
# Economic Evaluation of Trinidad and Tobago's Fiscal Regime for the **Development of Marginal Gas Fields**

Aazara Gazalie

# **Motivation**

□ Natural gas production in T&T has been declining since 2010 due to diminishing gas reserves and supply disruptions by upstream suppliers for major maintenance works.



### Located offshore T&T are **30 undeveloped marginal gas fields.**

Working Definition for a Marginal Gas field in T&T is one with a reservoir size between 60 and 500 Bcf

Production from marginal gas fields would help to alleviate the current decline in production.


### **Research Questions**

- 1. Do Trinidad and Tobago's PSCs incentivise the development of marginal gas fields under the current environment?
- Are the current PSC economic terms regressive, progressive or proportional?
- 3. How can the terms of the PSC be changed to incentivise marginal gas field development?

# Methodology

□ 3 Model Gas Fields: Small 100 Bcf, Medium 250 Bcf, Large 500 Bcf

ro calcula	Analysis: te NPV, IRR, /I, GT%		Ar (Mc	babilistic nalysis onte Carlo nulations)
	Key Model Assumptions	Small	Medium	Large
Deterministic	Reserves (Bcf)	100	250	500
	Development Costs (\$/boe)	12	10	8
	Operating Costs(% of devex)	7.75	7	6.25
	Abandonment Costs (% of devex)	10	10	10
	Gas Price (\$/mmbtu)	5		
	Discount Rate (%)	10		
Fiscal	Cost Recovery Limit (fixed)	50%		
	Government's share of Profit Gas (biddable)	52% - 68%, increasing with production		



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
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ial Criteria	Small (100 Bcf)		Medium (250 Bcf)		Large (500 Bcf)	
	Pre-tax	Post-tax	Pre-tax	Post-tax	Pre-tax	Post-tax
PV @ 10% on)	39	-47	154	-49	478	42
RR (%)	18%	-2%	22%	5%	32%	12%
PV/I @ 10%	0.20	-0.24	0.39	-0.13	0.80	0.07

Pre-tax, all fields are profitable.


□ Post-tax, only the large field is profitable based on positive NPV and IRR>10%, but has low NPV/I.

□ Huge difference between pre-tax and post-tax returns; major shift of the burden of the project risks towards the investor.

### Sensitivity Analysis




- Development costs and Gas price have the **most** influence on pre-tax and post-tax NPV.
- Rank changes on a post-tax basis due to the impact of the PSC terms, particularly the 50% cost recovery limit.



□ PSC terms are initially <u>regressive</u> in relation to price changes, but proportional or even progressive at higher prices.


### **Probabilistic Analysis**

and Gas price



# **Modifications to PSC Terms**

□ Scenario 1: Increase cost recovery limit to 80% □ Scenario 2: Reduce Government's share of Profit Gas (40%-50%) □ Scenario 3: Combination of Scenarios 1 & 2



- recovery.

## Conclusion

- directly targeted on economic rents.
- increase production from marginal fields

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□ 4 Stochastic variables: Reserves, Development costs, Operating costs

□ Scenario 3 generated the most profitable investments. □ Increased cost recovery ceiling and reduced GT provides the contractor with a greater share of PSC revenues and hence, faster cost

□ T&T's PSCs discourage the development of marginal gas fields under the current environment; they are economically inefficient and not

□ Fiscal terms are very regressive; 50% cost recovery prevents the contractor from achieving payback from the investment.

A change to the fiscal system is necessary to encourage investors and

□ Higher cost recovery ceiling and reduced GT are highly recommended.