# An Economic Analysis of Indonesia's Current Petroleum Production Sharing **Contract: Special Mention of Offshore Frontier Oil Field**

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## Introduction

- More oil and gas reserves are found in Indonesia's deep water frontier area.
- An optimal fiscal regime is essential to capture the economic rent while avoiding investment disincentives.
- This study evaluates Indonesia's current PSC regime under deep water PSC fiscal terms, considering its flexibility and neutrality as a rent capture mechanism.

# **Data and Methodology**

- Representative offshore deep water oil fields are incorporated: large (250 mmbls), medium (100 mmbbls) and small fields (50 mmbbls).
- Discounted Cash Flow method is used in the base-case scenario: NPV and IRR are the main yardstick.
- Sensitivity analysis and tornado charts
- Monte Carlo simulation is used to measure risk and uncertainty.

#### Key Data:

Field Size	Field A (250mbbls)	Field B (100mbbls)	Field C (50mbbls)
Devex	15	17.5	20
(\$/barrel) Opex	15	17.5	20
(\$/barrel)			

### Indonesia's PSC - Deep Water Oil Fiscal terms

Fiscal System	Indonesia - Deepwate	
Bonuses	Signature Bonus: \$3 n	
	B, \$1,375 million for t	
First Tranche Petroleum	20% of gross oil produ	
(FTP)	Contractor based on th	
Cost Recovery	From 100% of gross p	
	= 100%). Therefore, e	
Equity / Profit Sharing	After tax Government	
	After tax Contractor's	
Income Tax	Combined income tax	
	tax and 20% withho	
	deductions and deprec	
	Depreciations term $= 0$	
Domestic Market Obligation	Subject to 5 years of	
(DMO)	25% of its profit cruc	
	government.	

#### **Flow of Methodology**



# Results

- Government take in all model fields are larger than 65%, due to the DMO policy.
- Government take is higher in less profitable oil fields.
- Two most sensitive variables that affect project profitability: oil price and development cost.
- Monte Carlo simulation: field C gives highest risk and uncertainty to the investor.

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er – Model PSC 2008 Terms nillion for field A, \$2 miliion for field field C

uction split between Government and neir production sharing

roduction less the FTP (Cost oil limit ffective cost recovery ceiling is 80%

's profit oil share is 65%

profit oil share is 35%

rate = 40% (consist of 25% income olding tax). Levied on income less ciations.

declining balance with 25% rate.

DMO holiday, contractor should sell de oil at 25% of market price to the

<b>Base-case Results</b>					
Profitability	Large Field	Medium Field	Small Field		
Indicators	(Field A)	(Field B)	(Field C)		
Pre-tax NPV	3,032	1,114	455		
(\$million)					
Pre-tax IRR	24.3%	23.9%	22.7%		
Post-tax NDV	571	152	5 /		
(\$million)	371	100	J. <del>4</del>		
Post-tax IRR	14.1%	12.8%	10.2%		
Government Take	68.6%	68.7%	69.6%		

#### **Share of Economic Rents**



# Conclusion

- Flexibility and neutrality are not yet present in Indonesia's PSC deep water oil fiscal term.
- Government fails to optimally collect the economic rent from oil field exploration and development activities.
- The current fiscal term discourage investments in marginal fields.

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