

of the London Shipping Company, we ventured to think for ourselves.

It will not be difficult, I say, to show that this was the intention of the motion, and I shall proceed to do so. As hinted before, without explanation, it might be difficult for a stranger to guess, with what object the motion was brought forward, and even with the explanations now given, doubts might have remained on the point, but these doubts were fortunately cleared up by the speeches made in the Council, at the discussion of the motion. In introducing the motion, the gentleman who did so, said, that it was now admitted as a principle, that the servants of every public body, from Parliament downwards, should be of the same opinion as that body, or, at least, that they should give expression to no adverse opinions, and in the justice of this principle, he expressed his entire concurrence: he then went on to state that he meant nothing personal by the motion, but made it solely from a sense of public duty. Now, as there is nothing inconsistent in this avowal, with the intention of punishing persons offending against the principle contended for by the speaker, God forbid that I should question the assertion. He then said, that although Mr. Cruickshank and I were the paid servants of the Council, we were also the agents of a Tory Member of Parliament—that we had allied ourselves with a party, which laughed at the Reformed Councils, and that we had actually become Members of Conservative Associations, and that I, in particular, had organized a Club for the express purpose, he had no doubt, of intimidating the County Voters; and, therefore, (and it is an admirable specimen of the *non sequitur*), he argued, that we ought no longer to hold any situation under the Town Council of Banff. What connection that body had with the election of a Member for the County of Banff, I, who heard the speech, was somewhat at a loss to understand; it was, however, satisfactory to find, that it was not because we interfered in politics at all, but because we interfered on the wrong side, that the motion had been brought forward,—I say it was satisfactory to hear this so openly avowed, as otherwise it might have been said that the motion rested on the abstract principle, that it is wrong in any public officer to take an active part in politics, and that the motion was merely brought forward to vindicate this principle, and that I had no title to complain even although that principle should constrain my conduct. Aware that this might have been said, had the gentleman argued for his motion on “public principle” alone, it was with no small delight that I heard him