow of ethnic Germans to Germany since the end of the 1980s, German authorities exerted a strong effort to diminish the immigration of this group (Dietz 2006). Although the right of return for ethnic Germans has not been abolished, a variety of measures was introduced in order to prevent undesired immigration. These included the enforcement of admission barriers, a reduction in integration support and the provision of economic assistance to the sending countries. These policies led first to stabilization and later, from 1994, to a yearly decline in the total number of ethnic German immigrants (see figure 1). However, despite the introduction of various restrictions, the Aussiedler immigration was the greatest population inflow to Germany between 1991 and 2010, including approximately 2.1 million people.

Most importantly, the restriction of the Aussiedler immigration was related to the adoption of a new admission law (Kriegsfolgenbereinigungsgesetz) in 1993. With the exception of Germans from the former Soviet Union all Aussiedler had to individually prove that they had been discriminated in their countries of origin because of their German descent. As ethnic discrimination against Germans in Poland and Romania was almost non-existent following the political transformation of these countries at the end of the 1980s, their emigration to Germany practically ceased with the enforcement of this law. To the contrast the immigration of ethnic Germans from the successor states of the Soviet Union gained in weight. Between 1993 and 2010, nearly all Aussiedler (97 percent) came from post-Soviet countries. The new admission law had also established an immigration quota, fixing a maximum number of 220,000 ethnic German immigrants per year. In 1999, the authorities further reduced this quota to 100,000.

Since July 1996 ethnic German immigrants have had to pass a German language test as a confirmation of their belonging to the German people (Volkszugehörigkeit). As a result the immigration of ethnic Germans to Germany decreased sharply after 1996 (see figure 1). The 1996 regula-
tion was further tightened in 2005 by the introduction of the German Immigration Act, which made a German language test mandatory for every person who applied for admission in the context of the Aussiedler regulation. It can be argued that these immigration barriers, most importantly the German language test, reduced the number of ethnic Germans arriving in Germany from 177,751 persons in 1996 to 2,350 in 2010.

The results of the German language test which ethnic Germans had to pass to be eligible to immigrate are presented in figure 2.

**Figure 2: Results of the German language test for Aussiedler (1996-2008)**

![Graph showing results of the German language test for Aussiedler (1996-2008)](image)

Source: Federal Administration Office, Germany

The large numbers of participants who failed the German language test can be explained by the fact that Germans in the former Soviet Union were prevented from speaking German until the end of the 1960s and had little opportunity to learn it afterwards. Many ethnic Germans lost ties to their 'mother tongue'. As a consequence 52 percent out of 322,467 ethnic Germans who participated in the language test between July 1996 and December 2008 failed. It is remarkable that the share of participants who passed the language test fell from 74 percent in 1996 to only 34 percent in 2008. This mirrors the declining German language competence of the German minority in post-Soviet countries.

The shift of the immigration countries of ethnic Germans from Poland and Romania to post-Soviet states introduced new sending countries. Reflecting their history of forced resettlement and deportation, in the USSR, approximately half of Aussiedler (51 percent) immigrated from Kazakhstan. Furthermore, 39 percent came from Russia, 4 percent from Kyrgyzstan and 2 percent from Ukraine (see figure 3).

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4 This was the first comprehensive immigration law in the history of Germany after World War II.

5 It is important to note that ethnic Germans living in the (former) Soviet Union are an ethnic minority which is not characterized by speaking their 'mother tongue'.
It is a striking feature of Aussiedler immigration to Germany since the beginning of the 1990s that a considerable part of this group does not have an ethnic German background but is eligible for immigration as a close relative (spouse, children etc.) of an ethnic German immigrant. This bi-national background of recent ethnic German immigrant families has been documented by the German Federal Administration Office. In its statistics the Federal Administration Office distinguishes between ethnic Germans, the non-German spouses, children and other relatives of ethnic Germans. In the year 1993 a comparatively high percentage (74 percent) of the Aussiedler immigration had been of ethnic German descent. A decade and a half later, in 2008, this share had fallen to 18 percent (see figure 4).

The most important determinants for the increase in bi-national families in the Aussiedler immigration after 1993 appear to be the release of emigration barriers on the side of post socialist

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6 The registration procedure distinguishes between ethnic Germans (according to § 4 of the federal refugee law), their non German spouses and children (according to § 7 (2) of the federal refugee law) and their close relatives (according to § 8 (2) of the federal refugee law).
states and the shift of sending countries from Romania and Poland to the successor states of the USSR. This contributed to a broad emigration movement of ethnic Germans from the former Soviet Union, where bi-national marriages among ethnic Germans were traditionally high. At the end of the 1970s nearly half of ethnic Germans who had entered marriage in the USSR had entered mixed marriages. In 1989 ethnic Germans in the Soviet Union had the highest rate (65 percent) of mixed marriages among all national minorities (Dietz 1995, 46).

2.2 Admission regulations

In contrast to other immigrant groups ethnic Germans were provided by the German government with a number of integration privileges. They received economic support, assistance in housing, German language instruction and training courses. Furthermore their former home country education and labor market experience was officially recognized (Kogan 2007).

After admission in Germany, ethnic German immigrants are allocated among the German federal states (Bundesländer) according to the Act on the Assignment of a Place of Residence (1989) (Wohnortzuweisungsgesetz). This law allowed the federal states to assign ethnic German immigrants a temporary place of residence for a maximum of three years, if they do not have a job or other source of income sufficient to support themselves. Only in the assigned place of residence will Aussiedler receive social assistance or other government helps (Haug and Sauer 2007). The intention of this law was to improve the conditions for integration by supporting and integrating ethnic Germans evenly among municipalities under a quota system (Königsteiner Schlüssel) which reflects the population size and the tax revenue of the respective Bundesländer (see table 1). The Federal Administration Office usually allows ethnic Germans to express a choice regarding the Bundesland where they would like to live. In most cases new ethnic German immigrants are sent there, as long as the quota is not filled. Otherwise ethnic German immigrants have to move to the Bundesland the Federal Administration Office decides, if they do not want to lose government integration assistance. However ethnic Germans are free to settle anywhere in Germany if they are not dependent on social assistance.

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This law is terminated by December 2009.
Table 1: Quota and actual distribution of ethnic German immigrants at arrival to German Bundesländer by countries of origin 1989-2007 (in percent)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Bundesland</th>
<th>(former) USSR</th>
<th>Poland</th>
<th>Romania</th>
<th>all countries</th>
<th>quota</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Baden-Württemb.</td>
<td>13.1</td>
<td>11.1</td>
<td>33.5</td>
<td>14.4</td>
<td>12.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bavaria</td>
<td>12.9</td>
<td>9.2</td>
<td>41.3</td>
<td>14.6</td>
<td>14.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Berlin</td>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>2.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brandenburg</td>
<td>3.3</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>3.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bremen</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>0.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hamburg</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>4.1</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>2.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hesse</td>
<td>8.0</td>
<td>7.1</td>
<td>5.3</td>
<td>7.5</td>
<td>7.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mecklenb. Vorp.</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>2.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lower Saxony</td>
<td>9.9</td>
<td>9.0</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>9.2</td>
<td>9.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Northrhine-Westph.</td>
<td>23.1</td>
<td>44.7</td>
<td>9.1</td>
<td>25.1</td>
<td>21.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rhineland-Palat.</td>
<td>5.4</td>
<td>3.8</td>
<td>2.7</td>
<td>5.0</td>
<td>4.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Saarland</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>1.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Saxon</td>
<td>6.0</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>4.8</td>
<td>6.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Saxon-Anhalt</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>2.7</td>
<td>3.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sleswig-Holstein</td>
<td>2.9</td>
<td>2.8</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>2.7</td>
<td>3.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thuringia</td>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>3.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total number</td>
<td>2,186,702</td>
<td>411,031</td>
<td>218,413</td>
<td>2,816,330</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Federal Administration Office and Statistical Office, Germany

2.3 Demographic and social characteristics

Regardless of their German descent, ethnic German immigrants have been socialized in the norms, culture and language of their former home countries and received their education and professional training there. In Romania, and to a much lesser extent in Poland, ethnic Germans had been able to visit German schools and to learn the German language. In the case of the (former) Soviet Union it was considerable difficult to study and practice the German language. Consequently, while Aussiedler from Romania took up the German language after immigration fast, many German immigrants from Poland and the successor states of the Soviet Union stucked to Polish or Russian in communicating among each other.
2.3.1 Age composition

Compared to the native German population, the age structure of ethnic Germans is younger. At arrival in the year 2004, about 41.8 percent of ethnic Germans were younger than 25, while this quota was only 26.2 percent in the German population and 27.1 percent in the foreign population in Germany (see figure 5).

Figure 5: Age structure of ethnic Germans, Germans and foreigners in Germany (in percent)

Whereas the age structure of ethnic Germans and foreigners in Germany had not differed much in 1990, the age composition of foreigners in Germany had come noticeably closer to the native German population in 2004. This did not happen in the case of ethnic Germans who – at the time of arrival – were still younger than natives and foreigners in Germany. For decades the comparatively young age structure of ethnic Germans has been regarded as a positive factor with respect to their integration into the German labor market and society (Gieseck et al. 1995). However, since the end of 1980s this assumption has been severely challenged as a result of rising unemployment, especially among younger Aussiedler cohorts.

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8 Demographic information about ethnic German immigrants—for example their age structure and occupational attainment—is only available for the date, they enter Germany.

9 The year 2004 is used as reference because the Aussiedler immigration decreased radically thereafter.
2.3.2 Educational background

It is reasonably difficult to evaluate the educational attainment and the qualification of ethnic Germans when arriving in Germany. Nevertheless, the small existing data base indicates that this immigrant group was better educated and trained than labor migrants who came in the 1960s and 1970s to Germany (Münz et al. 1999, 138). At the end of the 1980s about 12 percent of ethnic Germans who had worked before emigration held a university degree, 22 percent had a secondary and two thirds a lower education (Blaschke 1991, 56). In a later study which analyzed ethnic Germans who had come to Germany between 1987 and 2004 more than 4 percent hold the highest schooling degree, while only 5 percent were found to have finished school without a degree (Fertig and Schurer 2007). However, because the education and training of Aussiedler has been completed in socialist and transition countries their professional qualification often does not correspond to German labor market requirements.

2.3.3 Employment structure

Several important characteristics can be identified in relation to the employment structure of ethnic Germans at the time of immigration. Whereas in Germany employment in agriculture decreased remarkably over the years, the share of ethnic Germans working in the agricultural sector before emigration even increased between 1995 and 2000, followed by a small reduction until 2006 (see figure 6). This is due to the growing number of ethnic Germans from the former Soviet Union, who still worked to a certain part in the agricultural sector. Moreover, industrial professions are, in comparison with native Germans, over represented in the occupation structure of ethnic Germans. By contrast native Germans are more often employed in service jobs than Aussiedler at the time of their arrival. These differences exist independently of the time period ethnic German immigrants entered Germany.

Figure 6: Sectoral employment distribution of Aussiedler and Germans (in percent)

Source: Federal Administration Office and Statistical Office, Germany

2.3.4 Religion

One area where ethnic Germans have been less influenced in their norms by their host countries is religion. Although they have lived in states that strictly controlled religious practices until the end of the 1980s, most Aussiedler belong to a religious group. Approximately 42 percent of them are Protestants, 39 percent Catholics, 16 percent belong to other confessions, such as Baptists and
Mennonites. Most ethnic German immigrants from Poland are Catholics, while the majority of Aussiedler from post-Soviet states are Protestants.

2.4 Economic integration

Integration into the economy is generally defined in terms of equal opportunities for natives and immigrants concerning labor market access and income positions. The realization of economic integration prospects basically depends on two factors. First, on the human and social capital immigrants bring along. And second, on the context and the institutions of destination countries (Borjas 1987, Reitz 2003, Kogan 2007).

With respect to labor market access, the Aussiedler integration in Germany was considered a success story until the end of the 1980s. Several studies showed that the integration of this group into the German labor market proceeded with comparatively few frictions until the political transformation in East Central Europe and the break-up of the Soviet Union (Klös 1992; Rudolph 1994, 117; Koller 1994). In subsequent years this situation changed, confronting ethnic Germans with substantial integration difficulties (Seifert 1996; Bauer and Zimmermann 1997; Koller 1997; Greif et al. 1999; Kreyenfeld and Konietzka 2002).

In the end of the 1990s, ethnic Germans were found in an unfavorable economic position: on average Aussiedler earned about 25 percent less than natives in 1998 and more often performed unskilled jobs, although their qualifications were comparable to those of natives. An analysis of income determinants showed that the earnings of ethnic Germans positively depended on professional training and qualification, but that more than half of this group did not work in the professions they were qualified for. Consequently, in many cases the positive impact of skills did not materialize. In addition, ethnic Germans are only expected to achieve incomes close to natives on the condition that they demonstrate a good or very good proficiency in the German language. This is especially true for all skilled professions, particularly in the service sector (Seifert 1996; Bauer and Zimmermann 1997; Koller 1997, 779). Given the fact that the German language competence of Aussiedler entering Germany had fallen markedly since the 1990s, their economic position has been negatively affected. A study which looked at ethnic Germans who had arrived between 1988 and 2002 discovered an initial income disadvantage of Aussiedler vis-à-vis comparable German natives of nearly 50 percent. However the earnings of ethnic German immigrants were predicted to grow over time, catching up with comparable natives after between 9 and 12 years. This indicates that more recent ethnic Germans perform worse upon arrival, but assimilate reasonably well to the German labor market if they find employment (Fertig and Schurer 2007).

In the labor market ethnic Germans highly depend on their German language proficiency, qualifications and the profession they acquired before migration. Thus the chances to find a job are significantly lower for ethnic Germans who have little German language skills and who have no qualification or training. This is also true for skilled persons who cannot exploit their education and experience on the German labor market. Professions with different profiles in market economies and transition economies, for example jobs in administration, trade, banking, technology or education, are a special employment risk. On the other hand integration assistance by the German government supported the labor market integration of ethnic Germans to a considerable extent.

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This study (Kreyenfeld and Konietzka 2002) refers to ethnic Germans who had come to Germany between 1984 and 1994. It might be suspected that the income position of ethnic Germans who immigrated thereafter is even worse.
degree, although its impact decreased because of severe cuts after 1989 (Klös 1992; Barabas et al. 1992; Zimmermann 1994).

At the end of the 1990s the unemployment rate of ethnic Germans was higher than that of natives, but slightly lower than that of foreigners in Germany. However, the unemployment risk of ethnic Germans increased thereafter. Among ethnic Germans who entered Germany between 2000 and 2004, on average 34 percent were unemployed (Brück-Klingberg et al. 2007). This was considerably higher than the unemployment rate among native Germans (11.1 percent in 2004) and also among foreigners in Germany, which amounted to 16.1 percent in 2000 and to 19.8 percent in 2004. Typically, a higher educational attainment increases the chances of finding employment. In 2004 this was confirmed by lower than average unemployment rates of highly educated native Germans and foreigners in Germany. By contrast, ethnic Germans with a higher education were the least successful in the labor market (Brück-Klingberg et al. 2007). Labor market disadvantages, experienced by highly educated ethnic Germans are especially strong among women (Kogan 2010).

In analyzing the determinants of this development, empirical studies point to low German language competence and to human capital characteristics related to the sending country. Ethnic Germans who came from the former Soviet Union and from Poland were more likely to become unemployed than those from Romania (Bauer and Zimmermann 1997). This is explained by language competence, education and training and by the integration into networks of Aussiedler sharing the country or region of origin. Network related settlement behavior has concentrated ethnic Germans from Romania in Bavaria and Baden-Württemberg, where a lower unemployment rate prevails compared to Lower-Saxony and Northrhine-Westfalia, with higher unemployment rates, where comparatively more ethnic Germans from the former Soviet Union live (see table 1).

The technological gap between Germany and the host countries of ethnic Germans has not been reduced over recent years. Accordingly the qualification of this immigrant group has not come closer to the requirements of the German labor market. In many cases qualifications are related to professions in low demand and often do not meet German standards (Ulrich 1994, Kreyenfeld and Konietzka 2002). Moreover, as a result of globalization, the share of industrial unskilled workers in the German labor force fell from 3.1 percent in 1985 to only 1.5 percent in 2000. By contrast, as many as 11.4 percent of ethnic German immigrants who came to Germany in 2000 had been occupied in unskilled work before emigration. This demonstrates a remarkable labor market risk for recent ethnic German immigrants, who find weak demand for their low qualified labor. Next to the lack of skills, such as language competence and education, the rigid German labor market where job advancement is highly dependent on formal qualifications is a general obstacle for job seeking immigrants (OECD 2007).

### 2.5 Social integration

In contrast to foreigners in Germany, ethnic Germans were expected to bring along a cultural background similar to those of native Germans. It was assumed that, together with state supported social integration programs, this similar cultural background would guarantee ethnic Germans a smooth integration into German society. These considerations are in line with an integra-

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11 This result refers to 1998. In that year 18 percent of ethnic Germans had been unemployed as compared to 10.1 percent of native Germans and 19.6 percent of foreigners.
tion model that puts assimilation at its heart (Gordon 1964; Alba 1997). In the medium and longer run the assimilation model predicts the absorption of immigrants into the culture, social structure and institutions of the host country. In general it is expected that immigrants will lose their specific previous cultural background and identity in the integration process.

Although the integration process of ethnic Germans was accompanied by high expectations, their socio-structural integration did not proceed without problems. Already in the 1970s and 1980s the social contacts of ethnic Germans were often limited to family members or friends from their sending countries. Participation in German organizations, institutions or neighborhoods was rare. But unlike German expellees and refugees, who had established effective (political) pressure groups in post war Germany, ethnic German immigrants have not been particularly engaged in establishing organizations to pursue their interests. The most important organizations of ethnic German immigrants are countrymen affiliations, which have first of all been initiated to preserve the history and the cultural traditions of ethnic German minorities. Typically, countrymen affiliations are organized according to former (historical) homelands, such as the affiliation of Germans from Bessarabia, Silesia or Russia. Only in recent years has the affiliation of Germans from Russia put emphasis on supporting the integration of German immigrants. It is noteworthy, however, that countrymen affiliations have not attracted a high number of members. Although 2.2 million ethnic Germans from the (former) Soviet Union moved to Germany between 1989 and the end of 2010, their most important pressure group – the affiliation of Germans from Russia – incorporates only 12,301 members. Other organizations, funded by ethnic German immigrants to provide legal, cultural, religious or social support, are of much lower and mostly only regional importance.

Since the beginning of the 1990s a slower acculturation path than in previous decades and a lack of socio-structural adaptation has been observed for ethnic German immigrants. Instead ethnic Germans have tended to build up and participate in Aussiedler networks, which have often been identified as the decisive support for the development of segregated immigrant communities or sub societies. If one looks at the most important indicator for acculturation, the proficiency and use of the host society’s language, significant differences between various Aussiedler groups can be observed. At the end of the 1990s nearly all ethnic German immigrants from Romania had a good or very good command of the German language, compared to only 61 percent of those from Poland and 59 percent from the former Soviet Union (Dietz 2006). It is remarkable that ethnic German immigrants from Poland and the former USSR expressed a higher proficiency in the Polish and Russian language than in German. This language profile has an impact on German language use in daily life. 79 percent of ethnic Germans from Romania but less than half of those from Poland and approximately half of ethnic Germans from the former Soviet Union spoke predominantly German. This confirms the view that a fast acculturation of recent ethnic German immigrants—especially of the most important group from the former Soviet Union—can no longer be taken for granted.

A survey conducted with ethnic Germans who came to Germany between 1984 and 1994 reveals close friendship ties to former countrymen: for nearly 40 percent of ethnics, the three best friends came from their former homeland and 72 percent had at least one friend from the sending country (Dietz 2006). Ethnic Germans from the former Soviet Union are especially involved in home

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12 The membership figure relates to families, as the affiliation of Germans from Russia does not register members individually.
country friendship circles. This situation points to the important role of migrant relations and networks built on personal ties. The frequency of meeting up with relatives and friends and the time spent in helping relatives and friends provide further insights into the social integration of this group. Ethnic Germans were heavily engaged in meeting (92 percent) and helping (52 percent) their relatives and friends on a weekly or monthly base. These figures were 80 percent and 42 percent, respectively, for native born Germans, which shows that the personal relationships of ethnic German immigrants are stronger.

Next to friendship relations, leisure time activities and inclusion in institutions are of importance for the social integration of ethnic German immigrants. Research found ethnic Germans less likely than native Germans to visit cultural events (Fertig 2010). Furthermore, no indication exists that recent ethnic German immigrants engage in political, social or neighborhood associations in Germany to any significant degree. It is notable though that ethnic Germans have a significantly higher likelihood of being involved in religious activities in their leisure time than native Germans (Fertig 2010).

2.6 Ethnic German networks

In the process of social integration, networks are usually seen as formal or informal ties through which information and other resources are distributed and channeled (Gurak and Caces 1992, 150; Lucassen and Lucassen 1997). In this context basically two ways are identified in which migrant networks may function. Migration networks can provide adaptive support in finding employment, housing or social information. This mostly short-term assistance may also have a positive impact on the long-term integration into the receiving society. On the other hand, migrant networks may work in the opposite direction, isolating immigrants in limiting their contacts to their own group and keeping them distant from the native population and from organizations and institutions of the receiving society. In the longer run, migrant enclaves may develop, which point to economic disintegration and social segregation.

A valuable indicator for the development of migrant networks is the spatial distribution of immigrant populations. In the case of ethnic Germans their settlement after arrival has been influenced to a considerable degree by the wish to live close to relatives and friends from the same country of origin (Hofmann et al. 1992; Münz and Ohliger 1998, 177; Dietz 1999). Nevertheless, as has been described earlier, German authorities distribute ethnic German immigrants according to a quota system throughout Germany to achieve some burden sharing at the local community level. Significant differences can be observed with respect to countries of origin in the settlement behavior of ethnic Germans (see table 1). Whereas ethnic Germans from Romania over-fulfilled the quota for Baden-Württemberg and Bavaria, those from Poland predominantly moved to Northrhine-Westfalia. In their turn, ethnic German immigrants from the former Soviet Union expressed a certain preference for Lower Saxon and Northrhine-Westfalia. It seems reasonable to argue that this settlement behavior is evidence of the formation of migrant networks.

The question of whether the settlement behavior and the participation of recent ethnic Germans in migrant networks have led to enclaves and segregation since the end of the 1980s cannot be discussed without looking at German housing policy. At the beginning of the 1990s, French, Canadian and U.S. troops were withdrawn from German territory, leading to free housing space. Where the German authorities were in charge of these housing facilities, they used them to accommodate ethnic German immigrants. In cases where housing space of withdrawing troops was offered on the free market, ethnic German immigrant families frequently rented them to live close to their relatives and friends who had already moved to these housing facilities. In some
cities and communities this contributed to a considerable segregation of recent ethnic Germans (Münz and Ohliger 1998, 177).

This growing spatial segregation of ethnic Germans has in some cases been accompanied by a tendency to withdraw from German institutions and neighborhoods, particularly on the part of the younger Aussiedler generation (Dietz and Roll 1998). In some cases the xenophobia of native Germans reinforced this tendency. As a result, a part of recent ethnic German immigrants who came from the former Soviet Union since the 1990s forms predominantly Russian speaking communities, where many newcomers integrate. These communities are strengthened by the bi-national background of ethnic Germans sustaining a framework in which the Russian language and major elements of previous cultural practices are actively retained.
3 JEWISH QUOTA REFUGEES

The immigration of Jewish citizens from the former Soviet Union to Germany (Jewish quota refugees) started immediately before the collapse of the Soviet Union. In July 1990 the last GDR government granted asylum to Jewish citizens from the Soviet Union who were threatened by persecution in their home country.

3.1 Historical overview

Since the liberalization of emigration regulations in the end of the eighties and shortly thereafter with the break-up of the Soviet Union an exodus of Jews from the successor states of the USSR took place. The Jewish outmigration resulted in a dramatic decline of Jewish communities in post-Soviet Union countries. Initially most of Jewish emigrants headed towards Israel and the United States. In the beginning of the nineties, because of an official regulation governing the admission of Jewish immigrants from the former USSR, Germany became the third important receiving country for the post-Soviet Jewish emigration worldwide.

Before moving to Germany, most Jewish immigrants had lived in the European part of the former USSR, in Russia, the Ukraine, the Baltic states, Belarus and Moldova (Schoeps et al. 1999). As is typical of the Jewish population in the former Soviet Union, nearly all had been city dwellers. Males and females were nearly equally involved in the migration movement to Germany (Haug and Wolf 2007).

3.1.1 Migration motivation

From what is known about the motivation of Jews to leave the former USSR for Germany, a number of reasons played a role (Domernik 1997; Schoeps et al. 1999). First of all, overt as well as latent anti-Semitism in Russia, the Ukraine, Moldova and other successor states of the Soviet Union were push factors. In addition, economic crisis and political instability contributed to the emigration decision of Jews, while in some cases, career advancement, the future of the children, or health problems were decisive factors. Yet, the decision to move to Germany was to a great extent related to the changing admission policies of Western states. When the authorities of post-Soviet states accepted the freedom of movement, many Western states, first of all the United States, closed their borders to immigrants from this area or reduced their immigration quotas. Israel, by contrast, kept its doors open to Jewish immigrants from the former Soviet Union and Germany introduced a new admission procedure for this group in 1990. When Jewish emigrants from the former Soviet Union started to move to Germany in the beginning of the 1990s this was in many cases second choice, as a number of Jewish emigrants, particularly those who lived in mixed families, felt insecure about going to Israel for economic, political, religious or social reasons, while others were unable to obtain a visa for the United States. Besides, some Jewish emigrants chose Germany due to its greater cultural and linguistic proximity to post-Soviet states in comparison with Israel. Furthermore, in the course of the ongoing migration movement, more and more Jewish emigrants from the former Soviet Union could count on relatives, friends or acquaintances in Germany to ease their integration. As a consequence, spreading migrant networks supported the immigration of Jewish people from the former Soviet Union to Germany.
3.1.2 The immigration of Jewish quota refugees to Germany

The immigration of Jewish quota refugees from the successor states of the USSR to Germany is recorded by two sources: the Federal Administration Office and the Central Council of Jews in Germany. Whereas the Federal Administration Office defines the number of Jewish immigrants according to the quota refugee act, including the group of non-Jewish spouses and children, the Central Council of Jews in Germany counts those immigrants who have become a member of Jewish Communities, meaning they are Jewish according to the Jewish religious law (Halakha). Consequently, these different classifications result in remarkable differences in immigration figures (see Table 2).

Table 2: Jewish immigrants from the former Soviet Union in Germany (1990–2007)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Federal Administration Office*</th>
<th>Central Council of Jews in Germany**</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td></td>
<td>1,008</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1991</td>
<td>12,583</td>
<td>5,198</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1992</td>
<td>15,879</td>
<td>3,777</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1993</td>
<td>16,597</td>
<td>5,205</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1994</td>
<td>8,811</td>
<td>5,521</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1995</td>
<td>15,184</td>
<td>8,851</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1996</td>
<td>15,959</td>
<td>8,608</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1997</td>
<td>19,437</td>
<td>7,092</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998</td>
<td>17,788</td>
<td>8,299</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td>18,205</td>
<td>8,929</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>16,538</td>
<td>7,366</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>16,711</td>
<td>7,152</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>19,262</td>
<td>6,597</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>15,442</td>
<td>6,216</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>11,208</td>
<td>4,757</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>5,968</td>
<td>3,124</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>1,079</td>
<td>1,971</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>2,502</td>
<td>1,296</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>1,436</td>
<td>862</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>1,008</td>
<td>704</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total number</td>
<td>231,677</td>
<td>102,533</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Jewish immigration according to the quota refugee regulation (Federal Administration Office, running statistics).
** Immigration of Jews who joined the Jewish Communities (Central Council of Jews in Germany, member statistics).

According to the Federal Administration Office, 231,677 Jewish quota refugees arrived between January 1991 and December 2009 in Germany; while the Central Council of Jews in Germany registered 102,533 Jewish immigrants, joining the Jewish Communities in that period. In the light of these differences it can be argued that approximately 50 percent of Jewish quota refugees in Germany are either non-Jewish (i.e. relatives of Jewish immigrants) or Jews who did not become a member of the Jewish Communities.
The year 2005, when the German Immigration Act entered into force, marks a considerable decrease in the number of Jewish quota refugees. This is related to the strengthening of admission regulations.

In population statistics, Jewish quota refugees are recorded by their citizenship after immigrating to Germany. This implies that they can not be distinguished from other immigrant groups coming from post-Soviet states, for example students or labor migrants.

### 3.2 Admission regulations

In July 1990, the last GDR government decided to grant asylum to Jewish citizens from the Soviet Union who were threatened by discrimination and anti-Semitism. A number of Jews from the USSR made use of this offer and moved to East Germany, mainly to East Berlin. Nearly all of these emigrants traveled with a tourist visa. After the German reunification it was no longer possible for Jewish immigrants from the former Soviet Union to be admitted as refugees in Germany with a tourist visa. Instead, immigrants had to apply for an entry permit at German embassies in the countries of origin. The new admission regulation (quota refugee regulation) was based on a law (*Kontingentflüchtlingsgesetz*), which had been established in 1980 for the admission of refugees from South-East Asia to Germany. The law regulated the immigration and distribution of refugees according to a quota system over the federal countries (Cohen and Kogan 2005). The admission of Jewish immigrants from post-Soviet countries at a time when migration to Germany was highly restricted has been justified by the German government with its historical responsibility with respect to the Holocaust (Dietz 2003). A further argument was to strengthen Jewish Communities in Germany which were continuously aging.

Until December 2004, entry visas for Jewish immigrants from the former Soviet Union were provided on the base of the quota refugee regulation, guaranteeing a residence permit for an indefinite period and entitling immigrants to various rights and benefits, including housing support, initial absorption assistance and social security benefits (Cohen and Kogan 2007). Non-Jewish spouses and children under 18, living in the household of the eligible Jewish immigrant, were equally allowed to move to Germany. However, when the German Immigration Act was introduced in January 2005, new criteria for the admission of Jewish immigrants from the successor states of the USSR were set up which came into force in November 2005 (Haug and Wolf 2007). Entry visas were issued, if Jewish immigrants were admitted by a Jewish Community in Germany, had some command of the German language and could guarantee not to become dependent on welfare payments.

Other than ethnic Germans, Jewish quota refugees are not entitled to German citizenship after arrival. Nevertheless they receive an unlimited residence permit, the permission to work, initial housing support and an absorption assistance for a maximum of six months, along with a state provided German language course. In cases where the education or the professional background of Jewish immigrants does not meet the requirements of the German labor market, a retraining course may be offered. Furthermore Jewish immigrants are eligible for social security benefits if they have not been able to find work after the absorption assistance has expired.

### 3.3 Demographic and social characteristics

Having entered Germany, Jewish quota refugees are divided among the federal states according to the *Königsteiner Schlüssel*, as is the case with ethnic Germans. Although Jewish quota refugees are free to move within the German federal states, financial benefits are contingent on the
place they are sent. Because Jewish quota refugees are not registered in population statistics according to their admission status but their citizenship, information on their distribution within Germany is only available for those immigrants who became member of a Jewish community.

Today, there are 108 Jewish communities in Germany which are organized in 23 regional associations. The umbrella organization for the communities representing their interests at federal level is the Central Council of Jews in Germany. Because of the immigration of Jews from the successor states of the Soviet Union the Jewish communities grew remarkably. In 2010, the Jewish communities in Germany had 104,024 registered members, nearly four times as many as in 1990, when 29,019 community members were counted (ZWST 2011). Approximately 90 percent of Jewish community members have immigrated from post-Soviet countries. The largest Jewish community in Germany is that of Berlin with a membership of some 11,000 persons. It is followed by the Jewish community of Munich with 9,500 members and the communities in Düsseldorf and Frankfurt with more than 7,000 members each. In the eastern part of Germany, new Jewish communities were founded in many cities after 1990. In Rostock, for example, no Jewish community had existed before the German unification. Now the city’s Jewish community has more than 700 members, almost all of them immigrants from the former USSR. The Jewish Community of Leipzig has grown from 30 members in the late eighties to 1,200 persons.

3.3.1 Age Composition

More than one-fifth of Jewish immigrants are over age 65 when they come to Germany. Another fifth is between 50 and 65 years of age and about 42 percent are younger than 40 years old (Schoeps et al. 1999, Bundesamt für Migration und Flüchtlinge 2010). In comparison, 75 percent of all immigrants to Germany were under the age of 40 in 2005 (Bundesamt für Migration und Flüchtlinge 2010). Although the Jewish immigration to Germany consists of a relatively high number of older people, on average, immigrants are still younger than the Jewish population who remained in the successor states of the USSR and they are also younger than the Jewish population in Germany. In many cases Jewish immigration to Germany included families. This is characteristic for migration movements with a religious or ethnic background, where migrants leave the home country without a return option.

Because of the inflow of younger age cohorts, Jewish communities in Germany started to rejuvenate in the beginning of the immigration movement from post-Soviet societies. However, this process slowly reversed in the end of the 1990s because of an unaffected low fertility of the Jewish population (Dietz, Lebok and Polian 2002). Whereas immigration could reduce the problems of an extremely aging population, it could not guarantee the long term rejuvenation of Jewish communities in Germany.

3.3.2 Educational Background

According statistical data and various survey studies Jewish immigrants from the former Soviet Union in Germany are well educated: over 70 percent of them have a university or college degree (Tress 1995; Schoeps et al. 1999, Haberfeld et al. 2010). Many have extensive professional experience, as academics, scientists or technicians. In most cases, however, this high level of human capital cannot be transferred to the German labor market.

Despite their high educational attainment, most Jewish immigrants move to Germany with no or very little knowledge of the German language. Only 15 percent of the respondents in a German wide survey of 1998 reported a good or very good knowledge of German (Schoeps et al. 1999,
In daily life many Jewish immigrant families stick to Russian, which is also the common language in Jewish immigrant networks.

### 3.4 Economic Integration

It is a striking feature of Jewish immigrants from post-Soviet countries in Germany that their labor market participation has been comparatively low. In the year 2000 unemployment reached 32 percent among those Jewish quota refugees who had immigrated between 1990 and 1995, while 60 percent of those who had come between 1996 and 2000 were unemployed. In addition, Cohen and Kogan (2005) found that Jewish quota refugees did not reach income convergence with comparative native Germans.

On the one hand, these frictions in economic integration were due to incompatibilities between the home countries and Germany with respect to the educational attainment and professional experience. This often prevents the access to appropriate jobs. The lack of German language competence is a further obstacle (Gruber and Rüssler 2002, Cohen et al. 2008). As has been shown, a low German language proficiency hampers the labor market access – also that of highly qualified immigrants (Esser 2006). On the other hand, the structural and institutional characteristics of the German labor market inhibit a smooth occupational integration of Jewish quota refugees (Cohen and Kogan 2007). This is not a unique experience for this immigrant group in Germany. In many occupations access is first of all provided to persons who have acquired their certificates within the German educational system.

### 3.5 Social Integration

The social integration of Jewish quota refugees is strongly assisted by Jewish communities. Supported by the German state, the Jewish communities and the Central Welfare Board of Jews in Germany are engaged in the social, economic, religious and cultural integration of Jewish immigrants (Harris 1999, 259; Kessler 1997). These institutions provide German language training, immediate housing support, instruction in Jewish culture and religion and in counseling. Apart from learning the German language and seeking housing, Jewish immigrants are also confronted with other wide-ranging integration problems, such as finding work, schools for their children and care for the elderly, where the Jewish Communities provide help.

Despite the important role, Jewish communities are playing in the integration process of Jewish immigrants, the inclusion of this group is not a straightforward process. As Jewish religious traditions have not been a part of the education and upbringing of most Jewish immigrants in the former Soviet Union, their Jewish self-identification is not strong. Many are estranged from Judaism, although their Jewish belonging has been reinforced by (post-)Soviet nationality policy and often by anti-Semitism (Tress 1995). Most Jewish immigrants in Germany use the Russian language to communicate and maintain strong ties to the cultural traditions of their former home countries (Kessler 2006). In a number of cases this led to the formation of Russian-speaking circles in Jewish Communities in Germany. Obviously, the more secular practice and the post-Soviet cultural background and education set Jewish immigrants apart from local Jewish Community members.

The implications of recent Jewish immigration for Jewish Communities and Jewish life in Germany are manifold. In the years to come the integration of Jewish immigrants from post-Soviet societies will challenge Jewish Communities in Germany, as the newcomers represent a more secular and pluralistic population. Nevertheless, the immigration of Jews from the former Soviet
Union strengthened German Jewish Communities, turning Germany into the only country in Europe with an expanding Jewish population.

3.6 Jewish Quota Refugee Networks

The integration of the first generation of Jewish immigrants into German neighborhoods or institutions seems to be rather limited so far. This is particularly true for older persons. Most Jewish immigrants base their social relations on family and friendship networks which rely on connections built up in the context of former home country origin, culture and religious practices. A survey by Schoeps et al. (1999, 86) found that a high fraction (70 percent) of Jewish quota refugees rarely or never meet Germans for leisure activities.

Although a considerable part of Jewish immigrants join traditional Jewish Communities, organized by the Central Council of Jews in Germany, some are active in more secular groups which have recently been established. The most important one is the Union for Progressive Judaism which counts approximately 4,500 members (Bundesamt für Migration und Flüchtlinge 2010). Other Jewish immigrants are active in newly established self-help organizations. Usually these organizations pursue integration-related goals.
4 NEW IMMIGRANT POPULATIONS FROM EAST CENTRAL EUROPE AND POST-SOVIET COUNTRIES IN GERMANY

Since the end of the 1980s a growing inflow of immigrants from East Central Europe and post-Soviet countries to Germany has taken place. These movements were only occasionally related to the immigration of ethnic Germans and Jewish quota refugees (for example in the case of family unification). Initially asylum seekers formed the majority of these immigrants. In response to a new legislation in Germany and the democratization in most countries of origin, the inflow of asylum seekers decreased. With the enlargement of the European Union asylum migration from the new East European members to Germany ceased to exist, while asylum migration from post-Soviet states continued on a lower level. Instead, labor, family related and student migration gained in importance.

4.1 Asylum movements

Until its amendment in 1993, the asylum law in Germany was characterized as one of the most generous worldwide (Knipping and Saumweber-Meyer 1995). However, because Germany had not established a coherent immigration law, political asylum became an entrance passage for those who would otherwise not have qualified to immigrate into the country. Especially at the beginning of the new East-West movement, many migrants from East Central European countries, which later joined the European Union, arrived via the asylum regulation.

4.1.1 The asylum law and its amendment

According to Art. 16 of the German constitution political refugees have the right for asylum in Germany. Between 1953 and 1978 only 7,000 individuals referred on that law yearly and only political occurrences like the suppression of the revolt in Prague in 1968 caused short time increases in the number of asylum applicants. In the early 1980s the yearly number of asylum seekers was far under 50,000. Since 1986 asylum migration strongly increased and peaked with about half a million applicants in 1992. Besides Asian and African countries, East Central European states were among the most prominent sending regions of asylum migrants to Germany in that period.

The sharp increase of asylum seekers to Germany led to a heated debate on the expected consequences of these movements. Many natives opposed the right for asylum, expecting an escalating economic and social burden because of asylum migration. However, even before its amendment the German asylum law only recognized those applicants who had been persecuted for political reasons in their countries of origin. As many East Central European asylum seekers had come because of economic hardship, the acceptance rate remained below 1 percent in the early 1990s.

The German government reacted to the high asylum migration by changing the asylum law, which came into effect on 1 July 1993. Thereafter it was much more difficult for persons seeking asylum to be recognized, and, in many cases, it excluded them from being admitted to the asylum procedure in Germany at all. According to the new law, citizens from so-called ‘safe countries’ were no longer permitted to ask for asylum in Germany. ‘Safe countries’ were those in which the legal and political situation guaranteed the absence of political persecution and inhuman treatment (Bosswick 1995). All East Central European countries (Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Romania, Hungary and Poland) were classified as ‘safe countries’. Following the passing of amendments the German government signed bilateral agreements with Bulgaria and Romania.
to regulate the readmission of rejected asylum seekers to their countries of origin (Rakelman 1994). With the inclusion of East Central European countries into the European Union in 2004 and 2007, asylum migration from this region became obsolete. To the contrast, post-Soviet states are still sending asylum seekers to Germany. In a retrospective comparison, the patterns of asylum migration differed considerably between East Central European and post-Soviet countries.

4.1.2 Poland

Asylum migration from Poland to Germany played an important role in the 1980s, due to martial law and the political oppression of that time, but declined significantly after 1989 (see figure 7). Although the economic situation in Poland was characterized by a severe crisis, the establishment of a non-communist government in September 1989 supported an expectation of economic improvement and political stability. In addition, job opportunities opened up in Western Europe, mainly in Germany which made labor migration feasible, though on a short term basis (Okolski 1998, Bundesamt für Migration und Flüchtlinge, 2010).

4.1.3 Bulgaria

Asylum migration from Bulgaria to Germany started in 1989, increased quickly until 1992, and declined rapidly after the amendment of the German asylum law (see figure 7). The liberalization of Bulgarian passport restrictions in 1990 opened up the framework for emigration, which was motivated to a considerable degree by economic reasons and the loss of confidence in political reforms in Bulgaria (Ciutacu 1996). Accordingly asylum migration from Bulgaria peaked in 1992 (see figure 7).

4.1.4 Romania

As in the case of Bulgaria, asylum migration from Romania to Germany was very prominent between 1989 and 1992, but lost importance after the amendment of the German asylum law (see figure 7). The desperate economic situation in their home country was the main factor in pushing Romanians to seek asylum (Bobeva 1996). This was particularly the case following the victory of the ex-Communist Party in the 1990 elections, which destroyed hopes of fundamental political and economic reforms. This fostered a migration movement, which used the asylum procedure to Germany because admission was not guaranteed otherwise. In addition, the deprived situation of the Roma minority in Romania played a role, as a major part of the asylum migration from Romania to Germany consisted of Roma (Ohliger 2000).
4.1.5 Post-Soviet states

The asylum movement from post-Soviet states to Germany emerged in the end of the 1990s, particularly from the Russian Federation and Caucasian countries. These were in the majority of cases related to ethnic conflicts and civil war. Between 1998 and 2009 approximately 25,400 asylum seekers came to Germany from Russia, many of them originating from Chechnya. In 2009 asylum seekers from the Russian Federation made up 3.4 percent of all persons who asked for asylum in Germany. Nevertheless, the number of asylum migrants from this country has seriously decreased since the year 2002. As in the case of asylum migrants from East Central European countries, the approval rates for asylum seekers from the Russian Federation are comparatively low (less than 5 percent).

4.2 Labor, student and family related migration

After the fall of the Iron Curtain labor migration from East Central Europe to Germany began to take place in the framework of bilateral contracts between the sending countries and Germany. The rational behind this policy was to improve the economic advancement of East Central European countries, to decrease the migration pressure on Germany and to prevent permanent migration as well as illegal work. In addition, East Central European labor migrants were expected to mitigate seasonal or occupational labor shortages in Germany. Besides these programs, the green card regulation supported labor migration to Germany between 2000 and 2005.

4.2.1 Labor migration

In the beginning of East-West labor movements to Germany, three different channels for the access of workers from East Central European countries to the German labor market can be identified (Höhnekopp 1999, Faist et al. 1999). All of them were opened up after the fall of the Iron Curtain and based on bilateral agreements between Germany and the respective sending state. The first channel was seasonal employment, according to which a German employer can recruit immigrant workers for seasonal work. Since January 2009 employers are allowed to occupy sea-
seasonal workers up to six months a year.\textsuperscript{13} Second, project-tied employment allowed foreign subcontractors to send foreign workers to Germany on a work permit for a maximum of two years. Finally, guest worker contracts were issued, allowing a limited number of workers from East Central European countries to migrate to Germany for a maximum of 18 months to improve their language and occupational competencies.

In the context of these special employment programs, seasonal workers are the most important group in quantitative terms, followed by project-tied and guest workers (see figure 8). Nevertheless the total number of 286,946 seasonal workers (in 2009) does not have an important weight on the German labor market as a whole. However, as nearly all seasonal workers (90 percent) are employed in agriculture, seasonal labor is an important factor for the agricultural sector.

Figure 8: Seasonal and contract workers from East Central Europe in Germany (1991-2009)

In absolute terms, the number of project-tied workers, who are mainly occupied in construction and related industries, is comparatively low. Furthermore, their employment declined steadily after an initial peak in 1992. Labor migration connected to the guest worker programme was even smaller and has never exceeded 5,500 persons per year.

In these employment programs, Poland is by far the most important sending country, followed by Romania. This reflects the existence of business cooperation and migrant networks between Germany and the respective sending countries. Long lasting migration relations exist between Poland and Germany, including labor and ethnic migration movements. In addition, business cooperation, which is a precondition for the sending of project-tied workers, is well established between Poland and Germany. In the case of Romania, migration relations have been built up more slowly, but gained in importance in recent years.

With respect to seasonal labor migration, the prominence of Polish workers has reduced. While in the middle of the 1990s more than 80 percent of all seasonal workers came from Poland, this share declined to 64 percent in 2009. The economic advancement in Poland and better job opportunities for Polish citizens in European Union countries explains this development. Instead, more and more seasonal workers from Romania head for Germany.

\textsuperscript{13} Before that date seasonal workers received a work permission for only 4 months.
With the enlargement of the European Union in 2004, Germany experienced a net immigration from the new East European member states of 35,000 people in that year. This was approximately 50 percent higher than in 2003. However, compared to the forecasted immigration of 155,000 people from the new EU members in 2004 this was moderate (Boeri and Brücker 2005). The number of work permits issued by Germany to nationals from East European Union member states who had newly immigrated was only a little bit higher in 2004 (317,835) than in the year before (310,339). In both years more than 95 percent of work permits were short-term ones, predominantly for seasonal work in agriculture. In 2005 the number of new work permits issued to EU-8 nationals decreased to 252,261, in 2006 to 234,364. Again, 90 percent of which were for short-term seasonal labor. Although transitional arrangements on labor migration (between 2004 and 2010) prevented the uncontrolled immigration of workers from the new East European member states to Germany, it is likely that a number of EU-8 nationals have entered as posted workers or as workers claiming to be self-employed in that period.

The labor force participation of immigrants from East Central European countries, belonging to the European Union since 2004 (EU-8), was lower than that of Germans in 2006 but higher than that of immigrants from non-EU countries (Brenke et al. 2009). Moreover, unemployment rates among migrants from EU-8 states in Germany were substantially higher (21 percent) than among Germans (10 percent). This reflects most likely their sectoral employment structure, i.e. their above-average occupation in agriculture, construction and services. Additionally, 48 percent of migrants from East Central European countries were occupied in low skilled jobs, while only 29 percent of Germans performed low skilled work. This exposes East Central European migrant workers to higher unemployment risks.

4.2.2 Students

In recent years a considerable number of citizens from East Central European and post-Soviet states moved to Germany to study (Federal Ministry of Education and Research 2008, Bundesministerium für Bildung und Forschung 2010). After students from China, young people from the Russian Federation ranked second among foreign students in Germany. In total numbers 9,740 students came from the Russian Federation in 2009, nearly as many had a Polish background, followed by students from Bulgaria, Ukraine and Romania (see table 3). Approximately 25 percent of all foreign students came from East Central Europe and post-Soviet countries.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country of origin</th>
<th>Number of students</th>
<th>In percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>9,740</td>
<td>5.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poland</td>
<td>9,401</td>
<td>5.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bulgaria</td>
<td>9,162</td>
<td>5.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ukraine</td>
<td>6,324</td>
<td>3.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Romania</td>
<td>3,081</td>
<td>1.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Georgia</td>
<td>2,511</td>
<td>1.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belarus</td>
<td>1,750</td>
<td>1.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other countries</td>
<td>138,253</td>
<td>76.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total number</td>
<td>180,222</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Federal Ministry of Education and Research

14 EU-8 countries include all states that entered the European Union in 2004, besides Malta and Cyprus.
In 2009, approximately 27,000 foreign students graduated in Germany, 17 percent of them had come from states that joined the European Union in 2004 and 2007. Another 5 percent had a Russian citizenship.

4.2.3 Family reunion

In established migration relations family reunion often contributed to the inflow of people from abroad. While persons from the new East European Union countries can join their families in Germany without restrictions, people from post-Soviet states need a residence permit. Because of this administrative procedure the number of family related immigrants from these countries is known (see table 4). In 2009, Russian citizens were second (6.4 percent of all family related residence permits) after Turkish citizens (16.1 percent) in receiving a resident permit, related to family reunion in Germany.\(^\text{15}\)

### Table 4: Residence permits related to family reunion in Germany (2009)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country of origin</th>
<th>Number of permits</th>
<th>In percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>7,759</td>
<td>16.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>3,084</td>
<td>6.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kosovo</td>
<td>2,556</td>
<td>5.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ukraine</td>
<td>1,363</td>
<td>2.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total number</td>
<td>48,235</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Statistical Office Germany

Furthermore 1,363 citizens from Ukraine (2.8 percent of all family related residence permits) joined their families in Germany. In most cases family related immigration from post-Soviet states has developed in connection to the movement of ethnic Germans and Jewish quota refugees.

4.3 Foreign citizens and persons with migration background from East Central Europe and post-Soviet states in Germany

Since the beginning of the 1990s migrant populations from East Central Europe and post-Soviet states in Germany have established. This was the result of various immigration waves from this region, such as the immigration of ethnic Germans, of Jewish quota refugees and of other immigrant groups, primarily labor migrants. These recent migrant populations from East Central European and post-Soviet states can either be classified by the citizenship concept or by a newly introduced definition, based on migration background.

The citizenship concept defines immigrants as persons who live in Germany but do not have the German citizenship. This has been a standard definition in German population statistics, although naturalized foreigners and ethnic Germans can not be distinguished. According to this definition 813,000 citizens from East Central European countries and 497,000 citizens from post-Soviet states lived in Germany in the year 2010. They accounted for nearly one fifth (19 percent) of all foreign citizens in Germany. As is demonstrated in figures 9 and 10, migrant populations from East Central Europe and post-Soviet states grew remarkably between 1995 and 2010. As a matter of fact, they are the fastest growing foreign population group in Germany in the recent two dec-

\(^{15}\) Altogether, 48,235 residence permits have been issued in 2009 in the framework of family reunion.
ades. This is in sharp contrast to the development of the total foreign population in Germany that declined by nearly 6 percent in that period.

The most important immigrant community from East Central European countries are citizens from Poland, including nearly 420,000 persons. They are followed by citizens from Romania (126,536 persons), Bulgaria (74,869 persons) and Hungary (68,892 persons). While the foreign population from Poland grew by approximately 73 percent between 1990 and 2010, Romanian and Hungarian citizens doubled. The number of persons with a Bulgarian citizenship increased by nearly six times in that period. It is remarkable that 125,000 Romanian citizens had already been counted in Germany in the year 1994. This was the result of the high asylum immigration from Romania since the beginning of the 1990s. Because of the return of many Romanians connected to a more restrictive asylum law in 1993, the number of Romanian citizens declined continuously. Since the year 2005 an increase of Romanians in Germany can again be observed, apparently related to the 2007 enlargement round of the European Union.

Figure 9: Migrant population (foreign citizens) from Poland, Romania, Hungary and Bulgaria in Germany (1990, 1995, 2000, 2005, 2010)

Source: Statistical Office, Germany

In 2010, Polish citizens ranked third among foreigners in Germany, after the Turkish and Italian communities. Meanwhile, the migrant population from Romania is slightly bigger than that from the traditional guestworker country Portugal. This indicates the growing weight of East Central European immigrants in Germany. Remarkably, this development has not manifested in the formation of minority enclaves or distinct migrant communities.

Next to migrants from East Central European countries citizens from post-Soviet states experienced a notable increase since 1995. The most important sending countries are Russia, Ukraine, Kazakhstan, Belarus and Moldova (see figure 10). Whereas in 1995, the immigrant population from these five countries was negligible, it accounted for 7.3 percent of all foreigners in Germany in 2010.

Citizens from post-Soviet countries living in Germany are highly diverse with respect to their migration motivation, their ethnic and social background. Many of them belong to the group of Jewish quota refugees, others are labor migrants, students or family related immigrants. The lat-
The group is particularly relevant in the case of people holding the Kazakh citizenship. These are in most cases relatives of ethnic Germans who have left Kazakhstan since the German exodus from this country, but were not eligible for the German citizenship.

Figure 10: Migrant population (foreign citizens) from Russia, Ukraine, Moldova and Belarus in Germany (1995, 2000, 2005, 2010)

Source: Statistical office Germany

Besides the citizenship concept, immigrants in Germany can newly be identified according to their migration background. This concept has been introduced in 2005 in German population statistics. It was developed to illustrate that citizenship as a sole indicator is insufficient to adequately describe the immigrant population. Persons with migration background include the following groups of people: foreigners born abroad, foreigners born in Germany, ethnic Germans, naturalised citizens who have themselves immigrated, as well as their children who have no personal, direct migration experience.

While the number of foreign citizens in Germany accounted for 6.75 million people (8.2 percent of the population) in 2010, 15.7 million people (19.2 percent of the population) had a migration background. This indicates that foreign citizens represent only less than half of those persons who have some kind of migration experience, either because they have migrated themselves or one of their parent. Europe is the most important sending region for people with a migration background in Germany. While 5.5 million persons with migration background are rooted in wider Europe, 4.6 million people come from the 27 member states of the European Union.

The most prominent home country for persons with a migration background is Turkey (2.49 million persons). It is followed by Poland (1.31 million persons) and Russia (1.05 million persons). As is demonstrated in table 5, only slightly more persons with migration background origin from the traditional sending country Italy (740,000 persons) than form the new emigration region Kazakhstan (720,000 persons). Comparing the foreign population and the population with migration background by sending countries reveals striking differences. Nearly two-thirds (65.5 percent) of all persons with a Turkish migration background hold the Turkish citizenship. In the case of Poland and Russia this percentage is much lower. While 32 percent of persons with a Polish migration background are Polish citizens, only 18 percent of people with a Russian migration background have a Russian passport. The high numerical differences between Polish and Russian citizens and persons with migration background coming from Poland and Russia can be ex-
plained by the large immigration of ethnic Germans from these countries, who received the German passport after arrival.

**Table 5: Persons with migration background and foreign citizens in Germany 2010, in million**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sending Country</th>
<th>Persons with migration background</th>
<th>Foreign citizens</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>2,49</td>
<td>1,02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poland</td>
<td>1,31</td>
<td>0,41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>1,05</td>
<td>0,19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>0,74</td>
<td>0,51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kazakhstan</td>
<td>0,72</td>
<td>0,05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greece</td>
<td>0,37</td>
<td>0,27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Romania</td>
<td>0,42</td>
<td>0,12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ukraine</td>
<td>0,25</td>
<td>0,12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>All</strong></td>
<td><strong>15,74</strong></td>
<td><strong>6,75</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Statistical Office, Germany

In a country of origin comparison, considerable variation exist with respect to the share of persons with migration background who have migrated themselves (see table 6). In traditional former labor sending countries such as Turkey, Italy and Greece this share is between 50 and 60 percent, indicating that a substantial part of the respective migrant population has been born in Germany (see table 6). To the contrast, more than 80 percent of migrants from East Central European countries and post-Soviet states have moved themselves. In the case of Kazakhstan and Russia the share of persons with migration experience is above 90 percent. This documents that East Central European and post-Soviet countries were the most prominent migrant sending states to Germany in recent years.

**Table 6: Persons with migration background and persons with migration experience in Germany 2010, in million**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sending Country</th>
<th>Persons with migration background</th>
<th>... of which persons with own migration experience</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>2,49</td>
<td>1,50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poland</td>
<td>1,31</td>
<td>1,11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>1,05</td>
<td>0,97</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>0,74</td>
<td>0,42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kazakhstan</td>
<td>0,72</td>
<td>0,69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greece</td>
<td>0,37</td>
<td>0,23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Romania</td>
<td>0,42</td>
<td>0,37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ukraine</td>
<td>0,25</td>
<td>0,22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>All</strong></td>
<td><strong>15,74</strong></td>
<td><strong>10,59</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Statistical Office, Germany

Approximately 15 percent of all people with migration background in Germany origin from a post-Soviet country. These are nearly as many people as from Turkey (see figure 11). The biggest group is from Russia, followed by people from Kazakhstan and Ukraine. Obviously this mirrors the high inflow of ethnic Germans from this region.
In 2010, slightly more than 1.4 million ethnic Germans (with own migration experience) lived in Germany who had come from the successor states of the Soviet Union. The biggest group (605,000 persons) originate from Russia, 537,000 ethnic Germans come from Kazakhstan and 39,000 from Ukraine. Out of all people with migration experience in Germany who had lived in Kazakhstan before they moved, nearly 78 percent are ethnic Germans. In the case of Russia, the share of ethnic Germans amounts to 62 percent and out of all persons with migration experience who had come from Ukraine only 12 percent are ethnic Germans. The much lower participation of ethnic Germans in the emigration from the last-mentioned two states can be explained by the fact that a considerable part of immigrants from Russia and Ukraine belong to the group of Jewish quota refugees, are students or labor migrants.

Although the migrant population from post-Soviet states in Germany differs in ethnic, social and country of origin terms, this group shares a transformation society experience and a Russian language background. In the public discourse, the migrant population from former Soviet countries is occasionally labeled as ‘Russian speaking minority’. Due to their linguistic background, ethnic German immigrants and Jewish quota refugees are included in this group. The recent establishment of several Russian language newspapers, which address the Russian speaking minority in Germany in general (Evropazentrum, Germania Plus), Jewish immigrants (Evreyskaya Gazeta) and ethnic Germans (Ostrowok, Deutsch-Russische Zeitung) supports this perception.
IDENTITY FORMATION AND INTEGRATION PROSPECTS OF ETHNIC GERMAN AND JEWISH IMMIGRANTS FROM POST-SOVIET COUNTRIES IN GERMANY: FINDINGS FROM EXPERT INTERVIEWS

Ethnic German and Jewish immigrants from the former Soviet Union decisively contributed to the growth and the pluralization of migrant populations in Germany. These two groups meanwhile constitute distinct immigrant communities which are characterized by their migration background, their admission status, and their ethnic, cultural and home country origin.

In the literature, the nature of minority/migrant group identity has been linked to various dimensions, most importantly to cultural differentiation and the institutional setting of boundaries (Wimmer 2008). Group identity is typically constituted as a sense of belonging to a distinct group based on shared characteristics such as language, history, culture and values. This translates into cultural differentiation in comparison to other social groups. Besides the social formation of group identity, the state is an important actor in defining group affiliation. Governmental institutions and policies contribute to the formation of immigrants’ group identity in defining the characteristics of belonging by an institutional setting of boundaries. More concretely, this involves the formulation of admission laws and integration provisions that relate to various immigrant groups. With respect to cultural differentiation and the institutional setting of boundaries, the formation of migrant group identity emerges in the context of a common frame of references which separates the respective minority/migrant group from others in the society (Wimmer 2008).

In the framework of the ENRI-East project, identity formation of ethnic German and Jewish immigrants was studied by means of expert interviews. The survey investigated the role of cultural differentiation and policy measures (institutional setting of boundaries) in defining the group identity of ethnic German and Jewish immigrants. Furthermore the experts were asked to assess integration prospects in analyzing the role of language competence and use.16

5.1 Description of expert interviews

The objective of the expert interviews was to obtain the analysis of professionals on identity formation and the integration situation of ethnic German and Jewish immigrants from the former Soviet Union in Germany. Therefore, the interviews aimed to obtain information coming from governmental representatives, from organizations representing ethnic German and Jewish immigrants themselves and from organizations working on or with them, but not necessarily representing them. In the light of these objectives, eight expert interviews were conducted.

The experts were recruited from the following organizations which are located in the North (Berlin and Northrhine-Westfalia) and South of Germany (Bavaria):

- Governmental organizations on the national and municipal level

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16 The expert interviews were conducted in cooperation with Professor Dr. Heike Roll, expert on German as a second language and intercultural communication, University of Münster.
- Cultural, religious or political NGO organizations, representing ethnic German and Jewish immigrants form post-Soviet countries or working with them on the national and regional level.

The experts were expected to be able to provide an analysis of the formation of group identity and integration prospects of ethnic German and Jewish immigrants from post-Soviet societies. In table 7, the characteristics of interviewed experts and their respective organizations are presented.

Table 7: Characteristics of experts and organizations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Interview code</th>
<th>Characteristics of experts</th>
<th>Name of the organization</th>
<th>Type of the organization</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Age</td>
<td>Gender</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Exi_01</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>Office of the Federal Government Commissioner for matters related to repatriates</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Exi_02</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>Youth and student organization of Germans from Russia, Association of Germans from Russia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Exi_03</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>Female</td>
<td>Jewish Community, Munich</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Exi_04</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>Female</td>
<td>Organization of Russian speaking youth in Germany (JUNOST)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Exi_05</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>Jewish Community, Krefeld</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Exi_06</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>Office for migration and housing of the city Munich</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Exi_07</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>Female</td>
<td>City administration, Krefeld</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Exi_08</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>Jewish Community, Düsseldorf</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

All experts were highly educated specialists and occupied a leading position within their organization. To conduct the expert interviews, a semi-structured interview method was used based on the specific themes and questions that were selected to be discussed face-to-face. The experts were asked to answer all questions in an analytical and reflective way, using the information that was available to them. The interviews lasted on average one hour, the shortest took 45 minutes, the longest 1.5 hours.

5.2 The purpose of experts’ organizations

On the governmental level, a representative of the office of the Federal Government Commissioner for matters related to repatriates (Aussiedler) and two representatives of city administrations, one in Bavaria and one in Northrhine-Westfalia were questioned. Ethnic German and Jew-

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17 The interviews were recorded and transliterated word by word.
ish immigrants’ organizations were represented by the Association of Germans from Russia and by Jewish Communities. Furthermore, one NGO participated in the expert survey, the organization of Russian speaking youth in Germany (JUNOST).

On 28 September 1988, the German government decided to create the office of the Federal Government Commissioner for matters related to repatriates (Aussiedler) to coordinate all government activities connected to the reception of ethnic Germans from Eastern Europe and the (former) Soviet Union. This office was installed in addition to the already existing Ministry of State in the Federal Chancellery and Federal Government Commissioner for migration, refugees, and integration. The new office was established to channel the immigration of ethnic Germans and to support their socially sustainable integration. Ethnic German immigrants should be enabled to quickly and permanently participate in the social, economic and cultural life in Germany. Moreover, the German government continued to support members of the German minorities in their regions of origin to improve their economic, social and legal situation. This was intended to help Germans who stayed in their home countries to establish there and to actively maintain ties to Germany.

The representative of the office of the Federal Government Commissioner for matters related to repatriates summarized the purposes of this organization as follows:

*Our institution is responsible for ethnic Germans coming from Central and Eastern Europe as well as from the successor states of the Soviet Union, whose admission is part of the German government’s effort to face moral responsibility for the consequences of the Second World War. That means the admission of people who had to suffer a particularly hard fate due to their German ethnicity. That’s the responsibility. It involves those who come as ethnic German emigrants and those who stay in their regions of origin as a German minority.* (Exi_01)

On the local level, meanwhile most municipalities in Germany maintain an office for migration, integration and intercultural affairs. These public institutions are responsible for the legal issues of foreigners, the integration of migrants and the social relations between natives and migrants, including ethnic Germans. In some cases other duties are performed by municipal integration offices as well, for example housing matters. The city of Munich is a case in point:

*The name of our office for housing and migration in Munich basically tells us the main issues this is all about. Naturally, this is the issue of housing in the broadest sense, which means housing market, housing agency, avoiding the lack of housings and it’s the issue of migration/ integration. With what groups of immigrants? With all, basically.* (Exi_06)

Typically, municipal integration offices address all migrants, independent of their status and often bundle a variety of activities which are offered in the city’s context.

*The office for integration in Krefeld has a cross-section function. Cross section function means nothing else than that many administrative units in this city are already busy with integration issues and that the office for integration, as supreme authority for these issues, coordinates all this work. Because that’s also the way it is in reality that many offices are concerned by these issues, but create parallel structures instead of working together and that’s how you waste important resources that are available. There are financial resources and human resources and if you don’t have a clear goal in mind, if everyone doesn’t have the same goal, it is more difficult to reach the goals. Beyond that, the office for integration is also the first place to go for persons with migration background, although we don’t do classic counseling, but rather mediate.* (Exi_07)
Besides providing information on integration activities it is an important task for migration/integration offices at the municipal level to include the representatives of various migrants’ organization to involve migrants’ into the formulation of integration concepts. In the case of the city administration of Krefeld this can be exemplified:

There’s also the integration committee; the administration of the integration committee is here; it is a political committee that has been here in Krefeld for one year. Many representatives of the migrants’ self-organization are in it and it is indeed important to organize the work in such way that everybody is involved. So that everything you do is supported by everybody and it’s important therefore to engage in these committees and to include the needs that are conveyed by these committees and work groups in order to shape the activities accordingly. And it’s a committee like all other committees, where the integration office receives questions, which are answered, concerning the topic of integration. (Exi_07)

While officials on the municipal level emphasize their responsibility for all immigrants and seek to involve all relevant migrants’ organizations into their integration activities, the representatives of particular immigrant groups are basically concerned with their own communities. The most important representative for ethnic Germans from the former Soviet Union is the Association of Germans from Russia (Landsmannschaft der Russlanddeutschen) which was founded in the early 1950s. According to the representative of the Association of Germans from Russia its activities include social welfare assistance to ethnic German immigrants and the promotion of integration.

The Association of Germans from Russia promotes integration, indeed. It’s still relevant. That’s why the Association of Germans from Russia has a lot of integration projects, which are carried out in federal states (Bundesländer) and nationwide. Particularly relevant is the promotion of language development, because the German language is the key to integration. Therefore there are a lot of German language courses, which we offer. And in the youth field there are leisure activities. Although many young ethnic Germans came here when they were two or three years old, they still have the mentality that they want to do something together. (Exi_02)

In the case of Jewish immigrants from post-Soviet states the Central Council of Jews in Germany and the Jewish communities are the key organizations that are responsible for the integration of Jewish newcomers. As a precondition for integration activities a wide range of German language courses are offered. The Central Council also enables people to explore their Jewish roots and their Jewish faith, which they were unable to practice for many years in their countries of origin.

A representative of the Jewish community in Munich described these comprehensive tasks:

The community – the Jewish communities in Germany in general and of course our community as well – have been the receiving places of the Jewish emigrants from its beginning, that is prior to – prior to the regulated integration process. As early as 1991 few individuals were arriving and after that, after this quota refugee law many Jewish immigrants have been accepted in a regulated procedure. All those social and legal things and those connected to aliens’ law were of course governmental matters, so there were administrative measures for it, how all this was dealt with. But the Jewish migrants were accepted because of the anti-Semitism in the former Soviet Union. And also to strengthen Jewish communities in Germany and the Jewish communities took over this task, this integration, as they say. (Exi_03)

18 The Association of Germans from Russia represents the German minority in all successor states of the Soviet Union. Its name still relates to the German minority in the Russian Empire.
When the immigration of Jews from the former Soviet Union to Germany started, the Jewish communities were not prepared to handle the economic and social integration of newcomers. However, supported by the Central Council of Jews in Germany, the Jewish communities adapted to this situation.

We had to think about religious integration first, but also about social, and thereby we were of course assisted enormously by our Central Council. It soon began to show the communities ways how to handle this, the social integration. It was particularly important that families who arrived with children, that the children were educated that they were placed in the right schools. Also particularly important was that homes were found. (Exi_03)

While the Association of Germans from Russia is concerned with ethnic Germans, and the Jewish communities with Jewish immigrants, recently a new organization has been founded that addresses all immigrants from post-Soviet countries or persons with a Russian language background. This is the Organization of Russian speaking youth in Germany (JUNOST) which primarily focuses on younger persons. The founding members of JUNOST were immigrants from post-Soviet states: ethnic Germans, Jewish immigrants and others with a Russian language background. The representative of JUNOST described the background and motivation to establish this organization as follows:

After immigration the idea of forming an association came up and so we were involved with the question, well, what kind of association would that actually be? One for the Russian Germans, for the Jewish migrants, or for the students who came from Russia and study here? And then we said, we don’t want to define ourselves along national lines, we don’t want these narrow limits now, but we just call it a Russian speaking group and everybody is welcome to us, no matter what national group she or he’s from. (Exi_04)

5.3 Identity formation

5.3.1 Cultural differentiation

Following the approach put forward by Wimmer (2008), one aspect of identity formation is provided by cultural differentiation which denotes a demarcation line between social groups. Cultural differentiation includes unique cultural practices, shared social experiences and a common history and ancestry. In the case of ethnic German immigrants from post-Soviet states a number of commonalities exist in that respect which defines the unique character of this group. As formerly persecuted national minority in the Soviet Union they experienced deportation and discrimination during and after World War II. These historical events legitimized the admission of ethnic Germans and their ethno-cultural rehabilitation by the German state. The representative of the Office of the Federal Government Commissioner for matters related to repatriates explained this nexus:

And the support we give is not only a support of integration, but also always a support of the cultural rehabilitation of ethnic Germans. So when we afford German language teaching and language promotion in Russia as well as here in Germany, I consider it a contribution to the cultural rehabilitation of this originally German-speaking, German ethnic group and – and accordingly, some things which we do now can be explained by this. So, for example we promote partnerships between the Association of Germans from Russia in Germany and ethnic German minority organizations in – in the Russian Federation and soon, we hope, in Kazakhstan and other places, too. (Exi_01)
Before emigration, the social experience, education and cultural practices of ethnic Germans were defined by the institutions of (post-)Soviet societies. Nevertheless, elements of German minority religious practices were preserved and revived after the emigration to Germany. For the Association of Germans from Russia for example, the religious affiliation (mainly lutheran and catholic) plays an important role in defining its tasks.

*Religion is of high value for the Association of Germans from Russia. That’s because it was founded by church representatives. It is in this context a lot of integration measures emerge – they’re often connected to the church. With adolescents, however, this tendency is not as strong anymore.* (Exi_02)

In the former Soviet Union, the language of communication for ethnic Germans was Russian and the adaptation to the culture of (post-)Soviet societies prevailed. In spite of that ethnic German minority culture occasionally existed, although influenced by the cultural traditions of surrounding nationalities. In families, friendship circles and in the framework of the Association of Germans from Russia this cultural heritage is carried on in Germany.

*The advancement of cultural identity is still quite important. There are a lot of music groups. There’s also the promotion of culture, that is what ethnic Germans have taken along, with a part from Russia or Kazakhstan, too.* (Exi_02)

In the view of the representative of the Association of Germans from Russia it is important to understand that ethnic German immigrants promote their cultural heritage and social traditions to a large part in a network of family and friends. The tendency to organize is very low in this group, most likely related to experiences in their former home countries.

*The ethnic Germans don’t organize themselves. That’s not the case and there you have to – but this is also due to their history. I mean since the Soviet Union they – you didn’t learn how to organize and how to assert your rights there. You’ve had negative experiences with the administration units, with society, and so it was more likely that you withdrew, and that’s a kind of pattern of behavior, which was then – I think – transferred to Germany, too, because that’s just unfamiliar, because you didn’t learn that in the country you’re from.* (Exi_02)

As in the case of ethnic Germans, Jewish immigrants from post-Soviet states share a common ancestry and the history of belonging to an often discriminated minority. Although many Jewish immigrants were not religious in the narrow sense of the word before immigration, they identified as Jews and were identified as Jewish in (post-)Soviet societies. Jewish communities in Germany relate to this background and promote a deepening of religious practices.

*The Jewish people who come here are – well, they already have got a stable identity, even though they don’t define themselves through religion, they are Jews. So that is deep, they do have this stable identity; it’s just that here it’s also defined with another component, religion, for example and for many it’s a new discovery…or rediscovery, or – because many have such childhood memories, or they know this from their grandparents’ stories, or they lived traditions, as handed down from generation to generation; they lived these traditions, but don’t know their meanings anymore. And there we do religious integration; that’s a huge priority with us, too. We offer people our support, seminars, courses, lectures; we celebrate Jewish holidays together here in our community and according to the Jewish calendar…. (Exi_03)

Because of their Russian mother tongue, Jewish immigrants are often identified as Russians in Germany. In the light of discrimination experiences in post-Soviet societies, a Jewish community representative described this situation:
The general problem, of course, is that people are considered to be Russians everywhere due to their language, because they speak Russian. Nevertheless, this has a certain advantage because many still have got this deep-seated fear of being discriminated against as a Jew, due to their personal experiences in the Soviet Union and during the war. (Exi_03)

But in the framework of Jewish communities, Jewish immigrants stabilized and strengthened Jewish activities, although they introduced new cultural elements and social experiences. A representative of the Jewish community in Krefeld exemplified this:

*It is very obvious. There wouldn’t be any more Jewish life in Germany, if those people hadn’t come. The communities would have died out, smaller communities, which back then, in 1990, had 120 members, would have 20 members today and wouldn’t be able to exist anymore. In my opinion, that was of great benefit to the Jews in Germany, and not only to the Jews, but also to the society as a whole. I mean, I see how many people of the non-Jewish..., that is non-Jews, come to the community for cultural events, I’d say almost more than from the Jewish community itself, how many guided tours are made, how many students, whom one can show certain things, take part. That has lead to a very positive change; it’s of course normal that there are difficulties sometimes, too, and that’s bound to occur, when so many people go somewhere in such a short time. (Exi_05)*

Recently, a new identification option has developed among younger immigrants from the former Soviet Union. Presumably in connection to the European enlargements and the effort of European Union institutions to install various cooperation programs, a European identification has evolved.

*Now, I have observed the tendency that a lot of adolescents among immigrants from post-Soviet countries define themselves as Europeans. And that has something to do with these open European borders, but it has also something to do with support, because suddenly a lot of new funds emerged, which promote the cooperation of different European youth organizations. For the first time some years ago we – there is a program “Youth in Action” and there the exchange between three European countries is promoted. In the past it were always two countries and we always chose Russia, though Russia is not always considered to be a part of Europe and now there are a lot of programs, as I said, which promote youth exchanges and the condition is always like three European countries, one of these East European. And the meetings with those young people from all those countries of course lead to --- contribute to the feeling that you are European, rather than German or an ethnic German repatriate and that you are simply an adolescent in Europe. (Exi_04)*

### 5.3.2 Migration experience

A further element that contributes to the formation of group identity in the case of ethnic German and Jewish immigrants alike is the migration experience. Against this background relation to the former home countries are of particular relevance. While the relationship of ethnic Germans to their former home countries was very limited in the period of the cold war, this situation changed since the political transformation and the dissolution of the Soviet Union. In recent years not only governmental representatives increasingly look for cooperation with the former home countries of ethnic Germans this is also the case for associations representing this group. The main intention is to support ethnic Germans who still live in post-Soviet states and to cooperate with them based on economic, social and cultural projects.
On the governmental level, the German-Russian cooperation on topics related to the German minority in the Russian Federation is still related to unsolved political problems in the past.

In 1992 a protocol was signed in the Russian-German relationship with the Russian side about the cooperation between Germany and Russia in a mixed governmental commission for the advancement of the German minority in Russia, in fact for the rebuilding of the – of the Volga Republic, and now we are conducting negotiations, which – which deal with updates to this protocol. Not that easy, because on the one hand the option of the – of the Volga Republic, its statehood, isn’t considered appropriate anymore in the Russian Federation, but on the other hand there is an obligation to rehabilitate, which is linked to the – the rebuilding of this statehood. (Exi_05)

In contrast to the political exchange of governmental authorities, the Association of Germans from Russia is mainly active in the social and economic field. Its representative described this new development:

Since recently, we have these trans-border projects, which are supported by Russia and Germany as well. We have a partnership with the organization of Germans in Russia and with the German youth organization in Russia. And we have something similar with Kazakhstan’s youth. Within the Association of Germans from Russia a business association (E.V.U.D.R) was established in the field of innovation. Young entrepreneurs are organized there and in the course of this, partnerships emerge, which are established now between entrepreneurs in Russia and in Germany. (Exi_02)

It is noteworthy that the exchange with Russia in the framework of a visiting program for young ethnic German repatriates resulted in an increasing self-confidence of this group.

We noticed that many people don’t dare to say ‘I am the German from Russia’. They say ‘I’m German’. It’s correct, we were Germans there (...). But they feel ashamed to say that they can speak Russian, too. They think they would be despised and excluded then. It is the case, indeed. And yet they become more self-confident, when they compare this after a voyage to Russia. They can speak two languages and English is a third one here anyway. And you can use Russian easily. So you come to Russia and suddenly say: ‘Oh, I spoke it in the past and now I can actually speak the language in Russia’. (Exi_02)

In their relation to their former home countries Jewish immigrants essentially refer to family and cultural bonds. Travels are often connected to a visit of family members left behind. Recently, the Central Council of Jews in Germany has initiated cooperation with Jewish communities in regions where Jewish people had left for Germany.

The Central Council of Jews in Germany it has – yes, a European exchange and an exchange with the countries of origin in the social sector. For example: it is asked how are welfare benefits organized there, or supporting measures. And the Central Council now tries to help – so that the countries of origin are supported with know-how from, for instance, Germany or Europe; how you organize welfare benefits, conduct projects and develop concepts and vice versa, how you improve benefits here for Jewish migrants. (Exi_03)

The most active in cooperating with former home countries is the organization JUNOST. This is related to its self-conception of integrating the Russian language and former home country culture into German life. The main focus of projects by JUNOST is cultural and social exchange.

We have a lot of relations to the former home countries, because we have a lot of exchange projects, too. So Russia and Ukraine are top priority, because we also have contacts to the or-
ganizations, where we ourselves are from, ... for example to the youth council of the Germans and to the German youth organization in Ukraine. An exchange project always has a main focus, it doesn’t always have to be cultural, they are different, there was social exchange, too, where we – where we did something with disadvantaged children. There was cultural exchange. We organized a big theatre festival in Munich and now we’ve chosen some partners in Russia. But we have nothing organized on the economic level, because according to our goals we’re not interested in these business contacts. (Exi_02)

5.3.3 Policy measures

Besides cultural differentiation that defines ethnic German and Jewish immigrant communities in terms of shared history, culture, social experiences and ties to their former home countries, policy measures, i.e. the institutional setting of group boundaries are of relevance in defining group identity. On the one hand the legal status relates to the admission procedure, on the other to integration measures. Until the introduction of the immigration law in Germany (2005), huge differences existed between the immigration rights of various immigrant groups. The most privileged group were ethnic Germans who were granted the German citizenship after arrival and a number of specific integration measures. Compared to the immigration provisions of third country nationals, ethnic Germans and Jewish immigrants from post-Soviet states are still in a better position, although the 2005 immigration law evened the rights of immigrants. The representative of the Office of the Federal Government Commissioner for matters related to repatriates illustrated the new law and its implications for the admission status of ethnic Germans:

The immigration law has of course lead to a leveling by virtually creating a unified legal and support framework for the – all immigration groups, for those, whose admission is actually a manifestation of a special historical-moral obligation and for those whose arrival is based on the rights of residence and aliens law, where the backgrounds are very different. A point, which presents a specific problem of the immigration law for ethnic German immigrants, at least in their perception, is the fact that the language requirement for the descendants of ethnic German repatriates was introduced by the immigration law. So far we had the situation, that since 1996, the ethnic German immigrant had to confirm his or her German ethnicity by family-mediated language skills, but all his or her immediate descendants would then be accepted without any additional proof of language skills. All family members are required to learn basic skills in the German language now, according to the immigration law. This created once again an additional barrier to immigration for ethnic Germans. (Exi_02)

The 2005 immigration law also restricted the movement of Jewish citizens from post-Soviet countries to Germany. But it is of key relevance for this immigrant group to relate their admission to the discrimination experience in their former home countries and to count on a secure residence status.

These laws which were created or implemented for Jewish migrants primarily brought security. They were tied to a temporary residence status and also to a work permit; they didn’t have to apply for it separately. And with it you had access to other benefits, for example to vocational training, health care, social welfare benefits... And that gives security; people get the feeling that they’re welcome here. As the saying goes, they have been invited.... (Exi_03)

On the regional level there is a strong support for the 2005 immigration law in Germany and the equalization of admission rights and integration provisions for all immigrants. In the context of
specific integration programs on the municipal level this was exemplified by the representative of
the office for migration and housing in Munich:

Specific programs for immigrants according to their status are just yesterday’s. Munich’s admin-
istration has never done such a thing. It’s no use, yes. Everyone, even the Jewish immigrants or
the ethnic German immigrants have to integrate themselves here first. They have to learn Ger-
man; they have to orient themselves. (Exi_06)

5.4 Integration prospects: The role of language competence

All experts who participated in the survey agreed that the most important integration requirement
is the German language competence. In the absence of German language competence, the percep-
tion of many ethnic Germans who expected their German ancestry to facilitate their integration
turned out to be wrong. The representative of the Office of the Federal Government Commis-
sioner for matters related to repatriates pointed to this problem and voted for policy interventions
in that context:

They mostly believed that their German origin is a – a more relevant link to German society than
they actually experience it here. They experience a pluralistic society in which relatively little is
spoken about ‘being German’ and where for that reason the relevance of this origin – where it’s
difficult to find links. So that is a – a disillusionment and I very much take a stand for – for coun-
tering politically and – and yes, actually also risking to define national obligations in this
context. Unfortunately it’s just a minority in German society, who really recognize the particu-
larities of the group of ethnic Germans. But – but to be honest, the majority of the German popu-
lation unfortunately does not distinguish or identify the particularities of this immigrant group,
nor does it see the special links to the majority society. (Exi_01)

It was also obvious to all experts that an initial German language deficit is common to immi-
grants from post-Soviet countries. In that respect status differences become irrelevant.

An important issue is of course the language problem. The – the – the adherence to the German
language among ethnic German repatriates is – is low and they’re mostly – they mostly have a
Russian, yes, a considerable relationship to their native language, so to say, and therefore they
also have the same comparable problems as others do. (Exi_01)

Although language courses were offered to ethnic Germans and Jewish immigrants, these courses
were apparently not financed long enough to guarantee the labor market integration. In the case
of Jewish immigrants only those persons were supported who were in working age.

It was of course very important that the Jewish communities offered language promotion from
the beginning. Up to the year 2005 only someone who had the chance to integrate himself into
working life got a place in a publicly funded language course, thus being 60 years and older
meant not getting a language course anymore. Many people who’ve come since 1991 and who
were that age, didn’t have any chance to learn the language in a regular way. And that’s why the
Jewish community together with the city of Munich…with the adult education centre developed a
concept installing German courses for older people at the adult education centre. So that older
quota refugees – at least once a week or twice a week – as the case may be – were able to learn
German, too. Since 2005 it’s been perfect…There are these integration courses everybody is able
to attend. (Exi_03)
However it was also pointed out that the development of Russian speaking communities in Germany tended to prevent the advancement of German language competence, particularly in the older generation of immigrants from post-Soviet countries.

**But it’s also the case that a Russian infrastructure has emerged in many German cities over the last 20 years; so there are Russian hairdressers, shops, shoemakers, anything, so that people can actually live these days without having to speak German. This wasn’t possible like that for other groups in the past, because they were much too small. (Exi_08)**

Besides the language problem experts also mentioned the limited recognition of certifications and skills as a barrier to labor market integration. Although in the case of ethnic Germans, skills and certificates were often officially recognized, reservations against qualifications from post-Soviet countries exist.

The biggest disadvantage was that qualifications and degrees...were not accepted and thus many people were... and also Germany was denied the opportunity of highly skilled people entering the labor market. And now after 15, 20 years everybody suddenly yells “skilled worker shortage” and we now recruit engineers from Ukraine, Moldavia, and Russia. And the engineers who’ve been living here for 15 years now and who’ve tried to get a job somewhere for years, the chance is over...(Exi_03)

On the municipal level, concepts have been developed to better employ the skills and qualifications of immigrants. The representative of the office for migration and housing of the city Munich pointed out that this concept has to be introduced for all immigrants, independent of their status.

There’s the concept of using the qualifications people have when they arrive, be it that they can verify it, be it that these are of informal nature. That means we examine: What can the migrants actually offer? What do they possibly need to qualify for the German labor market? This means that we accordingly offer specific training courses. We clearly address the skills people have, which means that we basically determine what exactly can be added to their skills by further language courses and qualification measures in their respective profession. Part of it is of course again and again multilingualism, but that’s not all. One result is that the procedure for recognition of vocational qualifications from third countries has to be accelerated. (Exi_06)

It is often the case that language deficits and the missing recognition of certifications and skills are mutually dependent.

**Well, without speaking German – you don’t get – a good job and without German education – German qualifications and degrees are of course very important, too. If you have a look at all the elderly now, who got a good education in Russia, but are not yet able to speak German very well, they almost don’t get any job. It does not only depend on age, but rather on this: no German skills and a Russian degree is not accepted. (Exi_04)**

In the context of the German language acquisition the expert survey discovered a new trend. While it had been strongly argued for years that the German language had to replace the Russian one, a bilingual language concept is promoted by a number of experts and organizations. The representative of JUNOST exemplified this approach:

Integration is always a two way process, which means that the German and the Russian language both have to play a role. And if JUNOST looks for new young people now, it’s not that we just look for Russians, or that we say he or she has to speak Russian, not at all, we also do have a lot of Germans who – who are interested in Russian culture or the Russian language and so in
general I’d say that you can’t just focus on German, because the whole … our past has a lot of potential, too. If I abandoned my language now, or what I’ve learnt in my homeland, then I would be nothing, then… That’s why I’m always in favor of mixing those two things together somehow. (Exi_04)

But there is also a part of the older generation of immigrants from post-Soviet states that are deeply connected the Russian language. The representative of the Jewish community in Düsseldorf provided an example:

Yes, we have to assume that we have an older generation, who won’t be able anymore to learn German to such a degree, that they can follow a reasonable – an intellectual speech. This means we have to serve those people, too, by offering cultural events in Russian; sometimes Russian cabaret artists, or musicians, or theatres come here; we also have a Russian-speaking theatre. True. But it’s – it’s actually like this with the perspective: It decreases as time goes by. The younger people are more and more able to speak German. Thus, I think in 50 years, if not much changes, there won’t be any more events in Russian. (Exi_08)

The assessment that Russian will loose its function in the framework of immigrant communities from post-Soviet states is not shared by all experts. Some of them observe that it is not only the older generation that tends to keep the Russian language but there is also a tendency to promote Russian among children and youth. On the local level, the representative of the Association of Germans from Russia reported about groups for children which offer leisure activities in the Russian language.

We always have an offer at the local association on Saturdays that children between 7 and 12 years can join the theatre group and those up to 7 years, they go to a kind of craft group. This is offered and we basically speak Russian there. (Exi_02)

For some officials in Jewish communities it came as a surprise that the Russian language played such an important role as a language of communication. It is further observed, that families from post-Soviet countries are bilingual (Russian/German) and that a bilingual education is supported by a number of community members from the former Soviet Union.

The Russian language? It’s surprisingly important. That is the Russian language….even the young still speak Russian, actually, as I sometimes hear it, speak Russian among each other and the parents even of little children, that is the children who are in the third generation now, want their children to keep the Russian language and probably speak Russian with them at home. That is clearly visible and above all audible. Now, for all the very young there are already courses in Russian, because they just lose touch with the language and the parents want them to be able to speak it. At first I was somehow skeptical; I admit it freely, because I said they should learn German, but they learn German very well in kindergarten at the latest, so that they don’t have any problems with it in school. And, well, I…at first I was not enthusiastic about it, but I can somehow understand now that parents say, yeah, why not learning the language of their origin and I mean it’s a language which a lot of people speak in this world, so why shouldn’t they keep it. (Exi_05)

Independent of the established contact points for immigrants from the former Soviet Union it can be observed that private Russian language institutions spread. They were established and supported by various people with a post-Soviet background or a Russian language affiliation.

There are a lot of so-called Russian schools now, that is clubs, groups, which call themselves Russian schools or cultural or education club, or whatever, and there they offer Russian.
language and Russian literature for children. And many parents bring their children --- so this is booming; many parents bring their children to the kindergarten on weekends as well, to the ordinary primary school or the secondary school, or whatever, in addition bring them to class there, Russian language and literature, because it’s very important that the children don’t forget the language. (Ext_03)

In the context of language acquisition and use there is agreement among all experts that the German language is of vital importance for the labor market and social integration. But there is also consensus that a bilingual background might benefit social relations and occupational advancement.
6 SUMMARY AND PRACTICAL IMPLICATIONS

In the European Union, Germany hosts the greatest number of people with migration background, coming from East Central Europe and post-Soviet countries. This was the result of various immigration waves since the early 1950s, including the return of ethnic Germans, the admission of Jewish quota refugees and the immigration of asylum seekers, students, labor and family related migrants. While ethnic Germans and Jewish quota refugees were accepted on the base of ethnic, political and humanitarian criteria, other immigrants from East Central Europe and post-Soviet countries passed through the general immigration procedure. The inflow of ethnic Germans began in the 1950s and accelerated as a result of the political transformation in East Central Europe and the break-up of the Soviet Union. Between 1991 and 2010 approximately 2.2 million ethnic Germans moved to Germany, more than 90 percent came from post-Soviet Union countries. Due to various legal restrictions the immigration of ethnic Germans from the successor states of the Soviet Union declined since 2005. This was also observed in the case of Jewish quota refugees whose immigration to Germany included approximately 231,000 persons between 1991 and 2010.

As a result of the overall immigration from East Central Europe and the former Soviet Union to Germany, 813,000 citizens from East Central European countries and 497,000 citizens from post-Soviet states lived in Germany in the year 2010. They accounted for nearly one fifth (19 percent) of all foreign citizens. As a matter of fact, citizens from East Central Europe and the former Soviet Union are the fastest growing foreign population group in Germany in the recent two decades. Among persons with migration background, who include ethnic German immigrants and naturalized foreigners, every fourth immigrant comes from East Central Europe and the former Soviet Union. While the most prominent home country for persons with a migration background is Turkey, Poland is second and Russia third.

Until the end of the 1980s the integration of ethnic Germans in Germany was considered a success story. In later years, ethnic Germans experienced substantial integration problems that were typical for immigrants from transition societies. Although ethnic Germans were in general better educated than labor migrants and their descendants who came in the 1960s and 1970s to Germany, they had difficulties in transferring their human capital to the German labor market. As for other immigrant groups, the labor market integration of ethnic Germans depended on German language proficiency, qualifications and professional experience. Professions with different profiles in market and transition economies, for example jobs in administration, trade, banking, technology or education, denoted a special employment risk. Because the German language competence of ethnic Germans was low and their qualifications did not fit the German labor market, their unemployment risk is higher and their earnings positions are lower than that of comparative native Germans. With respect to social integration, a lack of socio-structural adaptation was observed for ethnic German immigrants since the beginning of the 1990s. A growing spatial segregation was accompanied by the tendency to withdraw from German institutions and neighborhoods, particularly in the younger generation. Although the inflow of ethnic Germans from the former Soviet Union decreased since 2005, Russian speaking Aussiedler communities developed. In these communities major elements of social and cultural activities practiced in former home countries were retained.

Although Jewish quota refugees differed significantly from ethnic Germans with respect to their social background and education, they show some similarities regarding their economic and social integration in Germany. Their educational attainment and their professional experience are
often incompatible with the German labor market and their German language competence is low. This lead to an unemployment rate above the national average and forced many Jewish quota refugees to work in lower-skilled professions than they had been trained for. The integration of Jewish immigrants into German neighborhoods or institutions is rather limited. Most Jewish immigrants base their social relations on family and friendship networks which rely on connections built up in their former home countries. Jewish communities in Germany played a key role in supporting the integration of Jewish newcomers. But the more secular practices and the post-Soviet cultural background and education of Jewish immigrants contributed to a diversification of Jewish Communities in Germany. Nevertheless, the immigration of Jews from the former Soviet Union turned Germany into the only country in Europe with an expanding Jewish population.

Besides ethnic Germans and Jewish quota refugees a new immigration population from East Central Europe and post-Soviet countries established in Germany since the end of the 1980s, initially on the part of asylum seekers and subsequently in relation to labor, family related and student migration. Because of the enlargements of the European Union, labor immigration from EU-8 countries became easier and is no longer restricted since May 2011. Against this backdrop, Polish citizens outnumbered traditional immigration groups in Germany. In 2010, they ranked third among the foreign population, after the Turkish and Italian communities. Immigrant populations from Romania and Bulgaria also experienced a remarkable growth. Nevertheless, this has not manifested in the formation of minority enclaves or in the organization of East Central European citizens in cultural or political terms. The analysis of the economic integration of this group reveals a number of deficits. Although the labor force participation of immigrants from EU-8 countries is higher than that of immigrants from non-EU states, it is significantly lower than that of native Germans. Moreover, unemployment rates among migrants from EU-8 states in Germany are substantially higher than among Germans. This reflects their sectoral employment structure, i.e. their above-average occupation in agriculture, construction and services and their higher occupation in low skilled jobs.

The recent population inflow from East Central Europe and post-Soviet countries contributed to a considerable growth and diversity of people with migration background in Germany. In part this immigration was specific as ethnic German and Jewish immigrants were admitted on the base of ethnic, political and humanitarian considerations. But independent of the status and the home country origin of immigrant populations from East Central Europe and post-Soviet countries in Germany, similar deficits were identified concerning their economic and social integration.

Based on evidence obtained by this report, some practical implications for integration policy measures can be derived. In the context of economic and social integration, everything points to fact that integration policy measures have to be broadly defined, including not only specific programs for immigrants, such as language or integration courses, but general policies as well, for example labor market and education policies. The precondition for an equal labor market participation of immigrants is the unrestricted access to the labor market and the equal participation in the educational and vocational training system. As has been shown in this report, the unemployment of immigrants from East Central Europe and post-Soviet countries is higher than that of natives and many qualified immigrants can not find a job according to their qualification. Besides language problems, these frictions can be explained by a number of economic rigidities that concern many new immigrants. It is harder to move up the social ladder in Germany than in any other country in Europe and formal qualifications play a key role in labor market access. Although it is in the discussion in Germany to simplify the process for recognizing the educational
credentials for all immigrants and thus to ease the chance of newcomers to find a job according to their skill level, the introduction of this measure has to speed up. If differences between the education and qualification system in the home country and Germany are very high it is reasonable to offer training and further qualification courses. In any case, a cutback of labor market rigidities would facilitate the labor market access of immigrants and provide a chance of job advancement.

This report showed that German language competence plays a key role for the economic and social integration of immigrants from East Central Europe and post-Soviet states. The German language is not only a determinant for the labor market access and wage level, it is also the basic requirement for social interaction. Accordingly, the advancement of the German language is of high priority for new as well as for second generation immigrants. However this does not mean to neglect the mother tongue or the language of the former home country. Among all immigrant groups from post-Soviet states there is a strong affiliation to the Russian language and a number of immigrants from these countries argue in favor for keeping the Russian language competence and of a bi-lingual education. Besides the cultural relevance of maintaining the former home country’s language there is also evidence that a bi-lingual background advances the professional career of immigrants.

In the context of social integration the occasional development of migrant enclaves was observed among East Central European and post-Soviet immigrants, particularly among ethnic Germans. This was related to frictions in social adaptation processes on the side of the immigrants and to elements of social closure on the side of the native population. Meanwhile it is standard in European Union societies to understand social integration as a two-sided process and to promote the acceptance of cultural and ethnic plurality within societies. Accordingly, the social integration of East Central European and post-Soviet immigrants in Germany can only be advanced if their unique migration background is taken into account, if they are supported to cope with the social norms and the value system of the receiving society, and if indifferent and hostile attitudes of natives are overcome. This requires the joint effort of legal and educational institutions, of the media and representatives of various immigrants’ organizations in raising the awareness for cultural diversity but at the same time supporting equal treatment.
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Dr. Barbara Dietz is the head of the study group on migration and integration at the Osteuropa-Institut Regensburg which explores the determinants and patterns of East-West migration and the integration of immigrants from Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union in Germany and EU countries. She has conducted extensive research on migration policies and on East-West migration movements after the political transformation in Eastern Central Europe and the collapse of the Soviet Union. Furthermore she is involved in studies exploring the social and economic integration of East European migrant populations in Germany. She also worked as a consultant for the INTAS projects “Social and Political Trends for CIS Countries: Key-Indicators and Social Measurements of Transition” (INTAS Ref. N. 03-51-6388) and “Patterns of Migration in the New European Borderlands: An assessment of Post-Enlargement Migration Trends in NIS Border Countries” (INTAS Ref. No: 04-79-7165).