"The Expulsion of the Negative: Deleuze, Adorno, and the Ethics of Internal Difference"

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**Abstract**

This article offers a critique of Deleuzian ethics by returning to a founding operative concept of the Deleuzian project: "internal difference." Taken as an ontological ground of Being, internal difference becomes ideological, leading to an apartheid-like logic of the “expulsion” of difference from the “planes of immanence” on which any singular multiplicity “leads their life.” Used to describe the actual and potential forms of organization of specific and limited totalities, however, internal difference can serve to underpin a critical and reflexive ethics of constituent subjectivity.

To *compare* Deleuze with another thinker is already to proceed in counterpoint to deleuzian practice, to refuse at some level to follow Deleuze’s own method. The monograph (Bergson, Kant, Nietzsche, Spinoza, Leibniz, to name only philosophers) is Deleuze’s favored method of investigation. Deleuze does not orchestrate encounters of contradictory voices, but instead revoices the philosophical character (*personnage*) he is studying. He isolates himself (selectively) in a windowless monad with the object of his inquiry to enumerate the essential qualities upon a single plane of immanence. If, with Guattari, Deleuze will offer readers a bewildering multiplicity of objects to consider, these are understood to be *singularities*, each enclosed in the splendid isolation of its “operative function” (1993: 3). Between these singularities and the totality Deleuze calls the univocity of being, no dialectical relations inhere, but rather an absolute leap of perception.

Deleuze and Adorno thus appear to stand in irreconcilable opposition. The former the philosopher of immanence and the univocity of being, the latter the foremost thinker of irresolvable contradictions and negative dialectics, they look to very different precursors and speak entirely different philosophical languages that allow for precious little communication to
occur. Yet to leave each to his proper plane of immanence—in which their respective truth may be expressed without dissent—would be to abandon critique for the history of ideas. Instead, I think it is possible to compose a dissonant relationship between these two seemingly antagonistic thinkers. In this article, I propose to examine Deleuze’s early writings via a critical reading of the founding operative concept of the Deleuzian project: “internal difference.” If Alain Badiou rightly locates the precondition of Deleuzian thought in the “univocity of being,” this remains “a silent, supra-cognitive or mystical intuition” (Badiou 31) about which one can say no more than to repeat the mantra: “Being is One.” What one can talk about are instead the modes or “simulacra” of the One, and the implications for modal beings if one adheres rigorously to this univocity. The concept of internal difference thus allows Deleuze to begin exploring the world of simulacra after the founding intuition of the univocity of Being. Focusing on Deleuze’s texts from the 1960s, I question the logic of internal difference in light of the later Logique du sens, before addressing the ethical implications of internal difference as described in Nietzsche et la philosophie. While Deleuzian concepts (particularly the panoply generated in Milles plateaux) remain endlessly productive for progressive contemporary thought (witness Hardt & Negri), this essay constitutes an attempt to think through what remains (for me) the most problematic dimension of Deleuzian thought: the univocal celebration of a power-based ethics.

It is widely recognized that Deleuze begins his philosophical project not with the affirmative impulse of his later works, but as an explicit critique of Hegelian dialectical difference. In Nietzsche et la philosophie, Deleuze judges the dialectic “abstract” and “empty” insofar as “the Being of Hegelian logic remains merely thought being” (1962: 181, 211 my emphasis). Hegelian difference remains an external conceptualization of difference “with another thing” (a spatial difference), “its difference with all that it is not” (a difference of
contradiction) (2002: 33). This critique of Hegel takes on an oddly personalized tone of *ressentiment* at odds with nearly all of Deleuze’s work and his explicit norm of respect for another work: “One must take a work as a whole, follow it and not judge it... receive it whole."

There are people who only feel intelligent if they find ‘contradictions’ in a great thinker” (1990: 118, 124). For Deleuze’s Nietzsche, Hegel is the “adversary” (1962: 9), while for Deleuze himself, Hegel is the “traitor” upon whom Deleuze displaces the negative—affects as much as logic—allowing him then to proceed univocally, free of contradiction in the project he inherits from Bergson, Nietzsche and Spinoza to “think differences of nature, independent of all forms of negation” (1966: 41). Similarly, at the level of Deleuzian logic, the attempt to represent “pure positivity” always proceeds negatively as an expulsion or bracketing of negativity: “Le négatif n’apparaît *ni* dans le procès de différenciation, *ni* dans le procès de différenciation. L’idée *ignore* la négation [...] *excluant* toute détermination négative” (1968: 267, my italics). Is there a relation between the vilification of Hegel and this purging of the negative (itself a mode of negation) from Deleuze’s thought? Does such a displacement truly evacuate all relation and negativity?

And what are the implications of such a procedure, logically, practically, and, above all, ethically? I want to look then to internal difference, unsure whether Deleuze has been able to displace the negative and all contradiction upon Hegelian dialectics, and unsure whether, even if that were the case, this is entirely to be celebrated.

Michael Hardt observes that Deleuze often proceeds from book to book in a stepwise motion, in which the arguments of prior studies are presupposed in each successive one (32). To understand Deleuze’s concept of internal difference, we need to return to its earliest appearances in Deleuze’s work, before *Différence et répétition*, before *Le Bergsonisme*, to his two 1956 articles “Bergson 1859-1941” and “La conception de la différence chez Bergson,” both
recently republished in the collection *L’île déserte et autres textes*. There we find Deleuze’s presentation of internal difference, the definition of which the later texts will take as a given as they go on to explore its vast implications. In “Bergson 1859-1941,” Deleuze offers his most succinct formulation of internal difference (related here to Bergson’s *durée*, but a definition that remains effective for Deleuze’s concept of difference as such): “La durée est ce qui diffère ou ce qui change de nature, la qualité, l’hétérogénéité, ce qui diffère avec soi.” At its most succinct: “Duration is...what differs with itself” (2002: 34). How might we understand such an apparently impossible (contradictory?) statement? If duration is what persists through time in some sort of identity, then it is just the opposite of difference; to endure is to remain the same. Or from the inverse (Kantian) perspective, we are able to perceive difference in the world precisely because our sense of identity as a self-same subject persists, identical to itself, in time. Here, Deleuze is of little help: the following sentence (”L’être du morceau du sucre se définira par une durée, par une certaine façon de durer”) eliminates the contradictory nature of the proceeding statement, while our hopes for an answer to our question as Deleuze frames it (”Comment la durée a-t-elle ce pouvoir?”) are immediately dashed as Deleuze quickly rephrases the question to presuppose it as answered and gets on to the practical matters that really seem to interest him: “La question peut se poser autrement: si l’être est la différence de la chose, qu’en résulte-t-il pour la chose elle-même?”

The examples of internal difference Deleuze offers in other places are generally either mathematical or biological. All depend on a similar logic of abstraction. Bergsonism informs us that “The number, and first of all the mathematical unit [*l’unité mathématique*] itself, are the model of that which divides without changing its nature” (34). While this may be true on the plane of mathematical abstraction, as a “model” for empirical entities and experience it cannot be expected to transfer, as Deleuze seems to be implying it does, without some stubborn
remainders that do not conform to that model. This observation seems to be born out in the similarly abstract nature of Deleuze’s biological illustration of internal difference. Already implicit in Bergson’s tautological concept of an internal *élan vital* as the “cause profonde des variations” (1966: 55), Deleuze develops this biological model in his article “Gibert Simondon, *L’individu et sa genèse physico-biologique*” and his talk “La méthode de dramatization.” This force of internal differentiation, which takes on the various guises of *élan vital*, Will to Power, or *potentia* for Deleuze, occurs when a cell, for example, divides itself to become a different individual while retaining its generic (in the sense of *genus*) identity. Such an illustrative model, however, cannot sustain the abstraction Deleuze wishes it to bear: abstracted from relation, from an environment that determines their growth, power and division, cells (beings, species) die. Deleuze has simply displaced the determining limit of relational difference from the boundary between the organism and its environment to within it (the relational process of division, differing from, occurs between the elements of the cell rather than between individual organisms).

The other points at which Deleuze seems to define internal difference are not of much more help. The third chapter of *Différence et répétition*, “Difference in itself,” holds out the promise of further explanation. After repeating his anti-Hegelian critique of external, “extrinsic” difference, Deleuze suggests: “But instead of a thing that distinguishes itself from an other thing, let’s imagine something that distinguishes itself [*qui se distingue*]—and yet that from which it distinguishes itself doesn’t distinguish itself from [the first thing]” (43). This strange one-way logic he calls “unilateral” is hard to grasp, and the example Deleuze offers is of little help: “The lightening bolt for example distinguishes itself from the black night, but must bring it with it [*doit le trainer avec lui*], as if it distinguished itself from that which doesn’t distinguish itself.” There may be a difference between our perception of a lightening bolt and that of the black
night as an absence of sensory stimuli, but why should that difference be anything but a
relational one of presence vs. absence, black and white, etc? More conclusively, the thesis of an
internal difference free of any relation to an outside is unsustainable given the basic tenets of
Deleuze’s ontology. If Alain Badiou is correct to find the “thesis of the univocity of Being”
structuring the entirety of Deleuze’s thought, internal differences defining beings (étants) would
be no more than “local degrees of intensity or inflections of a power” (Badiou 39, 40). Beneath
these surface variations of intensity, Deleuze consistently maintains that “Being is said in a
single and same sense of everything of which it is said” (Deleuze, cited in May 68). If Being is
truly univocal, then internal difference (what Badiou calls the “simulacra” of the multiple) would
be no more than the ideological illusion of beings: if all beings are necessarily related to Being
insofar as they are drops in a “single and same Ocean” (1968: 389), one of those drops (i.e., any
being) could only believe in its absolute internal and unrelated difference from any other in
ignorance of its place in that ocean.

I can only understand the one-way logic of Deleuze’s “something that distinguishes
itself” to describe allegorically the bootstrap logic of internal difference itself: I (Deleuze)
understand there to exist the phenomenon of internal difference a priori, and though I’ll
attempt to explain what I mean by it, in the end this is simply the unquestioned ground (“le fond
[qui] monte à la surface”) of my project that is beyond explication (this “adversaire
insaisissable”), so now let’s get on with that project itself. Indeed, after this brief passage in the
first chapter of a 400 page book (Différence et répétition) of which we could presume perhaps
200 of those pages to treat the subject of difference, Deleuze quickly moves on to talk not about
difference in itself (that is, as a concept), but rather to describe the (admittedly fascinating)
implications of his concept. He is then free to assert, for example, that the “Idea ignores
negation…. [it is] a pure positivity…excluding all negative determination” (267). Here as
elsewhere, however, the definition of this pure positivity continues to take a negative form, as an exclusion and hygienic purification from negation. Internal difference, which Deleuze derives from Spinoza’s concept of the Substance⁴ (“By substance I understand what is in itself and is conceived through itself, that is, that whose concept does not require the concept of another thing, from which it must be formed”), is simply presupposed by Deleuze (as is substance for Spinoza) to exist. It is, in other words, a mere article of faith, similar to what Spinoza intended to describe by his concept of substance: God (Spinoza 85).⁵

What alternative is there if we find ourselves unable to rise to the transcendental perspective of univocal being, and remain trapped in earthly contradictions of reason and perception? One might look for an answer in the extreme logical contortions of Adorno’s Negative Dialectics, which—at the same moment as Deleuze’s Nietzsche—attempts to preserve the critical, negative thrust of Hegel’s dialectic while refusing the synthetic assertion of any Absolute Spirit or immanent totality. In place of an exterior, teleological process (Spirit, History), Adorno’s negative dialectics strives for immanence as a critical immersion of the understanding within objects themselves, to reveal their nonidentity with that same thought that hopes to understand them. If Adorno’s is thus an internal model of dialectics, it proceeds through an abandonment of the self in the other, rather than via a monadic interiority. Adorno offers such a definition of dialectics in the opening pages of Negative Dialectics: “The name of dialectics says no more, to begin with, than that objects do not go into their concepts without leaving a remainder, that they come to contradict the traditional norm of adequacy… It indicates the untruth of identity [Er ist Index der Unwahrheit von Identität], the fact that the concept does not exhaust the thing conceived” (Adorno 1973: 5). Conversely, one might say of Deleuzian singularity that it is necessarily a concept, not the thing in itself, a concept that necessarily
implies a universal in describing any singular entity: “The concept of the particular is always its negation at the same time; it cuts short what the particular is and what nonetheless cannot be directly named, and it replaces it with identity” (173). Such a definition of dialectics points to the necessary mediation of concepts and things: “There is no Being without entities.... Without specific thoughts, thinking would contravene its very concept, and these thoughts instantly point to entities” (135-6). This understanding refuses the leap to any undifferentiated unity of Being with the knowing subject of that Being: “The subject has no way at all to grasp universals other than in the motion of individual human consciousness” (46). All human knowledge is finite, constrained by the limitations of what Kant called our categories of understanding.

In Adorno’s reading, it is not dialectics that is wrong, but rather the world that does not (yet) conform to its nonidentical possibility. In the world as it stands, to think beyond contradiction, to think “positively,” “affirmatively,” would be for Adorno not to think at all, but to revert to myth or ideology (159). Put succinctly, “dialectics is the ontology of the wrong state of things” (11). Adorno agrees with Deleuze’s critique of Hegel that the nonidentical cannot be the product of the negation of a negation. Where he differs from Deleuze is in his further assertion that “the nonidentical is not to be obtained directly, as something positive on its part” (158). “What remains unthinkable for Deleuze,” Zizek comments, “is simply a negativity that is not just a detour on the path of the One’s self-mediation” (2004: 52). In contrast, Adorno inherits from Walter Benjamin the focus on critique in the perception of nonidentity. There is no reason we must accept uncritically Deleuze’s definition of philosophy as the production of concepts. Perhaps Deleuze overcomes the Gallic tendency to substitute rhetorical, poetic flourish for conceptual substance, to assume that because one is producing neologisms thought is actually occurring, only by driving this tendency to its absolute extreme. We might ask if these flows of concepts are no more than gleaming commodities rolling off the philosopher’s
assembly line, concepts that will not reveal their nonidentity until subjected to some external critique that “extinguishes the appearance of the object being directly as it is” (Adorno 160). What one would need to reveal is the sedimented history of a concept, its genealogy, rather than simply letting the Deleuzian conceptual machine function on endlessly, producing its effects unimpeded. Rather than the eternal return of the (highly productive) Deleuzian machines and their effects, one might hope for their constant dismantling and restructuration in every instance.

The fundamental difference between Deleuze and Adorno is simple: the former maintains a strict univocity of being in which, as Spinoza put the matter, “thinking substance and the extended substance are one and the same substance, which is now comprehended under this attribute, now under that” (II 7S). Like Deleuze, Adorno rejects a representational model of thought, but he refuses to reduce thought to a mere mode of being, arguing, in classic Hegelian fashion, that Being itself is no ultimate ground but itself a mediated, constructed concept. Both Adorno and Deleuze acknowledge the circular logic of transcendental subjectivity, in which, as Deleuze puts it, “le tort de toutes les déterminations du transcendantal comme conscience, c’est de concevoir le transcendantal à l’image et à la ressemblance de ce qu’il est censé fonder” (128). While Deleuze hopes to move beyond this circularity with the apperception of a univocal being, Adorno remains profoundly Kantian in his refusal to deny the possibility of an ultimate “block” between the phenomenal and the noumenal: “the thought aims at the thing itself” (205) without ever attaining remainderless identity with that object.

If both Adorno and Deleuze can rightfully be called empiricists, it is in very different senses. Each proceeds in the construction of concepts inductively in the manner of Enlightenment thought. “Empiricism… analyzes the states of things, in such a way that non-pre-existent concepts can be extracted from them” (Deleuze 1987: vii). In our pursuit of
understanding, Adorno writes, “we should search for an experience of necessity that imposes itself step by step, but which can make no claim to any transparent universal law” (1999: 148). And yet, one perceives a univocity of being in which thought, as virtuality, is merely the immanent map of future differentiations, while the other finds immanent contradiction to exist in the nonidentity of the mind and the world. Like the Hegel who bases his entire philosophy on Spinoza’s materialist univocity, but as a starting point and mere abstraction, Adorno is a philosopher of the immanence of thought and matter, but not of their identity. 

The distinction Deleuze draws on many occasions between the virtual and the possible neatly encapsulates this point of contention between Deleuze and Adorno. In Différence et répétition, Deleuze tells us, quite simply, “Structure is the reality of the virtual” (DR 270). This clue makes Deleuze’s various explanations of the two terms luminous. The virtual “does not oppose the real” because it is simply another mode of the real, that is to say, the world’s reality as structure (May 71). On the other hand, “the possible,” Hegel’s Möglichkeit, “opposes the real” insofar as it presupposes the nonidentity of thought (Idea, Essence) and entity (DR 273). Thus, in consonance with Deleuze’s Spinozian univocity of Being, the virtual implies the impossibility of any break with the world as it exists. The Deleuzian event is not a break with being, but rather a mode of being itself, merely another dimension of the univocity that grounds all specification. If we were to understand the difference between the virtual and the possible not as that of, respectively, true and false concepts (as Deleuze tends to imply), but rather as two different modes of understanding the world, an unexpected twist occurs. The virtual would then constitute the immanent, historically evolving ontological ground that enables any becoming-singular, comparable to a computer program, or to the genetic code that enables and determines the becoming singular of any biological being. The possible, in a philosophy of
immanence, would then be not some transcendental Beyond, but rather the multiple, unpredictable *ontic* instantiations of singularity in any being.

If for Adorno there is an immanence of thought, it is less in the mind’s productive capacity Spinozians like Deleuze and Negri underline than its preconstructed, social dimension. In this view, the illusion of the mind’s transcendence of facticity appears through critique as a mystified sublimation of the division of labor. On the other hand, Adorno mediates this critical position with its extreme opposite, the assertion of the mind’s capacity for the productive imagination of a transformed existence. This possibility of an absolute break with the given can no more be asserted absolutely than its opposite, that the mind is absolutely determined by the given. Instead, these two poles are for Adorno in dialectical relation, that is to say, their (logical) contradiction can only be worked through immanently, in its actual instantiations.

Adorno nonetheless sees the possibility of a break with the given, the appearance of something new not strictly predictable from the state of any situation, to arise from the concrete itself, from the immanence of suffering. “Conscious unhappiness is not a delusion of the mind’s vanity but something inherent in the mind, the one authentic dignity it has received in its separation from the body…. The smallest trace of senseless suffering in the empirical world belies all the identitarian philosophy that would talk us out of that suffering” (1973: 203). In his call for a negative dialectics that refuses the absolutization even of its own conclusions, Adorno moves between a Kantian refusal to abandon the distinction between thought and the noumenal thing-in-itself (thought is capable of a break with the given that is not entirely determined by that given) and an equally Kantian refusal to represent what form that break (utopia) might take. This leads to insoluble logical problems, the most obvious of which is that even the minimal logical affirmation of the former statement retains something concrete in its formulation, thus transgressing the ban on positive images of the latter. This contradiction is
not, in Adorno’s estimation, simply a problem of logic, but rather arises from social contradiction, and can properly be addressed only by concretely working through specific cases of contradiction and grasping their determinations (140).

“Duration is...what differs with itself” is undoubtedly a practical statement, a Zen koan intended to stop our thinking, to allow us to break through the sedentary boundaries of fixed subjectivity, passing through the looking-glass to perceive the transcendent plane of univocal being. We could only understand duration as what differs from itself in an apprehension beyond any subject-object logic. Perhaps “Duration is...what differs with itself” is impossible only from the standpoint of space, as Deleuze points out in “La conception de la différence chez Bergson”:

“la durée, c'est ce qui diffère avec soi. La matière, au contraire, ...[c'est] ce qui se répète” (51).

This distinction seems to depend, however, on an unsustainable logical abstraction of time and space. Time and space here function as absolute, abstract categories, rather than constructions of an empiricist philosophical project. Can we conceive of an entity that would actually have some empirical substance yet be entirely independent of either time or space? There might be extremely interesting implications for the Bergsonian distinction between space and time Deleuze is drawing here, but they can only be understood as a certain relation of time to space, not as an absolute hermetic isolation of one from the other.

In light of the later project of Logique du sens, the Deleuzian concept of internal difference is indeed contradictory from the perspective of classical logic, where something must be either true or false. Instead, the truth of internal difference lies not on the plane of the true and the false, an abstract “rapport d’exclusion” (1969: 85), of “either/or,” but rather on that of sens and non-sens, of “and/and,” a relation not of exclusion but of compossibility. As Alice grows bigger, she simultaneously becomes smaller (9): while from the perspective of a fixed,
transcendental point (self-same subjectivity), there “is” only one Alice of a given size $x$ at any moment, within temporal becoming Alice occupies an infinite array of points, earlier, later, in between, and as she grows taller at a later point, she must correspondingly shrink at an earlier one.

The relation between Deleuze’s Nietzschianism and a “logique du sens” is penetrating. That the central Deleuzian concept of internal difference is logically contradictory, that it is to be understood precisely through a sensuous logic of internal self-contradiction demonstrable not through classical logic but through the aesthetico-artistic dramatization of internal difference we find in Lewis Carroll, is in perfect congruence with the Nietzchean critique of reason and the latter’s turn to an aesthetic-based (sensuous) epistemology. Beyond true and false, beyond good and evil, Nietzsche “enthrones taste” and the will to power of a sensuous body as the sole criteria of truth (Habermas 1987: 123). Deleuze never bothers trying to show that the question of Truth is false; instead “Deleuze déclare n’avoir pour la catégorie de vérité ‘aucun goût’” (Badiou 84, my emphasis). Deleuze, like Nietzsche before him, establishes the degree of “power” of an individual body as the sole criteria of its truth, without ever addressing the transcendental status of this criterion that would hierarchize all beings in an ethics of power. All true/false statements succumb to a putatively more fundamental inquiry into the “fictions of logic” [der logischen Fiktionen] (Nietzsche 7). Deleuze, like Nietzsche before him, aestheticizes traditional logic, both as the analytical gradation of a sensuous will to power and in the rhetorical turn to an exemplary “fiction” (Alice). In so doing, however, the status of the knowing philosophical subject who enthrones power at the expense of truth remains unquestioned, all justification for this strategy simply displaced back upon a foundational philosophy (Spinoza, Bergson, Nietzsche).
The fundamentally biographical nature of much of Nietzsche’s writing (*Ecce Homo*) far exceeds Deleuze in its degree of self-reflexivity. Nonetheless, in their focus on Power, both leave unexamined its epistemological status: what is the truth status of the transcendental statement “Life is precisely Will to Power” [*Leben eben Wille zur Macht ist*] (Nietzsche 153)? One must presumably accept the truth of a Nietzschean *Lebens Asthetik* due to the mere aesthetic force or power of a statement’s enunciation in lieu of any rationally conceived norm (“Why I Write Such Good Books”). The zen-like breakthrough in perception of a *logique du sens* constitutes Deleuzism as a *practical project*, certainly, but can we understand internal difference as a concept? If the Deleuzian concept adheres to a *logique du sens*, and not an exclusionary logic of truth or falsehood, then this paradoxically implies a series of properly Hegelian contradictions internal to the logic of sense itself that bring Deleuze closer to the Hegelian Adorno than might have been immediately apparent. While Deleuze’s intention is to purge his concept of negative, dialectical contradiction, in the light of the *logique du sens*, internal difference itself comes to assume the form of a Hegelian ruse of reason.

Does Deleuze, former student of Hyppolite, simply adopt the old trick of taking up one of Hegel’s ideas and then accusing the grumpy dialectician of having argued the opposite? The Idea, we are told, “differentiates itself within itself.” Indeed, perhaps internal difference is a concept entirely coherent from the point of view of Hegelian logic. Is it Hegel or Deleuze who argues that any entity, which in its primary immediacy, its fixed, sedentary being or *Verstand*, appears to the observer as a unified totality, is in fact *internally* non-identical, and reveals itself as such *in time* (as *durée*)? Not only is an entity in negative, external relation to other entities, as Deleuze presents the stigmatized Hegelian dialectic, but Hegel further understands entities to be internally non-identical and self-differentiating. The movement of the Hegelian concept occurs because it reveals itself in its actual being to be unequal to its inherent concept, to its possibility.
Likewise, Deleuze refuses the logic of truth for that of the “condition of truth” (under what conditions would \( x \) be true?), thus reintroducing the idealism (the “true being” of a proposition) that the univocity of being would have overcome (1969: 25).

En parlant de condition de vérité, nous nous élevons au-dessus du vrai et du faux, puisqu’une proposition fausse a un sens ou une signification. Mais, en même temps, cette condition supérieure, nous la définissons seulement comme la possibilité pour la proposition d’être vraie. (29, my emphasis)

While something either is or is not true in its actual being, through the mediation of human understanding we can perceive the *conditions of truth* that would allow it to attain its inherent possibility. If the present world (as space, being) is untrue as ideological, subsumed under the timeless identity logic of capital, only in time, in a possible future (becoming), would there be true, autonomous difference; i.e., it is the very painful persistence of ideology (the eternal present of the commodities that keep returning endlessly) that drives us toward the transformation of the world insofar as we are able to understand that things might be otherwise. If the movement of Deleuze’s thought is not a teleological progression toward Absolute Spirit, a gradual accretion of differentiation as the Concept (*Begriff*) actualizes itself as the Idea, but instead the invention of conceptual machines that would dissolve every sedentary specification to allow a glimpse of primordial events on the univocal plane of being, Deleuze’s understanding of *non-sens* is nonetheless properly Hegelian. The being of nonsense contains its *internal* dialectical negation (*nonsense*). It is not that something either makes sense or is nonsensical (either/or); rather

La logique du sens est nécessairement déterminée à poser entre le sens et le non-sens un type original de rapport intrinsèque, un mode de coprésence, que
It is not a matter of arguing that Deleuze is really a crypto-Hegelian, anymore than Hegel would be a crypto-Deleuzian. Either conclusion would simply reverse a linear logic of filiation. Rather, each is his other all at once: “identité infinie des deux sens à la fois, du futur et du passé,” a Deleuze-Hegel-event, an event that “va toujours en deux sens à la fois, et [qui] écartèle le sujet suivant cette double direction” (11-12). Looking back on Nietzsche et la philosophie from the later perspective of Logique du sens, we find that the relation of Deleuze and Hegel is not a logical relation of true and false, nor a moral relation of good and bad, as Deleuze had implied, but rather the paradoxical looking-glass relation of the sense within nonsense, of the nonidentity within every identity: “Le paradoxe... détruit le bon sens comme sens unique” (12). If the one-way street (sens unique) of our understanding of Deleuze, indeed of Deleuze’s self-understanding as philosophical subject is to constitute him(self) as the (external, abstract) negation of his nemesis Hegel, this common sense understanding of Deleuze cannot withstand the destructive paradoxical force of the logique du sens itself, a properly Hegelian/Deleuzian logic of critique, dissolution, and becoming. This mediated identity of Deleuze and Hegel “détruit le sens commun [our common sense understanding of Deleuzian thought] comme assignation d’identités fixes” (12). Like Alice, the philosophical subject “Deleuze” morphs back and forth into his nemesis Hegel, as he pursues the Hegelian contradictions of the logique du sens. So who is the philosophical subject of a logic of sense, “Gilles Deleuze”?

This question points to the implicit paradox underlying Logique du sens itself (at once the book and the logic it contains). Deleuze repeatedly asks: “Qui parle en philosophie?” (130). Clearly, the self-understanding, the identity of this subject, the “Deleuze” of Logique du sens,
sees itself standing in opposition to an “Apollonian” logic, beyond true and false, good and evil, God and Man. This is a Nietzschean subject,

[qui] explore un monde de singularités impersonnelles et pré-individuelles....

Des singularités nomades qui ne sont plus emprisonnées dans l’individualité fixe de l’être infini (la fameuse immuabilité de Dieu) ni dans les bornes sédentaires du sujet fini (les fameuses limites de la connaissance. (130)

“Qui parle en philosophie?” is indeed the question, however, because while Deleuze gives us many portraits of other philosophical subjects, and while the self-understanding of the project of a Logique du sens may well be to dissolve fixed and sedentary individualities, this logique du sens itself stands before the reader as a philosophical object, an affirmative propositional logic of contradiction (as well as being a contradictory logic). Rather than dissolving into a pre-individual flow, Logique du sens enunciates its logic of dissolution from an implicit, unacknowledged standpoint. As we read and understand Logique du sens, we ourselves are not dissolved in schizophrenic flows of becoming, but rather, we stand and observe these flows through the mediation of a stable, self-same Deleuzian gaze:

Nous ne nous trouvons plus du tout devant un monde individué constitué par des singularités déjà fixes et organisées en séries convergentes, ni devant des individus déterminés qui expriment ce monde. Nous nous trouvons maintenant devant le point aléatoire des points singuliers, devant le signe ambigu des singularités. (139)

This is not simply an external, rhetorical contradiction, but rather one lying unacknowledged at the heart of Logique du sens itself. If, as Deleuze maintains, singular events are not productions of a self-indentical subject, but rather emanate from a pre-subjective plane of univocal being, who is the subject who perceives and asserts that “ce qui est impersonnel et
pré-individuel, ce sont les singularités, libres et nomades” (166); where is this Archimidean perspective on univocal being if not in “la fameuse immuabilité de Dieu [ou] du sujet”? Who is the subject who has gained unequivocal access to this primordial Truth? The enabling paradox of Logique du sens is to show its reader a pre-individual being that would ground and constitute all subjectivity, but to reaffirm in this very process the transcendental philosophical subject.\textsuperscript{ix} Logique du sens articulates from a transcendental standpoint the Concept of an Absolute that grounds all contradictions, to reveal them as mere folds of univocal being, earthly contradictions transcended for a cosmic night in which “it was too dark to see anything” (Alice), or, as Hegel put the matter, in which “all cows are black.”

Adorno’s contention that senseless human suffering compels thought to move beyond the given (“The smallest trace of senseless suffering in the empirical world belies all the identitarian philosophy that would talk us out of that suffering”) points to the final and perhaps most significant level of distinction I wish to draw between Deleuze and Adorno, that of ethical difference. While Adorno’s varied reflections on ethics and metaphysics “after Auschwitz” are recognized as fundamental ethical interventions in the second half of the Twentieth Century, it is clear that Deleuze’s philosophy constitutes a very different conception of what might make up an “ethics” (after Auschwitz or otherwise). Deleuze bases his “ethics” (what one should do) around two claims: the Spinozian maxim that life (individual, social) must be constructed such that “we come to experience a maximum of joyful passions” (cited in Hardt 95) and Nietzsche’s concept of a selective eternal return that would be pure affirmation, the elimination of ressentiment and the negative (Deleuze 1962: 40).

Deleuze’s ethics proceeds following the same logic of abstraction at work in his production of the concept of internal difference. Deleuzian and Adornian ethics appear to be in
absolute contradiction. While Deleuze follows Nietzsche in calling for an “eternal return,” Adorno formulates the apparently contradictory ethical absolute that Auschwitz never again be allowed to recur. “What knowledge has to confront is the configuration that arises out of the past but has never yet existed; it cannot be concerned with the fatal recurrence of the same” (Adorno 1999: 154). This contradiction is only apparent, though, since Deleuze proceeds from his conclusion that “the eternal return is not the permanence of the same, the state of equilibrium, nor the abiding [demeure] of the identical. In the eternal return, it is not the same or the one that returns, but the return is itself the one that proclaims itself [qui se dit] only of the diverse and of that which differs” (53). Eternal return is “selective” in the sense that only affirmation returns, since eternal return “makes of negation a negation of the reactive forces themselves” (79). If society were so arranged such that each individual were able to maximize the expression of his or her joyful passions, Auschwitz would presumably not return as Kosovo or Rwanda. But since it is not, Deleuze’s univocal empiricism necessarily flips over into sheer idealism: “It is the thought of the eternal return that selects” (78, emphasis in original). The problematic nature of a Deleuzian ethics is not this tendency to idealism per se, but rather the purging from Deleuzian philosophy of any reflection upon the relation between ethical absolutes (a categorical imperative calling for the unambiguous maximization of power, in which the negative will simply disappear without intervention thanks to its... negativity) and the politics of desiring machines.

What may seem an arbitrarily chosen early moment in Deleuze’s project I think reveals a paradox at the heart of Deleuzism: in the effort to secure a ground beyond Hegel via the Spinozian univocity of Being, Bergson’s élan vital and Nietzsche’s Will to Power, Deleuze reinstates the tautological totality of Absolute Spirit merely flipped over into its empirical inversion and shorn of any mediation that might help it approach concretion. If it is no longer
Spirit that recognizes itself in the totality, but rather the totality (univocal Being) that produces Spirit as one of its modes, Deleuze’s excision of the noumenal—as what would not be reducible to the modes of univocal Being, the negative—enforces a circular logic of absolute identity just as it finally did for Hegel. To the Hegelian world that the mind produces and comes to know as the result of its actions—a world that is thus ultimately only knowledge of itself, or absolute identity—corresponds the inverse Deleuzian world of univocal being in which all modes of being, including thought, are the immediate expressions of that being. Absolute singularity is absolute identity.

Ian Buchanan, in his discussion of Deleuzian ethics, invokes Auschwitz as perhaps the “supreme test of a philosophy’s integrity” (75), but I think he too quickly lets “Deleuzism” off the hook, never calling it truly to task to see just what constitutes such an ethics. Such a calling to task is certainly always already guilty in relation to Deleuzism; to “judge” Deleuzism is to relapse into resentment and negativity. But are we willing, on the other hand, simply to accept as unproblematically “ethical” the process of “unrestrained, savage attack” that Michael Hardt celebrates in Deleuze (52)? Deleuze reproduces without the slightest qualification Nietzsche’s celebration of the “pitiless destruction of all that presents degenerate and parasitic characteristics” (cited in 1962: 201). Is it truly possible, after Auschwitz, that such statements need no qualification? On the other hand, in posing the question of ethics under the sign of Auschwitz, are we falling into the trap Zizek has pointed out in his inimitably subtle fashion: “The return to ethics in today’s political philosophy shamefully exploits the horrors of Gulag or Holocaust as the ultimate bogey for blackmailing us into renouncing all serious radical engagement. In this way, conformist liberal scoundrels can find hypocritical satisfaction in their defense of the existing order” (127)? I disagree without being quite sure how to proceed; at the very least, we need to continue to develop our understanding of the Holocaust as an event that
lives on in the present, one that inflects any possible notion of an “ethics” today, without letting the past predetermine the ethics we might construct.

To answer these questions adequately far exceeds the scope of this essay, if only because one would have to address the extremely problematic question of the Postwar French reception of Heidegger. In other words, to what extent is Deleuze’s claim to have attained a Truth of singular events located upon “un champ transcendental impersonnel et pré-individuel” (1969: 124), a “logique du sens” beyond an illusory “true and false,” and “good and evil,” a critical reworking of a Heideggerian “thinking more rigorous than the conceptual” (quoted in Habermas 166)? This is a Truth ventriloquized for Deleuze by the late Nietzsche, neither a “sujet” nor “l’homme ou Dieu,” but who is instead “cette singularité libre, anonyme et nomade qui parcourt aussi bien les hommes, les plantes, et les animaux indépendamment des matières de leur individuation et des formes de leur personnalité” (Deleuze 1969: 131). If Deleuzian univocal, eventimental Being is an original concept, no mere mimicry of Heidegger, Deleuze nonetheless takes up uncritically Heidegger’s radical dismissal of the ontic in deference to the putative Truth of Being. Deleuze’s is a philosophy of univocal being that leaves little place for critique: “Si l’être se dit en un seul et même sens de tout ce dont il se dit, les étants sont tous identiquement des simulacres, et tous affirment, par une inflexion d’intensité dont la différence est purement formelle ou modale, la puissance vivante de l’Un” (Badiou 42-43). Though lacking the bombastic pomposity of Heidegger, Deleuze nonetheless poses as the oracular voice of a primordial Univocal Being before all Beings, and celebrates at other moments, via Nietzsche, the “pitiless destruction of all that presents degenerate and parasitic characteristics” with precious little critical self-reflection or historical consciousness (because to engage such reflection would presumably be to ignore the Truth of Univocal Being). Such a celebration, coming in 1962, points unavoidably to a failure to work-through a possible proto-fascist dimension to Nietzschean
thought, and, perhaps more importantly, to address the willfully obfuscatory French appropriation of Heidegger’s Postwar oracularism, of his enunciation of a Being prior to any Beings, in which the Holocaust is, as he callously put the issue in a letter of 1948 to a desperate Herbert Marcuse, rendered equivalent to the deportation of so-called “Eastern Germans” from Poland and Czech Bohemia (Habermas 163). From the perspective of univocal being, such questions are admittedly the mere “clameur de l’être.”

Deleuze’s 1962 formulation of a Nietzschean “ethics” of destruction and violence is no isolated phenomenon, but appears in its contemporary context as another radical critique of democratic humanism inspired by Heidegger’s elitist and simplistic dismissals of mass politics as the “chattering” of “the they” in favor of the radical actionism of “the great creators…the violent ones…who use force to become pre-eminent in historical Being as creators, as men of action” (Heidegger cited in Wolin 67-8). To take only one example, at the same moment as Deleuze’s *Nietzsche*, Hannah Arendt’s 1963 study *On Revolution* reserves “the political way of life” for “authentically political talents” in a gesture of Nietzschean elitism that disdains and fears the “so-called will of a multitude” and “the chaos of unrepresented and unpurified opinions” (Arendt 282, 162, 231).

Arendt’s argument is complex, at once an attempt to recover and celebrate the progressive specificity of the American Revolution, a vindication of the public sphere of enlightened discussion, and a neo-Burkean critique of the French Revolution’s attempt to address social problems through revolutionary and absolutist means. Arendt’s celebration of “action,” however, echoes the radical conservativism of Heidegger and Carl Schmitt’s attacks on parliamentary democracy in favor of an individualized, desocialized celebration of the “decision” (existentialist for Heidegger, dictatorial for Schmitt, and revolutionary for Arendt) of the man of action. The antidemocratic tendency of this dimension of Arendt’s book sits uneasily (to put it lightly) with her progressive political orientation.

This school of thought shares a conviction
that because democratic modernity in its actual manifestations (from Weimar to the EU and the
United Nations) displays radical insufficiencies, it should be violently “deconstructed” and
“destroyed” rather than reformed and perfected (the latter a viewpoint one might schematically
associate with Habermas). While Deleuze’s Nietzsche (like that of Heidegger) never descends
from its philosophical heights of abstraction to condescend to concrete political analysis along
the lines of Schmitt or Arendt, since it nonetheless calls itself an ethics, I think it is both valid and
necessary to draw such parallels.

In Qu’est-ce que la philosophie, Deleuze praises Primo Levi for having made readers feel
“the shame of being a man…. We are not responsible for the victims, but before the victims”
(103). This is obviously a complete reversal from Deleuze’s earlier nietzschean praise of
“irresponsibility.” But it remains an isolated, late statement by Deleuze that must be turned
back to illuminate his earlier thought that is taken by recent commentators such as Hardt to
constitute an “ethics.” Founding his ethics upon Spinoza’s radical definition of social justice as
the free deployment of an individual’s intrinsic potentiality implies (against Spinoza’s own desire
for an “absolute” concept of democracy) a differential, rather than absolute, attribution of
justice; as Zizek puts it, “the amount of justice owed to me equals my power”(2004: 36). The
postwar reappropriation and denazification of Nietzsche by Deleuze and Anglophone
commentators such as Walter Kaufmann has been only too successful in arguing that the
relation between Nietzsche and fascism is one of sheer falsification and ignorance. As this
writer’s initiation to philosophy, Kaufmann’s anti-fascist, anti-anti-semitic, European Nietzsche
has long been a given for me, but I feel less and less willing to accept uncritically the unqualified
affirmation of affirmation itself, and a corresponding will to “purge” the negative. Deleuze
constitutes his various “planes of immanence” in this way, through a process of exclusion. The
“affirmation” of the will to power that “expulses the negative”(1962: 199) follows a logic of
purgation not only thematically, but is only able to appear as ethical because it has itself been purged of all content. A “Dionysiac affirmation that no negation sullies [ne souille]” (205) can only remain ethical if we are not speaking of actual beings who are to be eliminated from sullying a “pure” affirmation. Paradoxically, for Nietzschean “affirmation” to remain ethical, Deleuze must assume a priori the absolute separation between thought and desire (to be purged of negative affects) and entities (presumably not to be liquidated in death camps). Deleuze is clearly attempting just the opposite, but never reflects on the implications of univocity for an immanent, nonidealist ethics. Instead, we hear only praise of Zarathoustra’s “active destruction” (200). Nietzsche’s “affirmation of …destruction” (cited by Deleuze, 201) remains innocent precisely because it is a contentless abstraction from which the negative has been previously expulsed.

Not to put too fine a point on it, but this is the logic of Jim Crow and Apartheid. From Spinoza, Deleuzian ethics adopts the maxim that we must structure existence “to produce active affections” and “come to experience a maximum of joyful passions” (cited in Hardt 95). Hardt, like Tony Negri’s study Spinoza: L’anomalia selvaggia, is brilliant in his construction of a progressive post-postmodern political program from Deleuze’s Spinozism. Still, Hardt enjoins us to proceed in instituting this utopia by “recogniz[ing] common relationships that exist between our body and another body,” and we are to do so by the apprehension of “visible signs” (presumably not skin color or facial characteristics) (96, 102). Instead, this is doubtless a call to the construction of a new, constituent universalism. But in the meantime, would not the cities we might construct—as long as there are “others” who are deemed the carriers of “negative” affects, others who might “sully” us with their negativity—be the ghetto of a race of affirmative “supermen”? 
This “apartheid” logic is not a mere epiphenomenal moment in Deleuze’s informal conversations with Claire Parnet. Rather, as Vincent Descombes has shown, it is follows rigorously from Deleuze’s attempt to elucidate a non-relational ethics of pure singularity in *Nietzsche et la philosophie*:

‘Negation opposes affirmation, whereas affirmation differs from negation’ [writes Deleuze...]. From the standpoint of affirmation, the non-identity of difference and opposition is not an opposition, but a difference, whilst from the standpoint of negation, the same non-identity is an opposition. [...] The criterion proposed by Deleuze demands that the relation of Master to Slave should not be superimposable upon that of Slave to Master. In one, it is a relation of difference, in the other a relation of opposition. But if this is so, the criterion is quite useless, for there can be no relationship between Master and Slave. The Master will live only among Masters, and the Slave will only ever encounter Slaves. [...] The noble evaluation derives from itself, out of the richness of its being, whilst the base evaluation derives from its own indigence relative to the superiority it recognizes and covets in another. But this difference is meaningful only if it is possible to conceive of an evaluation of a noble kind which would not be comparative. [...] But if a relationship to the other is not present in this sovereign affirmation of self, then Deleuze ought not to say that ‘the Master affirms his difference’, but rather ‘he affirms his identity’. (163-66)

The philosophy of internal difference and pure singularity is, in both its substance and logic, sheer identitarian ideology.°°

Such questions cannot be taboo if we are truly to learn from Deleuze. Can we accept his call to interiority, the praise of entities that “[remain] in themselves” (cited in Hardt 69) as an a priori value, in which the only need we would have to know an other is to undertake a
narcissistic “symptomatology” to discover whether the other increases or decreases our own force and positive affects (1962: 88)? Following through this line of thought, Deleuze ends up calling for “each group or individual [to] construct the plane of immanence on which they lead their life and carry on their business” (1987: 96). With no mediation constructed between singularity and the univocity of being (i.e. a social world), the world in which individuals are (internally differentiated, non-relational) singularities reverts in its absolutism into a logic of absolute identity. In contrast to Adorno, who maintained that there is no freedom for the individual in a context of unfreedom, Deleuzian ethics locates freedom in the putatively efficient internal cause; the individual’s goal remains self-centered and culinary (“to discover, to invent new possibilities of life” (1962: 115), its criteria for judgment merely whether an external body is “good for my nature” (cited in Hardt 94, my emphasis). The distinction between Deleuze and Adorno appears total: the former, following Nietzsche, replaces (relational, transcendental, resentment-based) morality with (internal, immanent, power-based) ethics, while the latter rejects such a gesture. Adorno explicitly refuses the turn to ethics in postwar thought as an obfuscation of social conflict, the imaginary resolution of real contradictions.

The reason why the question of moral philosophy has become so very problematic today is that the substantial nature of custom, the possibility of the good life in the forms in which the community exists, which confront the individual in pre-existing form, has been radically eroded.... [And yet] to reduce the problem of morality to ethics is to perform a sort of conjuring trick by means of which the decisive problem of moral philosophy, namely the relation of the individual to the general, is made to disappear. What is implied in all this is the idea that if I live in accordance with my own ethos, my own nature... then this
will be enough to bring about the good life. And this is nothing but pure illusion and ideology. (2000: 10)

But if Adorno stands as the untruth of Deleuze, Deleuze could be said to constitute the truth of an Adorno unable to see beyond the monadic genius (Beethoven, Schoenberg) lost amid universally alienated culture, and to envision a substantive, universal community. The concept of internal difference must be taken not as an ontological foundation of Being, as Deleuze presents it, but instead as a practical and situated modality of understanding the world. Rather than making transcendental claims as to the structure of Being, internal difference can and should remain a tool used to describe the actual and potential forms of becoming of specific and limited totalities, as it does for the contemporary Deleuzians Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri: “The multitude is a multiplicity of innumerable internal differences that can never be reduced to a unity or a single identity [...]. The multitude is a multiplicity of all these singular differences” (xiv). Despite their use of the present indicative (“is”), their strategic use of internal difference is explanatory and prescriptive; no claims are made that the concept actually serves as an ontological foundation of all reality, but rather that we should strive to form social existence into a totality of internally differentiated relations. Used in this limited and fundamentally critical fashion, the concept of internal difference can serve to underpin a critical and reflexive ethics that maintains a progressive orientation. Deleuzian ethics thus presupposes a standpoint of totality that transcends the interiority of isolated individual subjects. There is no other way to understand Spinozian affirmation as ethical other than in a total (future) context in which all are able to discover “what [their individual, collective] body can do,” to maximize the expression of their affirmative affects. Spinoza in this sense can be taken quite precisely as the positive construction of Adorno’s “No truth in untruth.” Only in the global instantiation of a free society, from which no others need be banned for their “negativity,” could individuals taken as
singularities reach the maximum of their capacity to act (together). If Adorno refuses such a positive image of utopia, the seduction of Deleuzism is to begin immanently to construct, on a plane not free of its own contradictions and idealism, representations of the constituent power of the multiple.

Bibliography


---. Portions of the following two paragraphs appeared in the article “Deleuze, Adorno, and the Composition of Musical Multiplicity” (55).

---. See Catherine Malabou’s article “Who’s Afraid of Hegelian Wolves?” and Zizek’s *Organs Without Bodies,* where he points out that “Hegel is the absolute exception [to
Deleuze’s stated desire to ‘take an author from behind’) a kind of prohibition of incest in this field of taking philosophers from behind, opening up the multitude of other philosophers available for buggery” (2004: 48).

iii Though these early texts are not explicit, the origins of a concept of internal, non-relational difference and singularity presumably extend for Deleuze back beyond Bergson and Spinoza to Duns Scotus. Scotus’ concept of the *haecceitas* (which Deleuze and Guattari will adopt in *Milles plateaux*) conceptualized things in themselves, their “this-now-here-ness.” As Heidegger recognized in his Habilitation thesis on Scotus, the *haecceitas* of any thing is previous to any relation with other things; negation, the not-being-another-thing of any thing is secondary, imported into them through comparative thinking. Instead, Heidegger, states, “What really exists is individual” (cited in Safranski 62).

iv And not, surprisingly, his definition of “singular things,” which is relational: “By singular things I understand things that are finite and have a determinate existence” (116). The finite—that which has definite boundaries or limits—defines itself in relation to what it is not; a singular thing is for Spinoza merely one of the many modes of a single and univocal substance, not the non-relational, autonomous being of Deleuzian internal difference.

v In the *Ethics* (E IP7S2), Spinoza does not attempt to prove that substances actually exist (this remains an unquestioned presupposition) but rather that “if someone were [to have] a clear and distinct, that is, true, idea of a substance” it would be contradictory to doubt its existence (89). But what if one were unable to attain a clear and distinct idea of this concept?
See for example Hegel’s discussion of Spinoza in the *Logic*, where he accuses Spinoza of “external thinking,” of conceiving the Absolute only as a “first, an immediate” (536-37). Caught in the logic of a schoolyard brawl, Hegel here returns the same accusation that we heard the Spinozian Deleuze making a moment ago against Hegel himself: “You’re abstract!” “No, you are!…”

Paul Patton offers a succinct and lucid analysis of Deleuze’s distinction between the possible and the virtual in *Deleuze and the Political* (35-40).

By Hegel, in Vol. II, Ch. 3 of the *Logic* (665).

This is not an isolated lapsus, but reappears in many guises; as for example in the celebrated discussion with Foucault “Les intellectuels et le pouvoir,” where they tell us: “Le rôle de l’intellectuel n’est plus de se placer ‘un peu en avant ou un peu de côté’ pour dire la vérité muette de tous” (2002: 290). “Qui parle en philosophie?” indeed; just how Foucault and Deleuze attained this lofty position from which they could place a universal ban on the attempt to articulate insight into totality is left unexamined in the eagerness to celebrate what Deleuze calls “partial and fragmentary…relations” (288).

In his study *Adorno: Disenchantment and Ethics*, J.M. Bernstein complexly renders the many contradictions and implications of an Adornian ethics, which I will not address here.

Alain Badiou underlines the fundamental debt of Deleuze’s thought to Heidegger: following the author of *Being and Time*, “la question posée par Deleuze est la question de l’être” (32), which Deleuze then goes on to supplement with a more “radical” critique of the philosophy of the subject as phenomenological intentionality (36).
See Ettinger on Arendt’s astonishing 1950 reconversion to and subsequent defense of Heideggerianism.

Arendt’s complex and profoundly democratic thought is in many ways at antipodes with this school of radical conservatism; my point is that an acceptance of the Heideggerian Zivilisationskritik nonetheless underlies her rejection of the “corruption and perversion” of democratic parliamentarism in favor of such radical democratic processes as the Jeffersonian ward system and the workers’ council movement (Arendt 255; see also Wolin 67).

Zizek points out that Spinoza’s own power-based ethics underwrites his acceptance and defense of the inferior rights of women in the Tractatus politicus: “Since this is nowhere the case [that women rule alongside men], one may assert with perfect propriety, that women have not by nature equal rights with men” (cited in Zizek 2004: 36). This is precisely where Hegel will begin his critique of slavery in Section 57 of the Philosophy of Right: that injustice exists empirically and appears as a fact of “nature” [Wesen] does not then make it right (Nesbitt, 2004).

This, I think, is the point at which attention to Ernesto Laclau’s theorization of hegemonic practices and their relation to the universal as an “absent fullness” can move beyond the dead-end of a postmodern celebration of pure, non-dialectical difference and singularity (See Emancipations 49 and Marchart 67).