
# **Decommissioning Contracts for Wells and Removals**

### **Anna Sutherland**

### **Motivations**

- UKCS decommissioning expenditure forecast at £10.4bn over next 8 years
- Removals and wells account for over 60% of total




Deterministic cost model to calculate base costs

 Monte Carlo analysis to simulate cost risks (assumed higher probability of cost overrun) and calculate expected operator payment and contractor profit

### Results


• For both activities, profit and payment highest under reimbursable and lowest under lump sum.

### **Removals: Expected Profit & Payment**



• Reimbursable returns the greatest (least) cost variability to operator (contractor)

### **Removals: Coefficient of Variation**



Incentivised contracts share the cost risks

• These stages are outsourced to specialist third party contractors

 Traditional contracts allocate 100% of cost risk to either contractor or operator

**Objective:** To identify efficient contracts for wells and removals which share risks and control costs

## **Methodology**

- 5 contracts analysed:
- ➤2 'traditional' : Lump sum ,Reimbursable
- ➤3 risk/reward sharing : Incentivised Fixed Price,

Incentivised Reimbursable, Incentivised Reimbursable

**Slab Basis** 


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Wells: Coefficient of Variation

## **Conclusions**

•Including a bonus/penalty element results in risk sharing



• Offshore activities are inherently risky, therefore the three risk/reward contracts are preferable to either lump sum or reimbursable

 Bonus schemes should be implemented to incentivise cost control

•Penalties should be used sparingly to encourage development of the service sector

• By developing capabilities and capacity in the service sector, total economic value can be generated from decommissioning