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Pluralism
 
 
 

The Pluralism project focuses on pluralist theories of truth, knowledge, existence and moral value. Generally speaking, the enterprise of locating the single essence of truth, knowledge, existence and moral value has been unsuccessful, so much so that the prevailing attitudes towards the projects tend to be those of indifference, such as deflationism about truth and Williamsonian primitivism about knowledge. Pluralist theories hope to rescue the thought that there are illuminating things to say about the essences of these phenomena, but aim to avoid the standard problems faced by suggesting that there may be more than one legitimate essence to truth, knowledge, existence and moral value, with the different essences tied to different domains of discourse (truth), projects of inquiry (knowledge), kinds of objects (existence) or moral sub-domains (moral value).

This project aims to scrutinise the motivations, forms, and implications of pluralism in these areas. It also examines the viability of a particular methodological approach to conceptual analysis, which forgoes the pursuit of standard analytical equivalences of the form ‘x is F = x is G’ in favour of ‘network analyses’ which aim to characterise concepts by locating their place in a relational network. Once a concept is located in the network, a list of features will be gleaned which any corresponding property must exhibit, and the broad pluralist thought is that these concepts will admit of multiple realization.

Project Keywords: pluralism, truth, knowledge, existence, moral value, deflationism, functionalism, network analysis, canberra plan, primitivism, contextualism, minimalism, mulitiple realization, conceptual analysis, concept/property distinction, expressivism, realism, anti-realism.

The Pluralism project is an NIP pilot project. You can view the schedule for the meetings on the 'This Week at NIP' page. For more information you can also contact the convener, Dr Douglas Edwards, at d.o.edwards@abdn.ac.uk.

 
 
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