Epistemology

• McGlynn, A. (forthcoming). Interpretation and Knowledge Maximization, Philosophical Studies (Link)
• Dodd, D. (forthcoming). Roger White's argument against imprecise credences, British Journal for the Philosophy of Science
• McGlynn, A. (forthcoming). Believing Things Unknown, Nous (Link)
• Dodd, D. (2012) Safety, skepticism, and lotteries, Erkenntnis 77:95-120. (Link)
• Zardini, E. (forthcoming), Luminosity and Determinacy, Philosophical Studies
• Zardini, E. (forthcoming), Knowledge-How, True Indexical Belief, and Action, Philosophical Studies
• Luzzi, F. (2012). Contextualism and Counter-Closure, dialectica 66(1): 187-199. (Link)
• Luzzi, F. (forthcoming). Interest-Relative Invariantism and Knowledge from Ignorance, Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 93(1): 31-42.
• Wright, Okasha and Chandler on transmission failure, Synthese 184(3)
• Reaber, G. (2012). Rational Feedback, Philosophical Quarterly 62, 797-819. (Link)
• Dodd, D. (2011). Against fallibilism, Australasian Journal of Philosophy 89: 665-85. (Link)
• Wright, C. (2011). Frictional Coherentism? A Comment on Chapter 10 of Ernest Sosa\'s Reflective Knowledge, Philosophical Studies 153(1): 29-41. (Link)
• Wright C. (2011) McKinsey One More Time, in Hatzimoysis, A. (ed.), Self-Knowledge, Oxford University Press, 80-104
• Dodd, D. (2010) Confusion about concessive knowledge attributions, Synthese 172: 381-96 (Link)
• Luzzi, F. (2010). Counter-Closure, Australasian Journal of Philosophy 88 (4): 673-683. (Link)
• Jenkins, C.S.I. (forthcoming) Justification Magnets. Philosophical Studies
• Jenkins, C.S.I. (forthcoming) Naturalistic Challenges to the A Priori. A. Casullo and J. Thurow (ed.s) The A Priori In Philosophy, OUP

Metaethics and Moral Psychology

• Edwards, D. (forthcoming) The Eligibility of Ethical Naturalism. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly. (Link)
• Plakias, A. (forthcoming). \'The Good and the Gross\' Ethical Theory and Moral Practice.
• Baker, C. (2011) Expressivism and Moral Dilemmas: A Response to Marino, Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 14(4), pp.445-455. (Link)

Metaphysics

• Edwards, D. (forthcoming) Truth as a Substantive Property. Australasian Journal of Philosophy. (Link)
• Berto, F. (forthcoming). Existence as a Real Property: The Ontology of Meinongianism, Synthèse Library (Link)
• Cotnoir, A. J. and Bacon, A. (forthcoming). Non-wellfounded Mereology. Review of Symbolic Logic. (Link)
• Cotnoir, A. J. (forthcoming). Composition as General Identity. Oxford Studies in Metaphysics, (eds.) K. Bennett and D. Zimmerman, Oxford University Press. (Link)
• Cotnoir, A. J. (forthcoming). Composition as Identity: Framing the Debate, in Composition as Identity, (eds.) A. J. Cotnoir and D. L. M. Baxter. (Link)
• Edwards, D. (forthcoming) Naturalness, Representation, and the Metaphysics of Truth. European Journal of Philosophy. (Link)
• Wright, C. (forthcoming). A Plurality of Pluralisms, in Pedersen, N and Wright, C (eds.), Truth Pluralism: Current Debates, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
• Berto, F., Tagliabue J. (2012), Cellular Automata. The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Link)
• Edwards, D. (2012) Alethic vs Deflationary Functionalism. International Journal of Philosophical Studies 20 (1): 115-124. (Link)
• Edwards, D. (2012) On Alethic Disjunctivism. dialectica, Vol. 66, Issue 1: 200-214. (Link)
• Berto, F. (2011). Modal Meinongianism and Fiction: the Best of Three Worlds, Philosophical Studies (Link)
• Pedersen, N. and Edwards, D. (2011) Truth as One(s) and Many: On Lynch\'s Alethic Functionalism. Analytic Philosophy, 52 (63): 213-30. (Link)
• Wright, C. (2011). The Pain of Rejection, the Sweetness of Revenge. Philosophical Studies, contribution to a book symposium on Mark Richard's When Truth Gives Out (Link)
• Berto, F. (2010). Impossible Worlds and Propositions: Against the Parity Thesis, The Philosophical Quarterly (Link)
• Cotnoir, A. J. (2010). Antisymmetry and Non-Extensional Mereology. Philosophical Quarterly, 60 (239): 396-405. (Link)
• Berto, F., Carrara, M. (2009). To exist and to Count, Dialectica (Link)
• Moruzzi, S. and Wright, C. (2009).Trumping Assessments and the Aristotelian Future, Synthese 166 (2): 309-331. (Link)

Philosophy of Language

• Dodd, D. (forthcoming) Counterfactuals and Chance: Reply to Williams, Analytic Philosophy. (Link)
• Edwards, D. (forthcoming) Truth, Winning, and Simple Determination Pluralism. In Truth and Pluralism: Current Debates (eds.) N. J. L. L. Pedersen and C. D. Wright. New York: Oxford University Press. (Link)
• Hale, B. and Wright, C. (forthcoming). Horse Sense, in May, R. and Parsons, C. (eds.), special number of Journal of Philosophy on Frege\\\'s Philosophy.
• Wright, C. (forthcoming). On the Characterisation of Borderline Cases, in Ostertag, G. (ed.) Meanings and Other Things: Essays on Stephen Schiffer, MIT press
• Wright, C. (forthcoming). A Note on 'The Problem of Non-Conclusiveness', in a special number of dialectica on the Philosophy of Paolo Casalegno, to be edited by Elisa Paganini.
• McGlynn, A. (2012). The Problem of True-True Counterfactuals, Analysis 72: 276-85 (Link)
• Baker, C. (2012). Indexical Contextualism and the Challenges from Disagreement, Philosophical Studies 157(1), pp.107-123. (Link)
• Edwards, D. (2012) Pluralist Theories of Truth, Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Link)
• Dodd, D. (2011) Quasi-miracles, typicality, and counterfactuals, Synthese 179: 351-60 (Link)
• Edwards, D. (2011) Simplifying Alethic Pluralism. The Southern Journal of Philosophy, 49 (1): 28-48. (Link)
• Dodd, D. and Sweeney, P. (2010) Indexicals and Utterance Production, Philosophical Studies, Volume 150:3, 331-348 (Link)
• Wright, C. (2010) The Illusion of Higher-order Vagueness, in Dietz R. and Moruzzi, S. (eds.), Cuts and Clouds Oxford University Press, 523-49 (Link)
• Wright, C. and Hale, B. (2010). Assertibilist Truth and Objective Content: Still Inexplicit?, in Weiss B. and Wanderer, J. (eds.), Reading Brandom: Making It Explicit, Routledge, 276-93.
• Cotnoir, A. J. (2009) Generic Truth and Mixed Conjunctions: Some Alternatives. Analysis 69.3: 473-479. (Link)
• Edwards, D. (2009) Truth-conditions and the nature of truth. Analysis, Vol. 69, No. 4: 684-688. (Link)
• Jenkins, C.S.I. (forthcoming) Merely Verbal Disputes. Erkenntnis (Link)

Philosophy of Logic

• Cotnoir, A. J. (forthcoming). Validity for Strong Pluralists. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research . (Link)
• Cotnoir, A. J. (forthcoming). Pluralism and Paradox, in Truth and Pluralism: Current Debates, (eds.) N.J. Pedersen and C.D. Wright, Oxford University Press. (Link)
• Cotnoir, A. J. (forthcoming). Nagarjuna's Logic. Analytic Philosophy and Asian Thought, (eds.) Y. Deguchi, G. Priest and K. Tanaka. (Link)
• Wright, C. (forthcoming). Comment on Paul Boghossian, 'The Nature of Inference', Philosophical Studies
• Berto, F. (2012). How to Rule Out Things with Words. In G. Restall, G. Russell (eds.), New Waves in Philosophical Logic, Palgrave Macmillan, pp. 169-89. (Link)
• Zardini, E. (forthcoming), Naive Modus Ponens, Journal of Philophical Logic
• Zardini, E. (forthcoming), First-Order Tolerant Logics, Review of Symbolic Logic
• Zardini, E. (forthcoming), Higher-Order Sorites Paradox, Journal of Philosophical Logic
• Zardini, E. (forthcoming), The Role of Utterances in Bradwardine Theory of Truth, Recherches de théologie et philosophie médiévales
• Hansen, C.S. (2012). A Kripkean Solution to Paradoxes of Denotation, in Lassiter, D., Slavkovik, M. (Eds.), New Directions in Logic, Language, and Computation, Springer, 212-220.
• Zardini, E. (2011), Truth without Contra(di)ction, Review of Symbolic Logic 4, 498-535.
• Sweeney, P. and Zardini, E. (2011) Vagueness and Practical Interest, in P. Egré, N. Klinedinst (eds.), Vagueness and Language Use. Palgrave Macmillan
• Berto, F. (2009). Impossible Worlds, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Link)

Philosophy of Mathematics

• Wright, C. (forthcoming). Frege and Benacerraf's Problem, in DiSalle, R., Frappier, M. and Brown, D. (eds.), Analysis and Interpretation in the Exact Sciences: Essays in Honour of William Demopoulos, Springer
• Berto, F. (2009). The Gödel Paradox and Wittgenstein\'s Reasons, Philosophia Mathematica (Link)
• Berto, F. (2009). There's Something About Gödel, Wiley-Blackwell, Oxford. (Link)
• Hale, B. and Wright, C. (2009). ‘Focus restored: Comment on John MacFarlane’s \'Double Vision\', Synthese 170 (3): 457-82. (Link)
• Hale, B. and Wright, C. (2009).The Metaontology of Abstraction, in Chalmers, D. et al. (eds.), Metametaphysics, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 178-212. (Link)
• Wright, C. (2009). The Metaphysics and Epistemology of Abstraction, in Hieke, A. and Leitgeb, H. (eds.), Reduction-Abstraction-Analysis 195-216 (Publications of the Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society: New Series, vol. 11) (Heusenstamm bei Frankfurt, Ontos Verlag)

Philosophy of Mind

• Wright, C. (forthcoming). Reflections on François Recanati's \'Immunity to Error Through Misidentification: What It Is and Where It Comes From\' in Prosser, S. and Recanati, F. (eds.), Immunity to Error Through Misidentification: New Essays, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
• Lalumera, E. (2010). Concepts are a functional kind. Comment on E. Machery's Doing Without Concepts, Behavioral and Brain Sciences 33: 217-218. (Link)
• Lalumera, E. (2010) Introduction (to a special issue on Concepts), dialectica 64(9): 1-9. (Link)
• Mazzone, M., Lalumera, E. (2010). Concepts. Stored or Created?, Minds and Machines 20(1): 47-68. (Link)
• Dodd, D (2009) Weakness of will as intention-violation, European Journal of Philosophy 17: 45-59 (Link)