

Migration and Community Formation under Conditions of Globalization

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This article sets out to rethink the dynamics of the migratory process under conditions of globalization. Two main models of migration and incorporation dominated academic and policy approaches in the late twentieth century: first, the settler model, according to which immigrants gradually integrated into economic and social relations, re-united or formed families and eventually became assimilated into the host society (sometimes over two or three generations); second, the temporary migration model, according to which migrant workers stayed in the host country for a limited period, and maintained their affiliation with their country of origin. Globalization, defined as a proliferation of cross-border flows and transnational networks, has changed the context for migration. New technologies of communication and transport allow frequent and multi-directional flows of people, ideas and cultural symbols. The erosion of nation-state sovereignty and autonomy weakens systems of border-control and migrant assimilation. The result is the transformation of the material and cultural practices associated with migration and community formation, and the blurring of boundaries between different categories of migrants. These trends will be illustrated through case-studies of a number of Asian and European immigration countries. It is important to re-think our understanding of the migratory process, to understand new forms of mobility and incorporation, particularly the emergence of transnational communities, multiple identities and multi-layered citizenship.

International migration suddenly became a key issue in international politics at the beginning of the 1990s, when the breakdown of the bi-polar power constellation of the Cold War seemed to have opened the floodgates for vast new population flows. Right-wing politicians and sensationalist media conjured up images of welfare states being 'swamped' and national identities being undermined by mass movements of impoverished people from East to West and South to North. Governments responded with tight border restrictions and international control measures such as the Schengen Agreement. In the meantime, exaggerated fears have died down, but issues of migration regulation and the effects of migration on both sending and receiving societies remain prominent in political and academic discourse. It is now widely rec-

ognized that cross-border population mobility is inextricably linked to the other flows that constitute globalization, and that migration is one of the key forces of social transformation in the contemporary world. This makes it vital to understand the causes and characteristics of international migration as well as the processes of settlement and societal change that arise from it.

In this article, I will start with a brief discussion of conceptual issues of migration research, and then focus on two main areas: likely trends in international migration in the years ahead, and perspectives for migrant settlement and their consequences for multicultural societies and transnational communities. I will concentrate on receiving countries, but it is not possible to do so exclusively, as migration is a major force of transformation in countries of origin, and therefore affects their international situation and their relations with receiving countries. Moreover, many countries are both sending and receiving countries for different types of migrants, or are in the process of transition from the one type to the other. Migration, development and international relations are thus closely linked (Castles, 1999, 2000a, 2000b).

INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION AS A SYSTEMIC FACTOR IN GLOBALIZATION

The upsurge of interest in migration in recent years obscures the fact that migrations of various kinds were always key factors in colonialism, industrialization and nation-building (Archdeacon, 1983; Cohen, 1987; Moch, 1992; Noiriél, 1988; Potts, 1990). In the post-1945 period, labor migration played a crucial part in the growth and restructuring of industrial economies (Castles and Miller, 1998), while forced migration was an inevitable result of processes of state formation and economic change under conditions of system competition and neo-colonialism (Zolberg *et al.*, 1989). Thus the public interest in migration in the early 1990s represented a shift in perception, rather than in the real significance of the phenomenon. Migration is clearly a systemic element in processes of globalization, but this is merely a new form of a systemic role that has existed in various guises ever since the beginnings of the capitalist world market around the sixteenth century.

Understanding the key role of population mobility and its corollary – processes of community formation leading to social and cultural change – is important for assessing future perspectives. Yet, if one looks back over the last half-century, the most striking feature is the failure of policymakers and analysts to anticipate actual developments. The settler nations of the New World expected modest continuing immigration from their traditional European

source countries. The new settlers were seen – often quite explicitly – as a bulwark against cultural change and the perceived threat of non-white immigration. Western European industrial countries saw migration from Southern Europe as a source of temporary manual labor for a boom that was not thought likely to last. Settlement was not expected, with a few exceptions based on demographic factors (France) and post-colonial political regimes (France, Britain and the Netherlands). No one foresaw enduring flows of migration from increasingly diverse source countries and the resulting emergence of multicultural societies. Yet this is what happened throughout the developed world. The result has been unprecedented social and cultural change. The consequences for national identity and political institutions are still being worked through.

There were perhaps two main reasons why policymakers and academics got it so wrong in the past. First, migration research has been plagued by entrenched assumptions and preconceptions. Problems include rigid disciplinary boundaries; paradigmatic closure between such approaches as neo-classical theory, historical-institutional analysis, social networks theory and ethnographic research; and compartmentalization between social-scientific and policy discourses. The main blinkering factor has probably been the influence of national models based on distinct historical experiences of migration and nation-building. Because border control is at the core of notions of sovereignty, policymakers have often seen migration as something that could be turned on and off like a tap in response to assumed national interests (Castles, 2000e). The result has been a fragmentation of migration research and a failure to accumulate an agreed body of knowledge (Massey *et al.*, 1998; Massey *et al.*, 1993). Of course, to some extent this is because ‘migration is too diverse and multifaceted to be explained by a single theory’ (Arango, 2000). Another result has been migration policies that often achieved the opposite of their original objectives.¹

Second, migration policymakers and analysts have paid little attention to human agency. Both the methodological individualism of neo-classical approaches and the legal positivism of bureaucrats have ignored the character of migration as a collective process based on the needs and strategies of families and communities. The rationality of family survival strategies has often

¹Examples include the German policy of importing temporary labor that actually led to settlement and formation of new ethnic minorities; or the Australian policy of bringing in European settlers to keep Australia white and monocultural that actually led to a multiracial and multicultural society. Similarly, current labor migration policies in the industrializing countries of East and Southeast Asia are likely to have unforeseen results (Castles, 2000d).

turned confounded the predictions of economic theories. Legal and bureaucratic obstacles to migration and settlement have been seen not as absolute barriers, but as factors to be taken into account in personal strategies, migration networks and community infrastructures.

Any attempt to forecast likely future patterns of migration and settlement needs to take account of the great economic and social transformations of our epoch, as well as the way in which ordinary people cope with these shifts, and in so doing often subvert the plans of the mighty. The systemic role of migration in modern society can be seen as a constant, but its character changes in the context of economic and social shifts and developments in technology and culture. It is therefore necessary to examine the specific characteristics of migration under current conditions. Globalization is not just an economic phenomenon: flows of capital, goods and services cannot take place without parallel flows of ideas, cultural products and people. These flows tend increasingly to be organized through transnational networks of the most varied kinds, ranging from intergovernmental organizations and transnational corporations through to international NGOs and global criminal syndicates (Held *et al.*, 1999). Globalization undermines many of the core features of the nation-state. It means, as Manuel Castells puts it, a change in the spatial organization of the world from a 'space of places' to a 'space of flows' (Castells, 1996:Ch. 6).

International migrants have, by definition, always crossed national borders. But in previous times the assumption has been either that they would permanently move from one nation-state to another (permanent settlement migration), or that they would return home after a period (temporary labor migration). In either case, the sovereignty and power of the nation-state was not questioned. Under conditions of globalization, such expectations lose their validity.

- Migration tends to increase and migrants to become more diverse in social and cultural characteristics. States do their best to encourage certain types (skilled and entrepreneurial migration) and stop others (unskilled labor migration and asylum-seekers) but find it hard to make clear distinctions and to enforce rules.
- New developments in information and transport technology increase the volume of temporary, repeated and circulatory migration.
- Increasing numbers of migrants orient their lives to two or more societies and develop transnational communities and consciousness.
- Such trends are linked to the increasing strength of informal networks as a mode of communication and organization which transcends

national borders. This can undermine state control policies and reduce the efficacy of traditional modes of migrant incorporation into society.

Clearly, international migration fits extremely well with the logic of globalization. This is why control strategies based on an older national logic are likely to fail. Migrants have in a sense always moved in what Thomas Faist calls 'transnational social space' (Faist, 2000), but under conditions of globalization it becomes increasingly easy for them to do so. This is the context for understanding likely future developments.

PERSPECTIVES FOR INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION

The Volume and Significance of Migration

UN figures show that about 120 million people were resident outside their country of birth in 1990, and that the number of international migrants was growing only slightly faster than world population as a whole (Zlotnik, 1999). Even allowing for faster growth in the 1990s and for the fact that many temporary migrants return home after a period abroad, this indicates that international migrants are a minority of 2–4 percent of global population. Some analysts therefore argue that the real task for social scientists is to explain why so many people stay at home when there appear to be sound reasons to move (Arango, 2000:293). This is indeed an important issue, but in my view the volume of migration is significant, and is likely to increase.

One reason for the significance of migration lies in its concentration in certain areas where it becomes a key factor in social transformation. The UN study shows that 90 per cent of the world's migrants were living in just 55 countries. In absolute terms, most migrants move between less-developed countries: 55 percent of all migrants in 1990. But in relative terms, the developed world has been far more affected by immigration: 4.6 percent of the population of the developed countries were migrants in 1990, compared with 1.6 percent in developing countries. The immigrant share in total population was highest in Oceania (17.8%) followed by North America (8.6%) and Western Europe (6.1%). The immigrant share in population was far lower in Asia (1.4%), Latin America and the Caribbean (1.7%) and Africa (2.5%) (Zlotnik, 1999). In the 1980s and 1990s, flows from less-developed to developed countries grew rapidly, despite attempts by receiving countries to restrict such movements. In addition, there have been large flows of labor migrants from the least developed countries of the South to the newly-industrializing countries (NICs), especially in East Asia.

Migration affects certain areas within both sending and receiving countries more than others. As migratory chains develop, large proportions of the young men and women of specific villages or neighborhoods leave, which may lead to local labor shortages as well as major changes in family and community life. In immigration countries, newcomers become concentrated in industrial areas and urban centers where there are chances of employment and where previous migrants can provide help with settlement. In Europe, North America and Australasia, virtually all major cities have large concentrations of immigrants. Typically, certain neighborhoods become centers of immigrant settlement, marked by distinctive businesses, associations, social facilities and places of worship. Such neighborhoods are the basis for ethnic community formation and cultural and linguistic maintenance.

Causes of Migration

Much migration research has focused on the causes of migration. These debates cannot be summarized here, but clearly are central to any assessment of likely future. However, it seems to me that, despite major conceptual differences, all the major theories lead to the conclusion that migration is likely to grow.

Demographic explanations point to the structural disparities between areas with stagnant economies but high rates of fertility, and areas with fast-growing economies but declining fertility (Hugo, 1998). The most dramatic case is Western and Southern Europe, where total fertility rates have fallen as low as 1.2 children per woman – far below the number needed to reproduce the population. The result is a rapidly aging population and a lack of people of working age, leading to severe labor shortages, particularly in low-skilled jobs. Just south across the Mediterranean are the countries of North Africa with their high fertility, rapid rates of labor force growth, and lack of jobs for the new entrants. The result is strong pull and push factors, encouraging young workers to migrate northwards, despite the legal barriers put up by ‘fortress Europe.’ Japan is a similar case: the collapse of fertility and the aging of the population make restrictions on overseas labor recruitment hard to sustain: who will do the ‘3-D jobs’ (dirty, demanding and dangerous) if foreign workers are not allowed in? Recent debate on the need for foreign women workers for aged care indicate that restrictions may soon be revised (Hirano *et al.*, 2000).

Neo-classical economics – which has had a dominant influence on migration policy in many Western countries – focuses on individual expecta-

tions of higher wages and better economic opportunities in destination areas compared with the place of origin. The income gap between poor and rich countries should be sufficient reason to make a 'rational choice' to migrate. In this free market model, international migration should in the long run lead to convergence of wage levels in sending and receiving countries, and thus to a long-term decline in migration. The shortcomings of this model in explaining actual movements have been repeatedly shown (*see* Castles and Miller, 1998:Ch. 2; Massey *et al.*, 1993). Moreover, it is clear that wage equilibrium does not in fact result, for income disparities between developed and less-developed countries continue to increase. In the terms of the neo-classical model, these growing disparities should lead to increased migration in the future.

The new 'economics of migration' approach puts more weight on collective elements in migration decision-making: migration is part of family and community survival strategies, and is shaped by long-term considerations of security and sustainability, as well as by the role of remittances and investment opportunities (Stark, 1991; Taylor, 1999). On this basis, we should also expect migration to increase in the future, since the high degree of insecurity in many areas of origin makes it highly rational to send a family member to a different and hopefully more stable economy. Adepoju shows that migration in Africa is closely linked to family strategies of high investment of their scarce resources in the education of one family member – usually the oldest male child. Since crisis-ridden local economies make it hard to realize the benefits of this investment, the result is often emigration in search of better conditions in other African countries (such as the Republic of South Africa or Gabon), or an attempt at illegal migration to the North. Similarly, migration may be a rational attempt to mitigate the dramatic effects of structural adjustment programs on the family. Such programs typically lead to cuts in education and health systems, and to reduction of employment opportunities, making emigration a 'coping mechanism of last resort' (Adepoju, 2000:385).

Historical-institutional approaches emphasize the role of large-scale institutions, particularly corporations and states, in initiating and shaping migratory flows. Mass recruitment of labor by capital and labor market authorities was a key factor in bringing about migration to Western Europe after 1945. Similarly, contract labor systems have been crucial in migration to the Gulf oil countries and to some Asian countries like Taiwan, Malaysia and Singapore. Even in the United States, with its emphasis on market forces, the

state played a major part in initiating labor flows from Mexico and the Caribbean through wartime labor recruitment programs. The emphasis on the role of the state in the historical-institutional approach might lead one to think that migration could be curtailed if state strategies change. Such beliefs have always been the basis of guestworker systems, and still underpin ideas of legal and bureaucratic regulation of migration. However, experience has shown that migratory movements, once started, develop their own dynamics and cannot easily be stopped. An important reason for this lies in interest conflicts between powerful groups in receiving countries. For instance, when the Malaysian government sought to repatriate large numbers of migrant workers during the Asian Crisis of 1997–99, plantation owners quickly intervened, claiming that they could not function without migrant workers. This led to a watering down of restrictive policies (Pillai, 1999). Similar interest conflicts can be found in the United States, where farm employers lobby for the right to employ Mexican laborers, or in Germany where employers point out that they cannot get local workers for the construction industry.

Sociological explanations of migration focus on the importance of cultural and social capital. Cultural capital refers to knowledge of other societies and the opportunities they offer, as well as information about how to actually go about moving and seeking work elsewhere. Clearly, globalization helps make this cultural capital available by beaming images of Western lifestyles into the most remote villages. Improved literacy and basic education also contribute to the ability to move. Social capital refers to the connections needed to migrate safely and cost-effectively. It is well known that most migrants follow ‘beaten paths’ and go where their compatriots have already established a bridgehead, making it easier to find work and lodgings, and deal with bureaucratic obstacles. Older migration scholars spoke of ‘chain migration,’ while in recent years much emphasis has been put on ‘migration networks’ and the way these develop as links between communities at home and in destination areas. These networks are much facilitated by the improved communications and transport technologies of globalization, and are therefore gaining in strength and salience. Networks are a further factor that helps sustain and transform migration when the original cause of a movement is removed. For instance, when the German government stopped labor migration from Turkey in 1973, flows continued and grew in the shape of family reunion, asylum-seekers and illegal migrants which all used transit paths and community infrastructures established in the previous period (Martin, 1991).

A full explanation of contemporary migration would need to combine all these – and other – explanations, and show how the various aspects interact in a dynamic process. Many other elements could be added, such as the way labor migration often paves the way for development of commercial activities, so that new migrant or ethnic middle-classes emerge. Another important issue is the way in which migration has become ‘a diverse international business, wielding a huge budget, providing hundreds and thousands of jobs worldwide, and managed by a set of individuals, agencies and institutions each of which has an interest in promoting the business’ (Salt and Clarke, 2000:327). The emergence of this migration industry, which ranges from major banks and travel agencies through to illegal traffickers, is a major factor sustaining migratory movements in the face of attempts at restriction.

The combined effect of all the causes of migration outlined is that international migration seems set to continue growing in the future. Indeed, as globalization reduces barriers to flows, it seems likely that the rate of increase in migration may accelerate. This does not imply that national and international attempts at migration control are irrelevant. They may well influence the size and character of flows to specific destinations. However, it seems unlikely that attempts to radically curtail migration can succeed in the face of the powerful forces which bring about flows.

Types of Migration

People have always migrated for a variety of reasons. However, in the last half-century, three types of primary migration have been most common: permanent settlement migration, temporary labor migration and refugee movement. Each of these often led to family reunion, which often became the largest flow as a movement matured. The tendencies of the last two decades have been towards a diversification, proliferation and intermingling of types of flows.

Highly-skilled migration is the type of migration currently most popular with governments of receiving countries. Since the 1980s, the United States, Canada and Australia have set up privileged entry systems to attract entrepreneurs, executives, scientists, professionals and technical specialists. More recently, Western European and some East Asian countries have followed suit (Findlay, 1995). Attracting Indian IT professionals has become a global competition, while the health services of countries like Britain could not run without doctors and nurses from Africa and Asia. This type of migration can represent a ‘brain drain’ – that is a transfer of human capital from

poor to rich countries – but may also bring about technology transfer and cultural innovation for areas of origin. Since poor countries continue to turn out more graduates than they can employ, while rich countries continue to prune their education budgets, such migration looks certain to grow.

Low-skilled migration was crucial to post-1945 industrial growth in most rich countries, but is now generally rejected on the grounds that it is economically unnecessary and socially harmful. NICs continue to import unskilled labor, often for construction or plantation industries. However, this often takes the form of systematic use of irregular migrants or asylum seekers, whose lack of rights makes them easy to exploit. It is one of the great fictions of our age that the ‘new economy’ does not need ‘3-D workers’ any more. The reality, as Saskia Sassen pointed out years ago (Sassen, 1988), is that global cities are based on dualistic economies, where the luxury consumption needs of elites create demand for new armies of low-skilled workers for construction, garment manufacture, food processing and service industries. The demographic and educational situation of local populations means that they cannot fulfil these roles, and low-skilled migrants are vital. Use of irregular migrants and asylum seekers has become a systemic need, which is covertly pursued by holders of economic and political power.

Forced migration is a broader term which fits better with current realities than the old notion of the individually persecuted refugee as laid down in the 1951 Geneva Convention. UNHCR-recognized refugees – about 13 million in 1997 (UNHCR, 1997) – are now far outnumbered by the other types of forced migrants: asylum seekers, internally displaced persons (IDPs), post-conflict returnees, people displaced by environmental and natural disasters, and development displacees (people who lose their homes and livelihoods due to large dams, industrial projects, infrastructure developments and so on). Prior to 1990, refugee policies were closely linked to Cold War interests. With the end of the bipolar world order, receiving countries became much less willing to accept refugees and asylum seekers. At the same time, conflicts linked to the changing international order led to vast new streams of forced migration in Europe, Africa and Central Asia. There seems little hope that the situation will improve in the foreseeable future, so that forced migration is likely to go on growing. Although most forced migrants remain in the poor countries of the South, attempts by a minority to reach the prosperous North have led to panic reactions. Draconian entry controls and restrictions on human rights and legal process have become threats to the new openness of the post Cold War world. Immigration authorities argue – correctly – that it

is impossible to clearly distinguish forced migrants from economic migrants. This is because the failure to build strong economies and viable states in certain regions is a structural aspect of globalization, which is expressed in both the form of impoverishment and conflict.

All the above forms of migration continue to lead to family reunion. In the 'classical immigration countries' it was – at least until recently – seen as axiomatic that immigrants of all types, once allowed to settle, should be entitled to bring in close dependents. This principle is now being eroded in Australia and elsewhere. In Western Europe, family reunion was not permitted under the labor recruitment systems of the 1960s and early 1970s, but took place anyway. Contract labor systems in the Gulf oil states and East Asia prohibit family reunion, but there are signs that it is getting underway despite the rules. In Western Europe it was the strength of human rights and the welfare state that made family reunion unstoppable. In newer immigration countries these factors are less important, but lack of regulatory capacity together with the continuing structural need for certain types of labor may have similar effects (Kassim, 1998; Komai, 2000; Kondo, 2000).

All forms of migration have become closely linked and interdependent. Officially-encouraged flows tend to stimulate irregular movements. Permanent and temporary migration cannot be clearly separated and tend to stimulate each other. Under conditions of globalization, certain new types of migration are emerging, or older types are becoming more significant:

- One new type is the astronaut phenomenon, in which whole families move to countries like Australia and Canada for reasons of security or lifestyle, while the breadwinner returns to the country of origin for work, commuting back and forth across long distances. This type became prominent with regard to Hong Kong in the period preceding re-integration into the People's Republic of China (Pe-Pua *et al.*, 1998; Skeldon, 1994), but continues today affecting increasing numbers of countries.
- Return migration, though obviously not new, seems to be growing in volume as a result of trends towards temporary or circulatory migration. Return migrants are important agents of economic, social and cultural change, and increasing attention is being paid to their possible role in development processes (Castles, 2000a; UN, 1998).
- Retirement migration is an emerging type of mobility closely linked to improvements in transport and communications. Increasing numbers of people from rich countries with relatively high living costs and unat-

tractive climates are seeking to spend their twilight years in more congenial surroundings. Western Europeans are moving to Southern Europe (King *et al.*, 2000), Japanese to Australia and New Zealand and North Americans to Latin America and the Philippines. This has considerable cultural impacts and also provides the basis for new service industries.

- Finally, mention should be made of posthumous migration – a phenomenon that reflects the cultural and psychological complexity of the migratory experience. Many migrants make plans to have their bodies returned to their native soil for burial (Tribalat, 1995:109–11). Even if the dream of return in old age proves a myth, at least the bond with the homeland can be re-asserted after death. Again, improvements in transport – not to mention refrigeration technology – are crucial.

PERSPECTIVES FOR MULTICULTURAL SOCIETIES AND TRANSNATIONAL COMMUNITIES

A core feature of the nation-state as it emerged in Western Europe and North America was its claim to manage ethnic difference through border control as well as through processes of cultural homogenization or subordination of minorities. As I argued in the previous section, border control is looking rather shaky: there are many reasons to believe that international migration will continue to grow in the years ahead, and that states and international bodies will find it hard to enforce restrictions. This brings me to the second main theme: to what extent will migrant settlement and community formation change under conditions of globalization? What will be the effects on social relations, culture, identity and politics in receiving countries? How will states seek to incorporate minorities and manage diversity? To answer these questions we can start by looking at shifts in modes of migrant incorporation over the last half-century.

Modes of Incorporation: The Western Society Convergence

Each immigration country has its own way of regulating the situation of newcomers, but – as I have argued elsewhere (Castles, 1995; Castles and Miller, 1998:244–50) – it is possible to summarize three main approaches to incorporation of immigrants into society: assimilation, differential exclusion and multiculturalism.

In older understandings of long-distance migration, newcomers were expected to move permanently and cut off links with their place of origin, so

that they and their descendants eventually became fully assimilated into the receiving society. As a mode of incorporation, assimilation means encouraging immigrants to learn the national language and to fully adopt the social and cultural practices of the receiving community. This involves a transfer of allegiance from the place of birth to the new country and the adoption of a new national identity. 'Farewell to old England for ever' was the refrain sung by emigrants leaving for the 'classical immigration countries' like the United States, Canada and Australia (Castles and Davidson, 2000:Ch. 7). Assimilationist approaches applied in somewhat different contexts in certain European immigration countries after 1945, especially to people coming to the 'motherland' from former colonies in the case of the UK, France and the Netherlands. Many sociologists (especially in the United States) have viewed assimilation as an inevitable and necessary process for permanent migrants (Alba and Nee, 1997; Gordon, 1964; Portes *et al.*, 1999). Assimilation leads logically to incorporation of immigrants and their descendants as new citizens.

However, not all immigrants have been seen as assimilable. Even the classical immigration countries have always differentiated on the basis of race (until recently), and of social and cultural background. Even the United States has had temporary migration schemes, like the Bracero Program for Mexican farmworkers. Moreover, not all immigration countries have tried to assimilate immigrants. Even prior to the industrial revolutions in Europe, practices of recruiting temporary migrant workers were common (Moch, 1992, 1995). In the late nineteenth century, such schemes became institutionalized in France, Germany and Switzerland with a high degree of control by the state and employers' organizations. In post-1945 Europe, 'guestworker' or temporary labor recruitment systems played a major role in labor market policies. 'Guestworkers' were meant to come from relatively proximate countries of origin – especially the European periphery – and had no right to family reunion or permanent stay. More recently, similar – if even more rigid – approaches have been used in Gulf oil countries and Asian NICs. I refer to this mode of incorporation as differential exclusion because it means that migrants are integrated temporarily into certain societal sub-systems such as the labor market and limited welfare entitlements, but excluded from others such as political participation and national culture. Citizenship is not an option. Since some of the temporary workers generally do stay despite official policies, the result is incorporation in a marginal legal and social situation.

However, both assimilation and differential exclusion share an important common principle: that immigration should not bring about significant

change in the receiving society. Such beliefs in the controllability of ethnic difference could be sustained in the past, but began to be questioned from the 1970s in Western immigration countries. In the 'guestworker' countries, temporary migrants were turning into settlers. Democratic states found themselves incapable of deporting large numbers of unwanted workers. Nor could immigrants be completely denied social rights, since this would lead to serious conflicts and divisions. The result was family reunion, community formation and emergence of new ethnic minorities. In classical immigration countries, the expectation of long-term cultural assimilation proved illusory, with ethnic communities maintaining their languages and cultures into the second and third generations. Immigrants began to establish cultural associations, places of worship and ethnic businesses – trends which soon also became important throughout Western Europe.

The result was the introduction of official policies of multiculturalism, initially in Canada (1971) and Australia (1973). In the United States, multiculturalism has a somewhat different meaning, linked to interpretations of the role of minorities in culture and history (Gitlin, 1995; Steinberg, 1995). Here pluralism was used to refer to acceptance of cultural and religious diversity for immigrants – generally in the private sphere rather than as government policy. Rather similar policies with varying labels (such as minorities policy in the Netherlands) soon followed in European immigration countries. In some cases they were introduced only in certain sectors, such as welfare or education, or at the municipal or provincial rather than the national level. In Asia, older forms of multi-racialism and communalism – often the result of colonial experiences – are important, but the idea of incorporating new ethnic groups as permanent residents or even citizens has not gained currency. It is seen by national elites as a threat to processes of nation-building. I have argued elsewhere that current trends towards settlement of migrants may question such principles in the long run (Castles, 2000c), but, at present, multiculturalism should be seen primarily as a Western society phenomenon.

Multiculturalism implies abandoning the myth of homogenous and monocultural nation-states. It means recognizing rights to cultural maintenance and community formation, and linking these to social equality and protection from discrimination. The term multiculturalism declined in popularity in the 1990s, possibly due to its overtones of state-led social engineering, but the notion of multicultural and multi-racial societies has become firmly entrenched in Western countries. There is widespread recognition that cultural and social changes brought about by migration are facts of life, which

must be recognized in various areas. This can be seen as one of the major impacts of immigration: in just a few generations, old myths of national uniqueness and homogeneity have been undermined. The cultural opening resulting from global diffusion of cultural and media products might have had similar effects, but migration has undoubtedly accelerated the process.

Yet, it is important to emphasize that multiculturalism can still be seen as a way of controlling difference within the nation-state framework, because it does not question the territorial principle. It implicitly assumes that migration will lead to permanent settlement, and to the birth of second and subsequent generations who are both citizens and nationals. Thus, multiculturalism maintains the idea of a primary belonging to one society and a loyalty to just one nation-state.

MIGRANT INCORPORATION UNDER CONDITIONS OF GLOBALIZATION: THE RISE OF TRANSNATIONAL COMMUNITIES

As discussed above, globalization leads to major changes in the character of international migration. The context for migrant incorporation has already changed radically and will continue to do so. The rise of multiculturalism itself is one sign of this, but is not the end of the story: new forms of identity and belonging go beyond multiculturalism. Most migration and settlement experiences still fit into one of the three models mentioned above (and often into a mixture of them) but, increasingly, important groups do not. At the dawn of the twenty-first century, globalization is undermining all the modes of controlling difference premised on territoriality. Increasing mobility; growth of temporary, cyclical and recurring migrations; cheap and easy travel; constant communication through new information technologies: all question the idea of the person who belongs to just one nation-state or at most migrates from one state to just one other (whether temporarily or permanently). These changes have led to debates on the significance of transnationalism and transnational communities as new modes of migrant belonging. Transnational communities are groups whose identity is not primarily based on attachment to a specific territory. They therefore present a powerful challenge to traditional ideas of nation-state belonging.

Transnational communities are not new, even if the term is. The diaspora concept goes back to ancient times, and was used for peoples displaced or dispersed by force (like the Jews, or African slaves in the New World), as well as for trading groups (the Greeks in Western Asia and Africa, or the Arab

traders who brought Islam to Southeast Asia), and labor migrants (Indians in the British Empire; Italians since the 1860s) (Cohen, 1997). Transnational communities appear to be proliferating rapidly at present. This trend can perhaps best be understood as part of processes of global integration and time-space compression. This is partly a technological issue: improved transport and accessible real-time electronic communication is the material basis of globalization. But above all it is a social and cultural issue: globalization is closely linked to changes in social structures and relationships, and to shifts in cultural values concerned with place, mobility and belonging. This is likely to have important consequences, which we are only just beginning to understand (Bauman, 1998; Castells, 1996; Held *et al.*, 1999). It is possible that transnational affiliations and consciousness will become the predominant form of migrant belonging in the future. This would have far-reaching consequences.

Transnational identities are complex and contradictory. They can take on a variety of forms, which may either complement existing modes of immigrant incorporation or work against these. If the primary loyalty of transnational communities is not to one nation-state or territory, what does it relate to? Here we come to an inherent tension in transnational theory. Transmigrants are sometimes portrayed as cosmopolitans capable of crossing cultural boundaries and building multiple or hybrid identities. But other theorists argue that transnational consciousness is based overwhelmingly on common ethnicity: transmigrants feel solidarity with co-ethnics in their homeland and elsewhere. In this approach, transnationalism appears as a revalorization of exclusionary ethnic identity, and transnational communities take on the form of exile diasporas, determined to establish their own nation-states.

We lack the empirical evidence for clear statements. There probably are highly cosmopolitan groups who feel at home everywhere – global business and professional elites might correspond with this image. There are also ‘nations without states’ based on forced dispersal, who mobilize politically to create or transform their homelands. But most members of transnational communities fall between these extremes, and probably have contradictory and fluctuating identities. A long tradition of oral history and migrant literature has shown how migrants have to negotiate their ways between complicated choices of return, assimilation and community formation. These are not exclusive options, and individuals and groups find creative ways of simultaneously adapting to and changing their social environments. The human agency they develop applies not only to overt political or social action, but also to strategies for everyday life.

The same applies to members of transnational communities. Individuals and groups constantly negotiate choices with regard to their participation in host societies, their relationships with their homelands, and their links to co-ethnics. Their life strategies bring together elements of existence in both national and transnational social space. There may be no exclusive loyalty to a specific territory, but transmigrants need political stability, economic prosperity and social well-being in their places of residence, just like anybody else. Successful transnational strategies are likely to involve adaptation to multiple social settings as well as cross-cultural competence. In a mobile world of culturally open societies, such capabilities should not be seen as threatening, but, on the contrary, as highly desirable. The notion of primary loyalty to one place is therefore misleading: it was an icon of old-style nationalism that has little relevance for migrants in a mobile world.

Transnational Communities and Global Cities

The ambiguous character of transnational communities and the ambivalence of their consciousness and identity is particularly evident when it is linked to discourses on global cities. The idea that immigrants may find their primary sense of identity at the level of the city, rather than the nation-state is implicit in some current research approaches, such as the Canadian Metropolis Program. As the boundaries of the nation-state become blurred and porous, there is a temptation to put increasing emphasis on sub-national belonging – that is to re-territorialize identity at the level of the city. Local social and political relations are seen as crucial, and local citizenship can be perceived as a substitute for diminishing chances for political influence at the national and supra-national levels.

This focus on the city can be seen as a reaction to critiques of multiculturalism as a policy actually encouraging divisions on the basis of ethnicity. It can be understood as an attempt to redefine transnational consciousness: the old diaspora, seen as ‘long-distance nationalism’ in ‘transnational virtual space’ can be replaced by ‘local transnationalism’ understood as the hybridization of cosmopolitan transnational communities sharing local territorial space (Ang, 2000). Hybridity rather than nationalism in global cities is an appealing perspective, but, again, it is far from clear that this is the most frequent outcome. Two problems need to be remembered.

The first is that cultural diversity in global cities does not in any way indicate equality or harmony between ethnic groups. Processes of differentiation based on class, race, gender and legal status lead to complex hierarchies

of privilege in global cities. Certain groups – both local and immigrant – have the chance of mobility into positions of high income, status and power, while others have to do the ‘3D-jobs,’ or are excluded altogether from the labor market. Portes and others have used the notion of ‘segmented assimilation’: immigrants do not get assimilated into society as a whole, but into a certain segment; in the United States it can be seen as assimilation as white, or assimilation as black (Portes *et al.*, 1999; Zhou, 1997). Major social issues arise where ethnicity or race becomes strongly linked to class and location – as can be observed not only in the ‘black ghettos’ of the United States, but also in the immigrant neighborhoods of European and Asian cities.

The second problem is that a focus on the city as the key site for inter-group relations can lead to misconceptions on its relative autonomy. The city is no more self-sufficient nor closed-off than the nation-state. Rather, it should be understood as a node where various types of global networks intersect. The transnational communities can be seen as one form of such networks. Thus, members of transnational communities are likely to have both transnational ethnic consciousness and local hybrid consciousness – in varying measures and at different times. Notions such as ‘code-switching’ and ‘negotiating identity’ (Kastoryano, 1996) are useful in understanding this.

The Significance of Transnational Communities for National Identity

Individuals and groups develop transnational linkages because these provide the best ways of dealing with the social situations and opportunity structures they encounter in the context of globalization. The states and civil societies of both sending and receiving countries do much to shape these contextual factors.

The governments of emigration countries often try to bind their expatriates to the homeland, because this can bring economic, political or cultural benefits. There is a long history of such efforts. For instance, the overseas Chinese have played an important role in political change at home, and both nationalist and communist Chinese governments have sought to control and mobilize the diaspora (Sinn, 1998). The Philippines government has special laws and programs to maintain links with nationals abroad – even when they take the citizenship of another state (Aguilar, 1999). The recent introduction of dual citizenship by the Mexican government was designed to keep the affiliations of the millions of citizens who have taken up residence and citizenship in the United States. Such measures are likely to strengthen transnationalism on the part of migrants.

Immigration countries also influence transnational community forma-

tion in various ways, both negative and positive. Practices of exclusion, discrimination or forced assimilation against immigrants can prevent integration and encourage a homeland orientation. In such cases, enclave communities with their own economic, cultural and political infrastructures may emerge. Where immigrants experience marginalization or racism, their best chance of success lies in mobilizing community solidarity and transnational links – a sort of ‘reactive ethnicity.’ Interestingly, Portes argues that transnational activities can in the long run empower low-status immigrants, and help them to secure better living standards and education for their children – leading to a better chance of assimilation in the future (Portes *et al.*, 1999). More positive attitudes on the part of immigration countries can also encourage transnational communities. Policies that accept linguistic and cultural maintenance are conducive to transnational linkages. On the other hand, anti-discrimination policies make it easier for immigrants to succeed in mainstream society. Since these are both aspects of multicultural policy, it seems that multiculturalism does not automatically encourage transnationalism, but perhaps gives immigrants more choice on the degree to which they want to carry out cross-border activities.

Thus, both discrimination and multiculturalism can lead to transnational communities – but of different types. Discrimination leads to closed-off communities, which are relatively isolated in their country of residence and compensate through transnational linkages. This may have negative effects on social cohesion and citizenship. Multiculturalism leads to cosmopolitan communities, which negotiate both local and cross-border linkages, bringing benefits in terms of cultural openness and economic opportunities. This type of transnational community is not likely to undermine national identity and citizenship, but may bring about transformations in their character.

Transnational Communities and Citizenship

Nation-state citizenship was the adequate form for a world of relatively autonomous nation-states. Such citizenship was meant to be singular and exclusive, and naturalization was seen as an exceptional and irreversible act implying loss of the original citizenship. But this model is no longer appropriate for a world in which flows are replacing places as the key loci of economic and social organization. If people move frequently between different countries, and maintain important affiliations in each of them, citizenship needs to be adapted to the new realities.

In fact, this is already happening. Over the last thirty years, virtually all Western countries have changed their citizenship rules in response to immigration and settlement. In many cases this has meant a shift away from *jus sanguinis* (citizenship through descent), which tends to exclude immigrants and their descendants, towards more inclusive forms of citizenship based on *jus soli* (citizenship through birth in the territory) and *jus domicilii* (citizenship on the basis of residence) (Aleinikoff and Klusmeyer, 2000; Castles and Davidson, 2000:Ch. 4).

Dual (or multiple) citizenship is a key issue for migrants, because it is the best way of recognizing multiple affiliations and identities. In recent years many countries have changed their laws and about half the world's countries now recognize dual citizenship (Vertovec, 1999:455). Emigration countries do so as a way of binding emigrants to the home country, because this brings benefits in the forms of remittances, technology transfer, political allegiance and cultural maintenance. Immigration countries do so as a way of improving the social integration of minorities, and preventing the linking of ethnicity with social disadvantage, which is at the root of ethnic conflicts and racism. This is why even former 'guestworker' importing countries have now changed their laws. The new German citizenship law of 1998 is a significant milestone because it represents an important move towards the *jus soli* principle. However, such changes are not on the agenda in more recent Asian immigration countries like Malaysia and Japan, where policymakers still believe that settlement will not take place.

Again there is an empirical deficit. Nobody seems to know how many dual citizens there are, nor what proportion of the population they make up. In Germany – a country which still officially rejects dual citizenship – there are thought to be up to two million dual citizens. In Australia there may be 3–5 million – up to a quarter of the population (Zappalà and Castles, 2000). Overall, dual citizens are a small minority, but a fast-growing one, with great potential significance.

The growth of transnational communities may in the long run lead to a rethinking of the very contents of citizenship. Differentiated forms of state membership may be needed to recognize the different types of relationships transmigrants have with different states – such as political rights in one place, economic rights in another and cultural rights in a third (Bauböck, 1994; Bauböck and Rundell, 1998). In practice, this already happens when immigration states create forms of 'quasi-citizenship' or 'denizenship' (Hammar, 1990) by granting rights with regard to residency, employment or welfare to

specific groups of immigrants. But such practices have developed in a piecemeal way, without much consideration of their long-term consequences for citizenship.

These debates are too complex to pursue further here. Moreover, they raise difficult questions about the future of democracy under conditions of globalization. Democratic government in modern polities focuses primarily on the nation-state. Yet more and more of the decisions that affect our lives are made at the supranational level. Global and regional governance is rapidly gaining in significance, yet transnational democratic institutions hardly exist – with a few limited exceptions such as the European Union. In the future, then, we need to think about the transnational form of democratic participation – not just for members of transnational communities, but for all citizens affected by the rapid shift in the location of political power.

INSTEAD OF A CONCLUSION: BACK TO BABY-FARMING?

In 1729, the Irish clergyman and satirist Jonathan Swift put forward a novel solution to the economic problems of a society being ravaged by British colonialism: the poor should turn to ‘baby-farming,’ and earn a living by selling their children as fresh meat to the British landlords (Swift, 1955). Writing in the early 1980s, I suggested that baby-farming had indeed become a widespread practice not just in Ireland but also in many other countries on the periphery of areas of rapid economic growth. The difference was that the human exports sent to the booming industrial economies of Western Europe were consumed not as meat on the tables of the bourgeoisie, but as labor power in their factories (Castles *et al.*, 1984:1).

At the beginning of the twenty-first century, we can imagine a new type of ‘transnational baby farming’ as the core of the global migration scenario of the next fifty years. Less-developed countries excluded from the positive aspects of economic globalization would help compensate for the demographic deficits of the rich countries. The scenario would look something like this.

- Fertility rates will continue to plummet in rich industrial countries, leading to aging populations and shrinking labor forces. Increasing prosperity and improved education will mean that few local people will be available for low-skilled jobs.
- Certain areas of Africa, Asia and Latin America will suffer exclusion from the mainstream global economy, resulting in deepening poverty, conflict and chaos. Fertility and population growth will remain high – despite AIDS and other epidemics. Migration in search of work will

appear as the only way out for millions of people.

- Intermediate-level countries will experience uneven forms of industrialization and growth, but large countries like Brazil, Mexico, India and China will still have huge reserves of labor-market entrants. As education systems improve, many of these young workers will have high skill levels, but will be unable to find work at home.
- The rich countries will collaborate with each other and put pressure on the rest of the world to tighten restrictions on migration, especially of the low-skilled. Rigorous surveillance measures using new technologies will raise the human costs of migration, leading to thousands of deaths in the oceans, mountains and deserts which migrants try to traverse. But enough people will get through to encourage others to try.
- Rich countries and NICs will use unskilled migrants as the labor force for 3-D jobs, and, increasingly, for aged care. Some such workers will be brought in through contract labor systems which deny them basic rights, while many others will be illegal migrants or asylum seekers.
- The education systems of the intermediate countries will provide skilled workers of all kinds for the rich countries.
- In addition, since the populations of rich countries will have virtually ceased to reproduce, immigrants from intermediate countries – carefully selected on the basis of economic, cultural and cultural criteria which serve as surrogates for race – will be allowed to settle, form families and replenish the population.

Like all dystopias, this one is unlikely to come to pass in such a radical form – although it is based on real current trends. The main force undermining it, as in the past, will be the human agency of millions of migrants, as well as other members of both sending and receiving communities. Transnational communities resulting from migration will, through thousands of micro-strategies, seek security and humane conditions for their members. By doing this, they will probably become a major factor undermining the plans of the mighty. The future will probably be as messy as the past, and all predictions are likely to be wrong, but one thing is clear: there is no return to the neat idea of closed-off nation-states with homogenous national communities.

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